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INTRODUCTION

The current system of corporate governance in the United States
is, at least in part, the product of fairly comprehensive state and
federal regulation. The existing rules relating to corporate governance are based on certain assumptions about the nature of corporations, corporate management, and corporate shareholders, including
the "inevitability" of shareholder passivity and directoral control.1 An
analysis of how corporations and corporate law have evolved and how
the changing patterns of corporate governance reflect this evolution
indicates that these assumptions may not be accurate.
The significance of any discrepancy between reality and the current

1. See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text (discussing almost nonexistent role of
shareholders in corporate governance under existing rules).
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corporate law paradigm lies in the increasing evidence that prevailing
corporate governance models are substantially flawed.2 Directors of
large American companies have been subject to increasing criticism
for acting out of self-interest,3 particularly in establishing or approving exorbitant executive compensation packages,4 deciding to acquire
other corporations,5 and responding to takeover attempts and tender
offers. 6 They are also criticized for inefficient decisionmaking.7 If
these criticisms are valid, they justify a reevaluation of the rules that
institutionalize the prevailing model of corporate governance in this
country.
Patterns of corporate control in American corporations share
tremendous similarities. As a matter of state law, directors in public
corporations have the ultimate say in the management of the
corporation.' While outside directors' are increasingly prevalent, °
a consistent pattern has developed where the dominant director,
usually the Chairman of the Board, also serves as the corporation's
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)."
Moreover, outside directors are
usually chosen based, at least in part, on perceptions about the extent

2. See infranotes 25-30 and accompanying text (finding that current corporate governance
models lead to inefficient use of property).
3. See infra part I.A.
4. See infra part II.A.1.
5. See infra part II.A.2.
6. See infra part II.A.3.
7. See infra part II.B.
8. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990) ("[T]he business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
direction of the board."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors."); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986) ("[T]he business of a
corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors .... ."); TEX. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.31 (West Supp. 1993) ("The powers of a corporation shall be exercised
by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed
under the direction of, a board of directors."). This pattern exists in both closely or publicly
held corporations. Thus, as a matter of state law, directors are given control over day-to-day
decisionmaking, although, as a practical matter, in publicly held corporations most of this
control is delegated to officers who comprise the executive management of the company. See
HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BuSINESS
ENTERPRISES §§ 223-226 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing officers' express and implied powers).
9. Outside directors, sometimes referred to as unaffiliated directors, are persons having
no other paid position with the corporation. They cannot be executive officers or employees
of the corporation. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 204 (stating that outside directors
must be non-officers). The American Law Institute's (AlI) proposed final draft of its Principles
of Corporate Governance sets forth a more rigorous and detailed definition of outside directors.
ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.34

(Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter ALl, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (discussing
"significant relationship" between outside directors and corporations).
10. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 204 (stating that most boards are two-thirds
outsiders and one-third insiders).
11. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 219.
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to which they are likely to be cooperative and receptive to management decisions.1 2 Because these patterns are so prevalent, it is
possible to address them as generalities, rather than by examining
particular structures established by individual corporations. If the
current patterns, including management"5 dominance and shareholder passivity, are not inevitable, and in fact have caused or
contributed to significant problems, we should explore the possibility
of modifying our regulatory regime to permit changes in the structure
of corporate governance. Although the SEC designed the recent
proxy amendments 14 to permit increased shareholder communication and to protect shareholder voting rights, they are no more than
small steps in the right direction. 5
The changes that this Article advocates are designed to permit large
shareholders a more active role in corporate governance. The
potential benefits of increased shareholder participation are based
primarily on practical concerns, but a theoretical basis for adjusting
the rules affecting the structure of corporate governance also
exists."
This Article considers both practical and theoretical
advantages to restructuring corporate governance models.
Part I provides a historical overview of shareholders and their role
in corporate governance in the United States. It describes the
evolving system of regulation affecting shareholders and management
and analyzes how the existing regulatory structure affects shareholder
participation in corporation governance.
Part II analyzes some of the problems that American corporations
have experienced due to the current approach to corporate governance. The principal focus is on problems that have an economic
impact on American corporations and on the shareholders of those

12. See infra notes 376-77 and accompanying text.
13. Many commentators appear to use the terms "management7 and "directors"
interchangeably because management dominates most boards.
Technically speaking,
management of most companies is comprised of senior officers and corporate executives, most
of whom are not directors. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 223 (discussing general
management functions of corporate officers). The company's chief executive officer, however,
is almost always responsible for the structure and activities of the board of directors, and for the
general structure of management operations as well. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, §
225. For that reason, it often makes sense to think of directors and management in American
companies as representing identical interests and sharing the same perspective.
14. 17 C.F.R- §§ 240.14a-1 to b-2 (1993).
15. The recent proxy amendments alleviate a few of the more oppressive restrictions with
regard to a public shareholder's access to information and ability to communicate with other
shareholders, but leave in place a large number of legal rules that preclude meaningful
shareholder participation in corporate governance.
16. See infra part III.A.2. (contending that shareholders are owners of corporation and
therefore ought to have role in corporate governance according to theoretical notions of
democracy).
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corporations.
Part III examines two related issues: whether permitting shareholders a greater role in corporate decisionmaking would produce any
real benefits; and whether sufficient numbers of shareholders have
the capability and the inclination to participate more actively in
corporate decisionmaking if regulations were modified to permit such
participation. This section also addresses some of the more common
objections to permitting shareholders a greater voice.
Finally, Part IV discusses various ways to revise existing regulations
to permit greater shareholder participation in corporate governance.
Specifically, this Article proposes changes thatwould give shareholders
the power to nominate directors, create a level playing field for
shareholder proposals, institute confidential proxy voting, and provide
shareholders with access to shareholder lists.
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA

A.

Growth of Corporationsand ShareholderPassivity

At the turn of the century, corporations became increasingly
prevalent and increasingly wealthy. 7 In turn, these corporations
were owned by increasing numbers of shareholders, more than ninety
percent of whom were individuals and many of whom came from the
middle class."8
These trends continued during the first three
decades of this century. 19
The most influential book documenting these trends and discussing
the ramifications of corporate growth was Berle and Means' The
Modern Corporation and Private Property.2"
Their statistical data
demonstrated both the growth of corporations and the increasing

17.

Cf RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

SINCE 1900, at 56-87 (1958) (outlining growth of financial intermediaries between 1850 and 1952
as example of growth of corporations generally during same time period).
18. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 17, at 60. As subsequent sections of this Article discuss, the
percentage of individual owners declined slowly over the next few decades. Id. But see Michael
Siconolfi, Individual Investors' Holdings of U.S. Stocks Fall Below 50% of Total Market for the First

Time, WAL ST.J., Nov. 13, 1992, at Cl (estimating that individuals accounted for 84% of stock
ownership in 1965). In more recent years, the rate of change increased. In 1980, individual
share ownership accounted for approximately 70% of equity interests in American companies.
Id. Today, individuals account for less than 50% of equity interests in U.S. companies. Id
19. See GOLDSMITH, supranote 17, at 56-87.
20. ADOLPH BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968). The book was the product of a collaboration that started in 1928,

when Adolf Berle,Jr., was appointed research director of a project funded by the Social Science
Research Council of America to investigate the impact of corporations on American society.

Gardner C. Means was hired to conduct a careful statistical analysis of the growth of large
corporations.

See Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporationand Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26

J.L. & ECON. 273, 274 (1983) (summarizing history behind Berle and Means' collaboration).
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dispersion of stock ownership in American corporations. Between
1909 and 1929, the value of assets held by non-financial corporations
increased from approximately $63 billion to $131.5 billion."'
Between 1900 and 1928, at the same time that corporations were
growing at an exponential rate, the number of people owning
corporate stock increased almost fourfold. 22 The number of small 23
24
shareholders also increased dramatically.
Relying on these statistical trends, Berle and Means reached a
number of conclusions. Their most influential conclusion was that
large corporations would almost inevitably experience a separation of
ownership from control. 25 Berle and Means then concluded that,
given this separation of ownership and control, the existing structure
26
of regulation affecting corporate governance was not satisfactory.
Berle and Means perceived the problem that shareholders had
accepted ownership of stock while giving up one of the traditional
indices of ownership-the right to control their property.27 Shareholders had agreed to become passive owners. 2' Berle and Means
believed that this passive ownership would lead to inefficient use of
the property.29 Economic theory justifies Berle and Means' fears.
Where the owners of an enterprise manage that enterprise, they have

21. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 36 tbl. III.
22. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 52 tbl. VIII (showing that number of U.S.
stockholders increased from 4.4 million to 18 million).
23. In this context, "small" refers both to the size of the economic investment by the
shareholder and the total economic wealth controlled by the shareholder. Small shareholders
owned a relatively insignificant fraction of the total shares of any corporation, and came from
the middle rather than the upper classes. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 59-60 (showing
distribution of stock ownership by income bracket).
24. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 59-60 (showing that, in 1929, corporations paid
approximately 26% of all corporate dividends to individuals earning less than $5000 in taxable
income per year, and approximately 51% of corporate dividends to persons with annual taxable
incomes under $25,000 per year).
25. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 6-7. Berle and Means viewed the separation of
control as a virtual prerequisite to the growth of large corporations. While they conceded that
it was possible to have exceedingly large corporations controlled privately, families or private
groups having "personal wealth... sufficient to finance great enterprises, are so few, that they
only emphasize the dependance of the large enterprise on the wealth of more than the
individual or group of individuals who may be in control." Id. at 6.
Berle and Means actually characterized these firms as quasi-public corporations, apparently
to distinguish them from corporations that were "public" in the sense of being operated by a
governmental entity. Id. For the purposes of this Article, the phrase "public corporation" will
be used as it is generally understood today-as short hand for a publicly owned corporation.
26. SeeBERLE & MEANS, supranote 20, at 10 (observing that existing corporate structure and
trends must be examined closely to understand structure needed for fusture).
27. BERLE & MEANS, supranote 20, at 304.
28. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 304 (concluding that equity interests in large
corporations were "passive property").
29. See BERLE & MEANS, supranote 20, at 115-16 & n.1 (citing pervasive mismanagement of
various railroads between 1900 and 1915 as evidence that management, left to its own devices,
would choose personal profit even at cost of bankrupting corporation).
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the classic profit motive to encourage efficient behavior; if they are
not efficient, they do not prosper. If owners are separate from
managers, and the managers have effective control, there is less
economic incentive to be efficient because profits are turned over to
the owners rather than retained by those in control.'0
The business community quickly accepted Berle and Means' vision
of corporate America as an accurate description of the way corporate
shareholders and directors interacted.
The community viewed
shareholders as passive, and directors as separate and distinct from
owners.3 2 The statistical evidence amassed by Berle and Means was
quite persuasive, and in the 1920s and 1930s, it was difficult to argue
that the typical shareholder in a large American corporation had
much to do with controlling or managing the corporation.3
B.

Regulation of Corporationsand Directors-Barriersto Shareholder
Participationin Corporate Governance

Berle and Means' study prompted reexamination of the regulations
affecting corporate governance structures. Legislatures and courts
could have responded to the trends Berle and Means documented by
treating corporate officers and directors as trustees acting for the
benefit of shareholders. 4 While this change might have alleviated
the concern that directors, as distinct and separate from shareholders,
did not have a sufficient economic stake in making efficient management decisions, the model of directors as trustees per se was never
adopted.3 5 Instead, the law attempted to institutionalize the ideal of

30. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 307-08 (applying Adam Smith's profit-motive
theories to corporations).
31. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of FiduciaryDuties: A Response
to the Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (1990); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying
Ownership and Controlin the Public Corporation,1989 WIS. L. REV. 881,894; Elliott Goldstein, Future
Articulation of CorporationLaw, 39 BUS. LAW. 1541, 1543-44 (1984).
32. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the AIl Corporate Governance
Projec 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1058 n.126 (1993) (stating that this is "world of passive
shareholders"); William J. Carney, The ALI's Corporate GovernanceProject: The Death of Property
Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 898,912-13 (1993) (recognizing passivity of shareholders); Aleta
G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managingthe Corporationfor the Long Tenn, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
513, 519 (1993) (noting that corporate managers dominate shareholders).
33. See BERLE & MEANS, supranote 20, at 246 (describing weak position of shareholders,
especially common shareholders). Of course, founding shareholders often retained vestiges of
control even in very large public corporations by virtue of having entrenched themselves or
those loyal to them in management positions.
34. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 219-43 (discussing pros and cons of treating
corporate officers and directors as trustees of shareholders).
35. See Hessen, supranote 20, at 278 (stating that ideal of directors as trustees roused little
support because it required close judicial supervision). In theory at least, it is true that directors
are fiduciaries for the shareholders or for the corporation, but the actual nature of directoral
duties has been so watered down that no one seriously contends that directors are held to the
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corporate democracy and to give more active control to shareholders. 6 Underlying this attempt was the belief that shareholders did
not participate in corporate management because it was difficult for
them to do so, and if corporations made shareholder participation
easier, shareholder behavior might change. 7
Based on the notion that shareholders needed better and more
information in order to assume some degree of effective control over
corporations, 8 Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933' 9 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The 1933 Act, which requires
full disclosure of facts relating to the sale or purchase of securities,
aims at allowing shareholders to make informed investment decisions.4" Unlike the 1933 Act, which focuses on disclosures in the
context of issuing and selling securities, the 1934 Act imposes
continuing disclosure obligations once a corporation has acquired a
group of public owners.42 Specifically, the 1934 Act authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt regulations
For very practical
governing proxies and proxy solicitation.'

utmost standard of care that typifies real fiduciary relationships. See, e.g., Louisiana World
Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that directors,
though fiduciaries, may be held liable to stockholders only for gross negligence); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (identifying corporate directors as fiduciaries, but
concluding that gross negligence is proper standard for judging their behavior); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 & n.6 (Del. 1984) (holding that corporate directors, as fiduciaries,
should be held to standards of gross negligence).
36. See Hessen, supra note 20, at 278 (contending that idea of returning control to
stockholders is more popular than holding directors up as trustees).
37. Hessen, supranote 20, at 278-79.
38. See BERLE & MEANS, supranote 20, at 253 (asserting that their original text "became the
foundation for the Federal legislation begun in 1933 and further developed later"); GeorgeJ.
Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L &
ECON. 237, 243-44 (1983) (asserting that The Modem Corporationwas powerful influence on
passage of Securities Exchange Act of 1933).
39. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1988).
42. For example, § 13(a) of the 1934 Act requires every issuer of a security registered on
an exchange to file with the exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
information that the SEC, by rule, designates as necessary to keep the information filed in the
registration statements "reasonably current," and to submit any annual and quarterly reports the
SEC prescribes. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988). The SEC, through Rule 13a-1, normally requires
corporations to file annual reports within 120 days after the close of the corporation's fiscal year.
17 C.FR. § 240.13a-1 (1992). The basic annual report form is Form 10-K, although the
Commission also requires corporations to submit copies of any annual report provided to
shareholders. See 17 C.F.R § 249.310 (1992). Rule 13a-11 also imposes current reporting
requirements on most issuers whenever certain specified events occur. 17 C.F.R § 240.13a-11
(1992).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988). The federal proxy rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1992), are those
regulations promulgated by the SEC relating to shareholder voting under the authority of §
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate.., to solicit or to permit
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reasons, these regulations have a significant impact on corporate
governance. With wide dispersion of share ownership, 44 expecting
shareholders to attend shareholder meetings in person becomes
impractical. State law, however, requires a minimum percentage of
shareholders to attend these meetings before the corporation can
legally conduct business at a shareholder meeting.4 5 As a practical
matter, the only way to achieve a quorum is to solicit proxies from
shareholders unable to attend but willing to cede their voting
authority to others.46 Shareholders who send proxies are counted
as present for quorum purposes.4 7 Proxy regulation, therefore,
affects how virtually all shareholder votes in publicly held corporations
are conducted.
The proxy rules adopted under the auspices of the 1934 Act did
not, however, change the fact that corporate directors controlled
American corporations, often to the exclusion of corporate shareholders. The proxy rules assume that those in control of the corporation
(management, through the board of directors) will administer the
proxy solicitation." The rules are designed to encourage communication only by the group controlling the corporation or a group
seeking total control. 49 Because the typical shareholder fits neither

the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any
security ... registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n.
It is widely understood that most shareholders in public corporations participate in
shareholders' meetings only via proxy, and not by attending the meetings in person.
Regulations governing proxies thus potentially affect all communications designed to educate
shareholders about matters submitted for shareholder approval, or to induce them to vote one
way or the other on such proposals. 17 C.F.R1 § 240.14a (1992).
44. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135 [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,262 (Oct. 12, 1982).
45. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 602 (West 1990) (stating that, generally, business may not
be transacted at shareholder meeting in absence of quorum); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216
(1991) (mandating that at minimum one-third of shares entitled to vote be present or
represented at shareholder meeting for corporation to conduct business); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
1 § 608 (McKinney 1986) (stating that majority of shareholders must be present or represented
to transact business at shareholder meeting); TEX. Bus. CoP. ACT ANN. art. 2.28 (West Supp.
1993) (requiring that at least one-third of shares entitled to vote be present or represented for
quorum to be present and for business to be conducted at shareholder meeting).
46.

Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 602; DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216; TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.

2.28.
47. See,e.g., CAL.. CORP. CODE § 602 (stating that majority of shares represented in person
or by proxy constitute quorum); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (including shareholders
represented by proxy in quorum); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616 (McKinney 1986) (counting
shareholders represented by proxy toward quorum); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.28
(permitting shareholders to be represented by proxy).
48. HARRY G. HENN, CORPORArIONs 461-64 (1961) (explaining proxy solicitation process).
49. Cf 17 C.F.R § 240-14a-2 (1993) (providing rules regarding proxy solicitation under
stated circumstances).
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of these descriptions, the proxy rules do not seem well-designed to
foster communication and coordination among shareholders.
The proxy rules, originally adopted by the SEC soon after the
passage of the 1934 Act,5" were intended to institutionalize the ideal
of corporate democracy and to help return some measure of control
to shareholders. 1 The rules, however, were unsuccessful in rousing
shareholders from their passivity. The rules, which permit shareholders to elect corporate directors, 2 mandate comprehensive disclosure
before corporations can solicit proxies relating to the election of
directors. 3 These disclosure obligations, while effective at stemming
some of the more egregious abuses of power, were and are clearly
insufficient to change the balance of power between management and
shareholders. In public corporations, the outgoing board nominates
candidates for the succeeding year's board of directors.54 Shareholders have the right to elect a given slate of directors, but unless
another party has initiated a proxy fight, where shareholders can
choose between two opposing slates, shareholders have no meaningful
options in electing directors. Under the federal proxy rules,
shareholders have no meaningful way to nominate or elect different
candidates.5
State law does not redress this imbalance of power. State corporate
statutes give corporate directors the legal authority to manage the
affairs of the corporation,5 6 a right that presumably includes the

50. The SEC adopted rules LA1-LA7 on September 24, 1935, in Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 378. The SEC promulgated regulation X-14, consisting of Rules X-14A-1 to X-14A-9,
on August 11, 1938, in Securities Act Release No. 1823. Rules LA1-LA7 were rescinded.
51. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1934) (concluding that 1934 Act
provisions relating to proxies were intended to permit SEC to act "with a view to preventing the
recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders"). Courts have concurred with this statement of intent and have allowed the SEC to act "to
require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage." SEC v. Transamerica Corp.,
163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. deni d 332 U.S. 847 (1948); accordJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964) (finding that "fair corporate suffrage" is important right that should
be provided to shareholders).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b) (2) (1992).
53. 17 C.FR. §§ 240.14a-4(a), 240.14(b) (1992).
54. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 205 (stating that shareholders only have right
to elect, not to nominate, new directors).
55. The proxy rules specifically require that corporations give shareholders the authority
to cast votes for write-in candidates, but because of the proxy rules themselves, shareholders
could not communicate to coordinate a write-in campaign, thus effectively eliminating the
usefulness of the write-in option. See 17 C.FR. § 240.14a-4(b) (2) (iii) (1992).
56. See ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 3.01 (suggesting that although
directors have broad corporate powers, they should appoint and supervise senior executives to
oversee daily corporate operations). The comments to these ALI provisions acknowledge that
most state statutes give the power to manage to directors, and may or may not expressly permit
directors to delegate these powers, which include the right to nominate successors. Id. § 3.01
cmt. a. In reality, these distinctions appear irrelevant because public corporations do indeed
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right to nominate successors. State statutes give shareholders the
power to elect, but not nominate, directors, 7 and most allow
corporations to give shareholders the right to remove directors for
cause,"8 although courts have not always construed "cause" broadly.59 As a practical matter, however, shareholders without access to
the corporate proxy machinery stand very little chance of waging a
successful campaign for removal of directors, especially over management opposition. Even when directors are removed, their successors
are nominated by the remaining directors, not the shareholders.'
In addition to specific voting rights, state law, at least in theory,

operate mostly through senior officers, the vast majority of whom are not themselves directors.
It is widespread practice for senior executives, most notably the chief executive officer, to
manage public corporations regardless of whether the state statutes expressly permit delegation
of authority. Id. § 3.02 cmt a ("Directoral management does not require a detailed inspection
of day-to-day activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies.") (citing
Francis v. UnitedJersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981)).
57. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1991); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 602(b) (McKinney 1986); see also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 188 (stating
that shareholder participation usually is limited to electing or removing directors).
Other statutory provisions give shareholders additional voting powers, but these are very
limited. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 188 (explaining that "in the broader sense of
participation in control, shareholders have limited management functions"). For example, most
state statutes give shareholders the statutory right to vote for major changes to the corporation's
structure. See, e.g., DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 279 (1991) (requiring shareholder approval for sale,
lease, or exchange of corporate assets); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a) (2) (McKinney 1986)
(permitting shareholders to vote on mergers); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909(a) (3) (McKinney
1986) (permitting shareholders to vote on sale, lease, or exchange of corporate assets). This
right typically includes the right to vote on such matters as mergers, recapitalizations,
reorganizations, and sales of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets. See HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 8, §§ 340-341. State statutes generally require shareholder approval for
any of these transactions, although the particular vote required varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and can be further modified by special provision in the articles of incorporation.
See id. §§ 340-351.
Shareholders are also typically given the right to vote for changes that would require an
amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation. See id. § 340. It is possible in a very
few instances for directors to amend articles without specific shareholder approval. If
shareholders approve a provision in the articles authorizing "blank check" stock, the directors
can amend the articles at a future date, specifying such rights, privileges, and other characteristics as the directors may determine without additional shareholder approval. See, e.g., DEL, CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1991) (authorizing blank-check shares); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art.
2.13 (B) (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing adoption of blank-check shares). Aside from these very
limited situations, however, control over public corporations is firmly vested in the hands of the
board of directors.
58. E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991) (permitting shareholders to remove
directors with or without cause); CAL. CORP. CODE § 304 (West 1990) (permitting shareholders
to remove directors for fraud, dishonesty, or abuse of position); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 706(a)
(McKinney 1986) (permitting removal of directors with or without cause); see also HENN &
ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 192; cf HENRY W. BALLANnNE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORArIONs 434
(rev. ed. 1946) (arguing that rule was "unsound" because it denied shareholder/owners right
to remove directors even if they proved to be "entirely unsatisfactory").
59. See, e.g., Leff v. C.I.P. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857, 865-66 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that
harm to plaintiff shareholders must directly result from director misconduct for shareholder to
meet cause requirement).
60. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 205.
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gives shareholders the right to sue to challenge actions taken by the
board of directors. 6 Again, as a practical matter, the courts were,
and continue to be, extremely reluctant to second-guess corporate
decisions.6 2 Because of this reluctance, legal doctrines protecting
directoral decisions in all but the most egregious circumstances have
developed such that the standards for prevailing against a director are
almost impossibly high.6 3
1.

Trends and recent developments entrenching directoralcontrol over
corporategovernance

As the years passed, patterns of regulation remained relatively
constant. Of course there have been new developments at both the
state and federal levels, but for the most part these have not been
effective in giving shareholders a greater role in corporate
decisionmaking. In fact, many of the historical developments have
made it more difficult for shareholders to participate in corporate
governance. In particular, the SEC has changed the definition of
"solicitation" several times, with the gradual effect of further limiting
shareholder communications.'
The definition of solicitation is important because the proxy rules
requiring advance notice to the SEC and extensive disclosure apply to
anyone engaged in proxy solicitation.65 Originally, the SEC limited
the definition of solicitation to any proxy request. 66 The first
regulatory amendments broadened the definition to include all
communications from the person soliciting the proxy.67 The next
change occurred when the SEC expanded the definition of solicitation to cover "any request to revoke or not execute a proxy."6 The
SEC then determined that solicitation included "any communication"
by a shareholder that could be "reasonably calculated" to influence

61. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 192 (noting that shareholders may sue directly
or on behalf of corporation).
62. E.g., Consumer Power Co. Derivative Litig., 132 F.R.D. 455, 483 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
("[C]ourts are not to second-guess the corporate decision maker's choice... and substitute
their own."); see also Hessen, supranote 20, at 278.
63. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (showing that directors' standard of care
is gross negligence, and in few recent cases challenged action was required to be ultra vira, or
tainted by fraud).
64. "Solicitation" is currently defined as "any request to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or
the furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security holders under
circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of
a proxy." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(k) (1) (1992).
65. 17 C.FR.§ 240.14a-2 (1993).
66. Exchange Act Release No. 378 (Sept. 24, 1935).
67. Exchange Act Release No. 2376, 5 Fed. Reg. 174 (1940).
68. Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 (1942).
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any other shareholder to give, deny, or revoke a proxy.6 9 These
amendments made it increasingly difficult for shareholders to
communicate with one another about upcoming votes; shareholders
feared that even informal comments might later be construed as a
"solicitation" and thus subject them to liability for failure to comply
70
with the proxy rules.
Changes in state law have also tended to entrench directors in
positions of virtually absolute power. One of the most obvious
examples is the extent to which state laws have indemnified directors
or exempted them from liability for breaches of duty owed to the
corporation. Historically, common law appeared to be divided on the
issue of whether to permit a director to receive indemnification from
liabilities arising out of actions taken in the course of corporate
business.7 ' Over time, however, all fifty states enacted statutes
specifically authorizing indemnification of corporate directors. 72 As
to limitations of liability, the trend is of even more recent vintage.
Since 1985, forty-two states have adopted statutory provisions
addressing directoral liability, most of which permit corporations to
adopt charter provisions limiting directors' liability for monetary
damages.7" This trend represents a striking change from earlier law,
which did not permit such broad limitations of directors' liability.74
Perhaps the most significant example of how state law has evolved
over time to insulate directors more and more effectively is the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule, which can be

69. Exchange Act Release No. 5276, 21 Fed. Reg. 578 (1956).
70. Cf. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1985)
(concluding that communications appearing in general-circulation publications can constitute
solicitation if reasonably calculated to influence shareholders' votes); SECv. Okin, 132 F.2d 784,
786 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that preliminary communications may be deemed solicitations even
if they do not request that recipient give, withhold, or revoke proxy).
71. Compare New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848-49 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(holding indemnification not justifiable because liability is inherent risk in directorships) and
Griesse v. Lang, 175 N.E. 222, 223 (Ohio 1931) (finding indemnification not permitted in
absence of benefit to corporation) with In re E.C. Warner Co., 45 N.W.2d 388, 393-94 (Minn.
1950) (holding that directors were entitled to indemnification and finding stockholders failed
in derivative suit) and Solimine v. Hollander, 19 A.2d 344, 348 (N.J. Ch. 1941) (upholding
indemnification and allowing corporate directors to prevail in stockholder derivative suit).
72. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974); see alsoJOSEPH W. BISHOP, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE 1 6.02, at 6-4-5 (1981
& Supp. 1988).
73. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (1991) (limiting directors' personal liability for
damages stemming from breach of fiduciary duty); see alsoDENNISJ. BLOCK ETAL, THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIREcTORs 40, 42-47 nn.73-95 (3d ed. 1989)
(listing and discussing such provisions).
74. See Theodore D. Moskowitz & Walter A. Effross, Turning Back the Tide of Director and
Officer Liability, 23 SETON HALL L REV. 897, 902-06 (1993) (discussing trend of increasing
statutory limits on director and officer liability).
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traced back at least 150 years,75 apparently began as a presumption
of regularity. Early cases tended to exonerate directors from liability
for ordinary "mistakes"76 and refused to impose on directors the duty
of utmost care, 77 choosing instead to impose the same degree of care
that ordinarily prudent persons would exercise. 7 At least one
hornbook described this conception of the business judgment rule as
the majority view.79 Although "occasional opinions" declared that
directors were not liable except for "gross negligence,"" this view
was deplored as too lenient and was dismissed as the minority
position.8 Today, the majority rule retains the business judgment
rule as a presumption of validity, but has adopted gross negligence as
the principal standard of liability.8 2 At least one court has adopted
that the challenged
an even more stringent test for liability, requiring
3
action be ultra vires or tainted by fraud.
In addition to these trends showing the increased latitude directors
have in controlling their corporations, recent developments, which
75. The business judgment rule can be traced back at least to the 1829 Louisiana decision
in Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829). The court in Percy held that a director will
only be liable by failing to possess "ordinary knowledge," which the court defined as failing to
exercise "common sense, and ordinary attention." Id. at 77-78.
76. See, e.g., Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43 (App. Div. 1944) ("Mistakes in the
exercise of honest business judgment do not subject the directors to liability."); Hodges v. New
England Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853) (stating that directors will not be liable for "mistakes").
77. See, e.g., Pollitz v. Wabash R.R, 100 N.E. 721, 723-24 (1912) (holding directors to
standard of merely "honest and unselfish" decisionmaking).
78. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (explaining that defendant
directors are only bound to level of care "which ordinary and diligent men would exercise");
Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania RR., 61 F. Supp. 905, 910-11 (D. Pa. 1945) (requiring directors to
exercise "care, skill, and diligence which the ordinary prudent man would exercise in similar
155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Anderson v. Akers, 7 F. Supp. 924,928 (W.D.
circumstances"), afftd,
Ky. 1934) ("It is ... well-settled that, even in the absence of a statute ... directors ... are
director would
bound to exercise . . . the degree of care which a reasonably prudent ...

exercise."), modified in 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), reo'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937).
79.

NORMAN D. LATrIN, LATrIN ON CORPORATIONS § 78, at 274 (2d ed. 1971).

80. See Spiegel v. Beacon Participants, Inc., 8 N.E.2d 895, 904 (Mass. 1937) ("If directors,
acting in good faith, nevertheless act imprudently, they cannot ordinarily be held to personal
responsibility for loss unless there is a 'clear and gross negligence' in their conduct."); Swentzel
v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405, 414 (Pa. 1892) (holding directors "only liable for fraud, or such gross
negligence as amounts to fraud").
81. LATrIN, supra note 79, § 78, at 274 ("Any court taking such a view has a heart too
tender for the hard-hearted business men who usually sit upon boards of directors.").
82. See Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that proper standard in for-profit business is at least gross negligence); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (concluding that gross negligence is proper standard
by which to judge directors' behavior); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 & n.6 (Del. 1984)
(stating that business judgment rule is predicated on concept of gross negligence). But see
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring
standard of "reasonable diligence," not gross negligence); see also BLOCK ET AL, supra note 73,
at 36-40 (dismissing idea that corporate directors should only be liable for gross negligence).
83. Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) (refusing to
impose liability under Texas law on noninterested corporate director unless challenged action
was ultra vires or tainted by fraud).
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are not part of any distinct trend, nonetheless exclude shareholders
from participating in corporate governance. One of these innovations
is the development of "blank-check" shares.8 4 Blank-check shares are
created when a corporation's certificate of incorporation8 5 authorizes
its board of directors to issue a class of shares having rights, designations, and preferences to be determined in the future by the board
of directors.8 6 Normally, shareholders must approve any class of
shares having such differences before they are issued, but with blankcheck shares, the board can decide on the rights, designations, and
privileges without consulting the shareholders even if the original
blank-check authorization was adopted for a purpose other than one
for which it is ultimately used.87
Another modem innovation relates to limiting voting rights of large
shareholders. Nonvoting stock is not new,' but until recently, no
court had upheld the issuance of a class of shares that gives voting
rights to shareholders that hold less than a specified percentage of
outstanding shares, and denies voting rights to shareholders whose
stock ownership exceeds that threshold.89 This type of share
obviously undermines shareholder voting rights.'

84. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1991) (allowing shareholders in Delaware
corporations to authorize directors to issue classes of stock that will have their voting powers,
designations, preferences, and other special rights determined by board of directors at later
date).
85. The articles of incorporation must authorize all corporate shares. See HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 123.
86. HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 123.
87. SeeAsarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468,476-77 (D.NJ. 1985) (holding that, generally,
blank-check provision in corporate charter authorized board of directors to issue special class
of shares as takeover defense, even though shareholders had voted in favor of blank-check
provision pursuant to proxy solicitation that had addressed need for flexibility in capital
structure to facilitate future acquisitions). The court in Asarco held, however, that, under the
circumstances of the case, the directors could not issue the blank-check shares with the special
terms proposed by the directors because to do so would destroy the equality of voting power
between stockholders. Id.
88. In fact, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has long been concerned with nonvoting
shares and shares having multiple votes.
89. See Baker v. Providence and Worcester Co., 378 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. 1977).
The SEC attempted to prevent companies from taking steps to nullify, restrict, or disparately
reduce the per share votes of existing shareholders by adopting Rule 19c-4. See Voting Rights
Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-25,891, 53 Fed. Reg.
26,376, 26,394 (1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240 19c-4 (1990)). The Business Roundtable
successfully challenged the SEC's authority to promulgate this rule. Business Roundtable v. SEC,
905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that SEC had no authority to control substantive
allocation of power among classes of shareholders). The NYSE and NASDAQ, however,
voluntarily adopted the essence of Rule 19c-4, and the AMEX also took action to limit
disenfranchisement of existing shareholders. SeeDouglas C. Michael, UntenableStatus of Corporate
Governance ListingStandardsUnder the Securities Exchange Act 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1470-72 (1992).
None of these actions, however, preclude the sale of new classes of shares with such restrictions.
90. One might wonder about the advantages of creating a class of shares that so obviously
limits shareholder rights. One advantage is that such a class of shares is a powerful disincentive
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In essence, state corporate statutes give shareholders very limited
rights to participate in corporate management, and state courts have
upheld creative strategies that encroach on even these limited rights.
In addition, state courts generally have not permitted shareholders to
assume greater responsibilities at the expense of directoral discretion. 91 In the rare instances where states have adopted rules
allowing shareholders to assume greater roles in corporate gover92
nance, such provisions usually do not apply to public corporations.
It is not true that all modern rules and regulations are designed to
preclude shareholders from participating in corporate governance or
that all trends in corporate law are aimed at achieving that result.
Many existing regulations are intended to encourage shareholder
participation. The federal proxy rules,93 for example, provide two
specific mechanisms whereby shareholders can communicate with one
another. First, if a corporation conducts a proxy solicitation, as it
must at least once a year, the regulations expressly require the
corporation to assist any shareholder in communicating with other
shareholders by way of a separate proxy solicitation. 4 Second, the
regulations require the corporation to include shareholder proposals
that meet certain requirements in its proxy materials.9 5 Because the

to a hostile takeover. A successful acquisition of more than the threshold percentage of such
a class of shares would result in the acquiror holding such shares but being unable to vote them.
In a takeover context, it is voting power that makes the shares valuable, and so this type of
limitation on voting makes the issuance of this kind of share particularly suitable as an antitakeover defense.
91. See Charleston Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85, 86-87 (1880) (refusing to
impose liability on board of directors that negligently refused to follow recommendations from
shareholder representative regarding proper disposition of corporate assets, at very substantial
loss to corporation); see also HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 267 (explaining that "[e]ven
unanimous agreements which substantially impinge on the directors' discretion or other
'statutory norms' are invalid, in the absence of express statutory recognition"). Henn and
Alexander recognize that although a few state statutes permit shareholders to restrict directors'
discretion in closely held corporations, this remains the exception rather than the norm. HENN
& ALEXANDER, supranote 8, § 267. Even where such shareholder agreements are permitted, for
example, by inclusion of relevant provisions in the certificate of incorporation, liability is shifted
from the directors to the shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 351 (2)-(3) (1991); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 620(f) (McKinney 1986).
92. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1986) (allowing shareholders to
assume responsibilities typically left to directors, so long as articles of incorporation clearly spell
out this allowance, and noting that this is limited to corporations whose shares are not listed on
national securities exchange or regularly traded in over-the-counter market); see also Zion v.
Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that Delaware public policy did not proscribe
shareholder agreement that took away management functions from directors in corporation with
fewer than thirty shareholders).
93. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14a-14 (1992).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1992) (requiring corporation either to give shareholder
"reasonably current list of the names and addresses of the holders of record" of voting stock,
or to mail shareholder's proxy itself, at shareholder's expense).
95. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8 (1992).
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first alternative is so expensive," it is typically used only by those
seeking control by means of a proxy contest, and it generally is not
used by shareholders who want only limited changes to existing
management or policies. 7 The second
alternative, the shareholder
98
proposal, is used far more frequently.
Even the shareholder proposal provision, however, is very limited.
A corporation may safely exclude a number of types of proposals from
its proxies. 9 The most significant of these exclusions relate to
proposals that deal with "the conduct of the [corporation's] ordinary
business operations,"'" and proposals that relate "to an election to
office.""0 ' Moreover, shareholders are limited to one proposal per
meeting,102 and that proposal may be accompanied only by a
supporting statement of no more than 500 words. 0 3
The most recent amendments to these rules were designed to
increase shareholder communications and shareholder participation.
In October 1992, the SEC adopted amendments to the federal proxy
rules "designed to foster shareholder communication" and remove
"unnecessary limitations on shareholders' use of their voting
rights."'
The SEC concluded that the prior proxy rules were
contrary to Congress' intent to assure "fair, and effective shareholder
suffrage."0 5 The SEC declared that the amendments were necessary
to remove "regulatory impediments to communication among
shareholders and others and to the effective use of shareholder voting

96. Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal and Tactical Considerations in Proxy Contests: The
PrimaryMeans of Effecting FundamentalCorporateChange in the 1990s, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
745, 752 (1991).
97. Id. at 751-52.
98. Id. at 751 (stating that, because most proxy fights are expensive, they are generally used
for gaining control of corporation, whereas shareholder proposals are used for expressing
dissatisfaction with management).
99. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1992) (allowing exclusion of proposals related to subjects
not proper for shareholder action, to operations that account for less than five percent of
corporation's total assets and less than five percent of its net earnings and is not otherwise
significantly related to registrant's business, to conduct of ordinary business, to election to office,
to shareholder attempts to oppose proposal to be submitted by corporation, and to other
proposals that have been previously submitted and received fewer than certain specified
percentages of shareholder votes); see also infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text (discussing
these limitations and ability of management to exclude shareholder proposals).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1992).
101. Id. § 240.14a-8(c) (8).
102. Id. § 240.14a-8 (a) (4).
103. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
104. Shareholder Communications and Executive Compensation, Exchange Act Release Nos.
33-6962 and 31-326, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 1525, pt. II (Oct. 21, 1992) [hereinafter
Shareholder Communications]. The SEC adopted these rules following "an extensive three-year
examination by the Commission of the effectiveness of the proxy-voting process and its effect
on the corporate governance system .... " Id. at 7.
105. Id. at 7-8.
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rights."1 6 These amendments did not, however, remove any of the
limitations imposed on shareholder proposals.
2.

Exclusionfrom the directoralnominatingprocess

The foregoing discussion indicates that developments in recent
years have made it increasingly difficult for shareholders to participate
in corporate governance. The single most significant obstacle,
however, is the inability of shareholders to nominate directors.
Because management of the typical corporation is vested in its
board of directors, the process by which directors are nominated is
particularly important. 10 7 Obviously, the entire election process is
important, but if directors are not nominated, they cannot be elected.
Because management traditionally has controlled the nominating
process, the fact that shareholders get the final vote is not nearly as
significant as it might appear. Unfortunately, both state law and
federal regulations have been drafted in such a way as to ignore the
nomination process.
The federal proxy rules' provide mechanisms through which
shareholders can initiate proposals for consideration by other
shareholders." 9 The same regulations that obligate management
106. Id. at 8. The text of the amendments is quite lengthy. The most important provisions
relating to shareholder communications and shareholder voting, however, are relatively
straightforward. Rule 14a-2(b) is amended to exempt from the proxy statement and disclosure
requirements communications from most persons not seeking proxy authority and not having
a substantial interest in the matter subject to a vote. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (1992). Rule 14a1 now permits shareholders to announce how they intend to vote without having to comply with
the proxy rules. It. § 240.14a-1 (1). Under new Rule 14a-3, solicitations made via public
broadcast, speech, or publication are exempt if a definitive proxy statement is already on file
with the SEC. I& § 240.14a-3(f). Preliminary proxystatements are now allowed under rules 14a3(a) and 14a-4. Id. §§ 240.14a-3(a) and 240.14a-4. Finally, under Rule 14a-4(d), shareholders
who seek minority representation on a board of directors may name one or more management
nominees on their proxy, so long as the nominees consent. I& § 240.14a-4(d).
107. The importance of nominating directors becomes immediately apparent when one
reviews typical proxies solicited for annual meetings. For each position on the board of
directors that needs to be filled, management will nominate one candidate. Because it takes
only a plurality vote to elect directors, even withholding votes for a management candidate will
not change the outcome. Nor are nominations from the floor a viable option; most
shareholders will cast their votes in advance, by means of the very proxies that offer no
meaningful choices.
108. 17 C.F.RL § 240 (1992).
109. Id. § 240.14a-8. There are, however, numerous requirements that a shareholder must
meet before a corporation can be forced to include a shareholder proposal in its proxy
materials. For example, the proponent must own at least one percent or $1000 in market value
of voting securities for a period of not less than one year. Id. § 240.14a-8(a) (1). In addition,
the shareholder must submit the proposal substantially in advance of the meeting, which in the
case of annual meetings means at least 120 days before the corporation is expected to release
its own proxy materials. I& § 240.14a-8(a) (3). A shareholder is limited to one proposal, and
the supporting statement may not exceed 500 words. It § 240.14a-8(a) (1)(4). Finally, the
corporation need not include the proposal if it falls into any one of 12 categories identified by
statute. Id. § 240.14a-8(c); see also supra note 99 (listing types of shareholder proposals that
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to accept and disseminate shareholder proposals, however, expressly
authorize management to exclude proposals relating to election to
office."' While the SEC claims authority to regulate the nominating process,"' it has not chosen to do so, and this default has
allowed management to control nominations to the exclusion of
potential shareholder candidates.
The longstanding corporate governance project of the American
Law Institute (ALl) set out to evaluate existing regulations and rules
on corporate governance issues." 2 One of the specific topics the
project addressed was the directoral nominating process." 3 After
more than a decade of discussion, the project proposed as a final
recommendation that corporations form a nominating committee of
outside directors" 4 to recommend 15 directoral candidates to the
board. The comments to this section make clear that this suggestion
was not intended to prevent management from taking an active role
in the nominating process." 6 The ALl remarked, "On the contrary,
such persons, and in particular, the chief executive officer, can be
expected to be highly active in recommending to and discussing
candidates with the committee ....

In fact, the ALI's proposed

final draft seems little more than a codification of existing practice.
Although existing law does not require the use of nominating
committees, surveys of large public corporations indicate that such
committees are widespread." 8 Thus, the ALI's proposed final draft

corporation need not include in proxy materials).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8).
111. Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, [1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
81,296 (Aug. 29, 1977).
112. See ALI, CORuPORATE GOVERNANCE, supranote 9 (showing that first tentative draft of ALl
project on corporate governance was finished in 1982, while proposed final draft was not
complete until March 31, 1992).
113. ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 3A.04.
114. The proposed final draft does not use the term outside director. The draft actually
suggests that the nominating committee be composed "exclusively of directors who are not
officers or employees of the corporation, including at least a majority of members who have no
significant relationship with the corporation's senior executives." ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 9, § 3A.04(a). In addition, "officers," "significant relationship," and "senior
executives" are defined terms. See AUJ, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at pt. I,
Definitions, 1-68.
115. The use of the phrase "recommend to the board" may be quite significant. There is
nothing in the ALl draft that requires the board to accept the nominating committee's
recommendations, and nothing gives the committee any authority to interact directly with the
shareholders. ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9.
116. See ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 3A.04 cmts., at 160-64.
117. ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9,§ 3A.04 cmt. c, at 161.
118. The Reporter's notes to § 3A.04 indicate that the AI was aware of these studies in the
drafting process. ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 3A.04, reporter's notes. The
Reporter cites two studies, HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD tbl. 11, at 13 and
KORN & FERRY, BOARD OF DIRECTORS ths. 4A, 4B, which report that approximately 60% of
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offers no real hope for reapportioning control over the nomination
process between directors and shareholders."'
3.

Other limits on shareholderproposals

Of course, the inability of shareholders to assume a meaningful role
in the nomination of directors is not the only significant result of the
division of responsibility and power between shareholders and
directors. As mentioned earlier, the federal proxy rules do provide
mechanisms through which shareholders in public corporations can
communicate with each other.12 ° If a shareholder desires to make
a proxy solicitation at the same time as the corporation is making
such a solicitation, the corporation may be required to include in its
proxy materials copies of proxy statements and proxies furnished by
the shareholder, provided that the shareholder bears the cost of
Alternatively, shareholders desiring to
including such materials.'
make proposals for consideration by other shareholders can force the
corporation to include such proposals in the corporation's own proxy
materials, but only if certain requirements are met.'2 2
In fact, these requirements for shareholder proposals are quite
restrictive. One of the most important restrictions on such proposals,
discussed in the preceding section, is that they may not relate to
This restriction is not the only significant
elections to office. 2
limitation. Management can choose to exclude any shareholder
24
proposals that are not "proper subjects of shareholder action."

responding corporations utilize nominating committees composed primarily of outside directors.
119. Participants in and observers of the ALI drafting process will not be surprised by this
insight, given the active participation by the Business Roundtable in discouraging any significant
reapportionment of power between management and shareholders.
120. See supranotes 93-95 and accompanying text (describing two ways federal proxy rules
facilitate shareholder communication); see also 17 C.FR. §§ 240.14a-7 to 14a-8 (1992) (dictating
guidelines under which shareholders can make proxy solicitations to other shareholders or
include proposal in corporation's proxy statement).
121. 17 C.F.R- § 240.14a-7. At the option of the corporation, the shareholder seeking to
distribute proxy materials may be given a shareholder list and told to distribute the materials
without further assistance from the corporation. Id. § 240.14a-7(c). Corporations, however, do
not typically rely on this alternative, possibly because of a reluctance to provide current
shareholder lists to dissidents. SeeLouis LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 466-67
(2d ed. 1988) (stating that management prefers to mail proxy materials for shareholders while
shareholders prefer access to mailing list in order to do personal solicitation).
122. 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-8 (1992); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (listing some
limitations on content of shareholder proxy proposals).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (8) (1992).
124. Id. § 240.14a-8(c) (1). This power to exclude shareholder proposals is designed not to
upset the allocation of power between shareholders and directors mandated by state law. See
LoSS, supranote 121, at 473 (suggesting that state law is not sufficient guide because there is not
much of it). Therefore, most shareholder proposals are cast in advisory terms. See Klaus Eppler
& Karen B. Leibowitz, Dealing with Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals, in PLI PROXY CONTESTS,
INSITUTIONAL INVESTOR INiTIATiVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 779, 788 (1990). In one sense,
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Furthermore, shareholder proposals must relate to a significant aspect
of the corporation's business;125 they may not relate to dividends"2 6 or the ordinary business of the corporation.2 2 Finally,
shareholder proposals may not conflict with a management proposal."'28 The SEC has permitted management to exclude a wide variety
1 29
of shareholder proposals on these grounds.
In addition to these substantive limitations on shareholder
proposals, other aspects of the requirements for shareholder
proposals tip the balance in favor of management. Shareholders must
this limitation does not prevent many shareholder proposals because shareholders can often
circumvent the rule by careful phrasing. In another sense, however, this exclusionary rule is very
powerful because it means that most shareholder proposals are no more than precatory in
nature. Even a "successful" shareholder proposal might, therefore, have minimal impact;
directors are not obligated to heed shareholder proposals in reaching a final decision on the
issue.
125. 17 C.F.R- § 240.14a-8(c) (5) (1992). This regulation determines significance primarily
in terms of whether the proposal relates to a matter that accounts for more than five percent
of the corporation's business or assets, but also authorizes shareholder proposals that are
otherwise significant even if they fail the financial interest threshold. Id.
126. Id. § 240.14a-8(c) (13). This provision reflects the traditional state law rule that directors
have discretion in declaring and paying dividends. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653 (Michie 1993)
(allocating authority to board of directors to declare and make distribution to shareholders).
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (7) (1992).
128. Id. § 240.14a-8(c) (9).
129. See Eppler & Leibowitz, supranote 124, at 796 (discussing SEC no-action letters that
allow exclusion of shareholder proxy proposals). The Commission has permitted exclusion of
proposals limiting the number of officers, e.g., The Procter & Gamble Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No. 0610-85003 (May 30, 1985), proposals requiring directors to
report negative votes, e.g., Union Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No.
22486008 (Feb. 19, 1986), and proposals dealing with executive compensation and dedication
of the budget to specific items such as advertising, e.g., Carolina Power and Light, SEC NoAction Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No. 040483023 (Mar. 25, 1983); Litton Industries, SEC NoAction Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No. 102780049 (Sept. 9, 1980, reconsidered Oct 29, 1980).
During the first four months of 1990, the Commission published approximately 320 no-action
letters. Eppler & Leibowitz, supra note 124, at 802. Through these letters, the Commission
excluded a wide variety of proposals relating to compensation issues. See id. at 828-29. See also
Pinnacle West Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No. 040290021 (Mar.
23, 1990) (excluding proposal that called for reduction of corporate salaries until dividend
payments were resumed); UAL Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No. 030590020
(Feb. 23, 1990) (allowing exclusion of proposal to reduce directors' salaries and benefits). The
Commission also excluded some resolutions condemning particular officers, directors, or the
entire board, or asking for a vote of"no confidence." HealthVest, SEC No-Action Letter, Wash.
Serv. Bureau, No. 040990029 (Apr. 4, 1990) (excluding proposal for no-confidence vote); TimeWarner Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No. 040290023 (Mar. 23, 1990)
(permitting corporation to omit proposal for censure of directors who voted against acquisition
offer); Exxon Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, Wash. Serv. Bureau, No. 020590022 (Jan. 26,
1990) (excluding proposal to remove board of directors and CEO).
Although reported decisions in this area are rare, courts have upheld some of these
exclusions. For example, in Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d 455, 457 (2d Cir. 1993), the
court permitted a corporation to exclude a shareholder proposal that would have required
approval of corporate capital expenditures in excess of a specified minimum. Id. The court
allowed the corporation to exclude the proposal because it related to the ordinary business of
the corporation. Id. at 458; see also Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (permitting corporation to exclude proposal because it related to pension rights
and because proposal was offered by holder of only one share).
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limit their proposals and any accompanying explanations to a
combined total of 500 words,13 1 while management can respond at
length. i31
Moreover, management, unlike shareholders making
proposals, has access to proxy cards as they are returned.132 Because
the vast majority of American corporations have steadfastly refused to
respect the confidentiality of shareholder votes, 133 management
often contacts shareholders prior to and even after submission of
proxies."

Resolicitation of shareholders who vote against manage35

ment wishes apparently is not uncommon
Until recently, shareholders could not even communicate with
other shareholders about how they intended to vote on matters to be

presented at upcoming shareholder meetings without complying with
the extensive disclosure requirements of the federal proxy rules. In
the latest round of amendments to the proxy rules, however, the SEC
has exempted certain types of shareholder communications from the
disclosure requirements. These include statements of how sharehold-

ers intend to vote on proposals to be considered at upcoming
shareholder meetings 13 6 and communications by shareholders who
are not seeking proxy authority.
The amended proxy rules do
not, however, allow shareholders to seek proxy authority on any
matters discussed in their communication, nor do they change most

130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (1) (1992).
131. See Loss, supranote 121, at 471 (stating that management is not limited to maximum
number of words in reply).
132. See infra notes 492-95 and accompanying text (analyzing shareholder studies that
indicate shareholders are increasingly contacted and pressured to vote in particular way).
133. A minority of American corporations have, however, recognized confidentiality of
shareholder voting. For example, Alcoa, American Brands, American Telephone & Telegraph
(AT&T), Chase Manhattan, Chemical Banking, Chevron, Citicorp, Datapoint, Du Pont, Exxon,
General Electric, General Mills, General Motors, IBT, IT&T, Loral, Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing (3M),J.P. Morgan, Sara Lee, United Technologies, and Xerox were all included
in a 1988 study on confidential voting conducted by the Investor Responsibility Research Center.
PATRICK S. MCGURN, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILrTY RESEARCH CTR., CONFIDENTIAL PROXYVOTING 39
(1989).
134. The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) conducts regular annual surveys
of institutional investors. In response to the IRRC's 1988 survey, more than three out of four
respondents indicated that management representatives had contacted them to discuss pending
proxy votes, and 14% of such shareholders indicated that they thought the contact that they had
received was "improper." Id. at 64. In both 1986 and 1987, approximately two-thirds of all
responding investors had indicated that such contact had occurred. Id.
135. While there are no precise figures on resolicitation, there is substantial evidence that
it occurs. For example, resolicitation on the infant formula shareholder proposal at American
Home Products was apparently the impetus for repeated shareholder proposals seeking
confidential voting. Id. at 76. This incident also prompted the SEC to examine the issue of
resolicitations. In its 1980 Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, the Commission indicated
that resolicitation "may constitute an unfair use of management control over the corporate
proxy machinery." Id. The SEC eventually declined to regulate such resolicitations.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l (1) (2) (iv) (1993).
137. Id. § 240.14a-2(b).
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of the restrictions on the content and form of shareholder proposals.
Taken as a whole, the system of regulation relating to shareholder
proposals allows shareholders no more than a glimpse at what
increased communication on important issues might accomplish.
In effect, the proxy rules are designed to allow shareholders some
measure of freedom to communicate with each other and to make
proposals for consideration at shareholder meetings. The current
rules, however, fall short of creating a system where shareholders are
permitted the same access to other shareholders that management
enjoys.

38

Without a more level playing field between management

and shareholders with regard to voting on corporate governance
issues, and particularly with regard to the nomination of directors, it
is unlikely that shareholders will be able to exercise proxy rights in a
way that will operate as an effective check on abuses of power by
management.
C. The Modern Corporation
The SEC not only structured the original proxy solicitation
rules139 with the Berle and Means' corporate paradigm in mind, 4 '
but also promulgated them at a time when that paradigm accurately
reflected reality. The vast majority of American investors at the time
were individuals,' 4 ' and those individuals tended to be passive and
Sharerelatively loyal to the companies in which they invested.
holders typically lacked the expertise, resources, time, and motivation
138. Cf infra note 184 (explaining that exorbitant costs limit shareholder participation).
While it is true that most shareholders not seeking proxy authority may now communicate with
each other without complying with the extensive proxy solicitation rules and that management
must comply with the proxy rules, management expenses are paid for by the corporation, and
management can hire corporate counsel to insure compliance with the rules. Cf. LOSS, supra
note 121, at 450 (suggesting that policy of paying management's proxy costs from corporate
funds should be one of reasonableness and that corporation should not pay "unreasonable"
expenses with corporate funds).
139. 17 C.F.IL §§ 240.14a-1 to 14a-12 (1992).
140. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (describing Berle and Means' view of
corporate America, which includes passive shareholders and division between directors and
owners).
141. See GOLDSMrrH, supra note 17, at 225 (observing that at turn of century individual
holdings accounted for 92.4% of equity securities in this country). Institutional ownership of
such securities increased from 7.6% in 1900 to over 20% by 1950. Id. According to the SEC,
in 1952 individuals owned almost 75% of the outstanding stock in American companies. 1 SEC
INSTrTTIONAL INVESrOR STUDY REPORT, H.R Doc. NO. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1971).
142. Louis Lowenstein, Beating the Wall Street Rule with a Stick and a Carot 1988 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 251, 252 [hereinafter Lowenstein, Stick & Carrot] (estimating that annual turnover
of stocks on New York Stock Exchange in 1960 was as low as 12%); Louis Lowenstein & Ira M.
Millstein, The American Corporation and the InstitutionalInvestor. Are There Lessons From Abroad?,
1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 739, 743 (estimating 1960 turnover rate at 14%). At the time the
SEC promulgated the proxy rules, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock
Exchange was three million shares. Id.
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to become actively involved in the management of corporations in
which they chose to invest. 1 3 They were willing to wait patiently for
dividend checks, hoping for appreciation in share value, but willing
to depend on others to manage the corporation in such a way as to
produce that appreciation. 14
This vision of corporate America is no longer accurate. Numerous
commentators have noted the extraordinary shifts in patterns of stock
146
4
ownership over the last few decades. ' Institutional investors
now account for a substantial percentage of stock ownership in
American companies, 147 owning approximately one-half of the

143. See Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1276-77
(1982) (arguing that individual investors lack expertise and inclination to actively participate in
corporate governance).
144. Id. The appreciation was a less important consideration because most shareholders
tended to invest for the long term. A reliable income stream was often more important in
deciding between investment options, and in fact, the dividend theory of stock valuation, which
developed while this model of shareholder participation was prevalent, posits that dividend
policy is the single largest determinant of share value. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURrTY
ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES, 480-82 (4th ed. 1962) (discussing historical primacy of
dividends in investment decisions).
145. See, e.g., Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders,CorporateDirectors,andInstitutionalInvstment:
Some Lessons From the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977, 977 (1993) (discussing shift of
majority of corporate equity into institutional hands); Warren F. Grienenberger, Institutional
Shareholders and Corporate Governance, in PLI PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS
UNDERTHE NEW PROXY RULES 593, 600 (1993) (attributing growth of ownership by institutional
investors to growth of pension funds in large corporations and government); Lowenstein &
Millstein, supra note 142, at 742 (reporting that assets controlled by institutional investors
increased from about $2.1 trillion in 1981 to $4.46 trillion in 1987). In 1986, institutional
investors owned 42.7% of the total outstanding stock in American companies. Id. at 743.
Congress is also aware of the shifting patterns of ownership. In 1986, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce reported that "[w]hile direct holdings of stocks by individuals fell by
$400 billion over the period from 1978 through 1985.... holdings by institutional investors rose
by $221 billion." Pension Funds in Capital Markets, 1986: Hearings on the Impact on Corporate
Governance, TradingActivity and BeneficiariesBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerc4 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986)
(opening comments of Rep. Wirth).
While more than 90% of all equity securities were in the hands of individual investors at the
turn of the century, GOLDSMrrH, supranote 17, at 225, the Securities Industry Association has
estimated that individual share ownership today accounts for less than 50% of the total shares
owned. Siconolfi, supra note 18, at Cl. This percentage declined slowly at first, and has recently
decreased more rapidly. Id. (noting 13.1% drop in individual ownership between 1965 and 1980
and 71% drop between 1980 and 1992).
146. The term "institutional investor" is generally defined to include pension funds,
investment companies, life insurance companies, bank-managed trust funds, state and local
retirement funds, foundations, education endowments, and similar funds. See Lowenstein &
Millstein, supranote 142, at 742 (defining "institutional investor").
147. SeePeter F. Drucker, Reckoning with the PensionFundRevolution, 69 HARv. BUS. REV., Mar.Apr. 1991, at 106, 106 (estimating that total institutional investor ownership accounts for nearly
40% of ownership of large and mid-size businesses). Other sources estimate that institutional
ownership is even greater. On November 13, 1992, the Wall Street Journal reported that
individual investors' holdings in U.S. stocks fell below one-half of the total market. Siconolfi,
supranote 18, at Cl. Furthermore, the economic importance of institutional investors is only
likely to increase over the next few years. For each year during the 1990s, it is likely that
pension plans alone will have between $100 and $200 billion to invest, and much of that is
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outstanding stock in public companies.' The "typical" shareholder
in this country is now an institutional investor, such as a pension
plan.149 This contrasts sharply with earlier patterns of stock ownership.
The shift in ownership and economic power has been accompanied
by a significant decrease in the average holding period for stocks.
This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated by comparing the stock
turnover rates experienced in the early 1960s with current turnover
rates. 5 ° In 1960, the rate of turnover for stocks traded on the New
51
York Stock Exchange was between twelve and fourteen percent.
To rephrase this statistic, if 1000 investors had each purchased one

expected to be placed in the equity markets. Drucker, supra, at 106.
148. See Drucker, supranote 147, at 106 (stating that institutional investors control as much
as 40% of common stock in large and mid-size businesses); Siconolfi, supra note 18, at C1
(reporting that holdings by individual shareholders fell to 49.7% in second quarter of 1992).
The concentration of institutional holdings in large companies was convincingly detailed in an
SEC report on institutional investors. See 3 SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R.
Doc. NO. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1307 (1971). This SEC report concluded that "[i]nstitutions
systematically hold a greater proportion of stocks with large market value than do individuals
,
Institutions held extremely large percentages of the 27 largest stocks." Id. at 1317. These
conclusions are also supported by the data from the Columbia Institutional Investor Project.
C. BRANCATO, THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN CAPITAL MARKETS: A SUMMARY
OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH AT THE COLUMBIA INSTITLrrIONAL INVESTOR PROJEcT tbls. 1, 2, 8, at 22-

23 (June 14, 1990).
149. See Drucker, supra note 147, at 106 (noting that 20 largest pension funds now own
nearly 10% of equity in America's publicly held corporations).
150.

See Louis LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE

ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 66-68 (1988). Lowenstein provides the following table, which clearly
demonstrates the increasing rate of stock turnover
ANNUAL TRADING--NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE

Shares Traded

Annual

(millions)

TurnoverRate

1960

767

12%

1965

1556

16%

1970

2937

19%

1975

4693

21%

1980

11,532

36%

1986

35,680

64%

Year

Id. at 67, tbl. 3-2.
These figures are even more dramatic on closer examination because they do not include
additional trading of NYSE-listed stocks in the over-the-counter markets, on regional exchanges,
or in foreign markets. Once these trades are figured in, the actual "turnover in Exchange-listed
stocks for 1986 was about 87 percent, not 64 percent." Id. at 67.
151. See supra note 142 (comparing results of two different studies on turnover rates).
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share of stock in 1960, approximately 860 of those investors would
retain ownership of their shares one year later. In contrast, if 1000
investors each purchased one share of stock today, chances are that
900 or more of those shareholders would sell their shares within a
year.152 In large part, institutional investors are responsible for this
increased volatility; they account for nearly eighty percent of trading
15 3
volume on the major American exchanges.
These changes in patterns of stock ownership and retention lead to
questions about the proper role of shareholders in corporate
governance. Institutional shareholders with a significant investment
in corporations have the practical ability to oversee management
functions and operations at a meaningful level. 54 Because of their
concentrated ownership, institutional investors have the economic
incentive to assume responsibility for overseeing management. 55
Under the current proxy rules, which deprive shareholders of the
opportunity to participate in corporate governance, shareholders have
no option but to sell if they are dissatisfied with management. 5
This is likely to increase the turnover of corporate stock ownership,
57
a phenomenon that is generally perceived as undesirable.

152. By 1986, the average trading volume had increased to 140 million shares per day, and
one year later the average daily volume had increased to 188 million shares. Lowenstein &
Millstein, supranote 142, at 743. If trades on markets other than the New York Stock Exchange
are factored in, it is estimated that the actual turnover rate in 1987 approached 95%. Id.
153. A comprehensive study by the Securities Industry Association reported that 74% of the
trading volume on the NYSE was attributable to trading by institutional investors. SIA RESEARCH
DEP'T, TRENDS: AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 4 (1989).

The

same study estimated that institutions were also responsible for 43% of all NASDAQ trading.
Id.; see also Thomas C. Franco, Institutional Ownership in the U.S.: An Overview, in PLI,
SHAREOWNER AcrnvSM: THE EMERGING ROLE OF INSTrTUTIONAL INVESTORS 285, 288 (1987)

(contending that increase in annual turnover rate on New York Stock Exchange from 13% in
1962 to over 50% in 1987 was due in large part to institutional dominance of equity markets).
154. See Louis Lowenstein, Why Managements Should (and Should Not) Have Respect for Their
Shareholders,17J. CORP. L. 1, 3-6 (1991) (relating effectiveness of relationship between corporate
management of General Motors and its large investor du Pont); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. LJ. 445, 453-59 (1991)
(pointing out that any institutional investor with substantial holdings overcomes one obstacle
facing scattered individual investors--collective action).
155. See Rock, supra note 154, at 460 (arguing that increased concentration of shareholding
creates incentive to actively participate because better management will more directly benefit
shareholder, result in less incentive to free ride, and undermine benefit of dumping shares
because selling block all at once depresses price).
156. See Fischel, supra note 143, at 1277 (arguing that when shareholder is dissatisfied, logical
course is to sell); infratext accompanying note 164 (describing policy of voting with one's feet,
i.e. selling shares when unhappy with management).
157. See Lowenstein, Stick & Carro supra note 142, at 252 (noting that high turnover
undermines operation of market and corporate governance, and focuses energies on short-term
rather than long-term gains). The lack of investor loyalty and high turnover in stock portfolios
make it virtually impossible for management to count on long-term shareholder support of
proposals that require significant lead time. The high turnover also results in vastly increased
transaction costs, which have been estimated to be as high as one-sixth of the underlying stream
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Moreover, the existing management model has produced a number
of highly questionable management decisions.158
The change in patterns of stock ownership in this country has been
accompanied by a remarkable change in the ability of investors to
exercise meaningful oversight of corporate management functions.
When the average investor was an individual, rarely owning more than
a tiny fraction of the total outstanding shares in a corporation, the
business community reasonably assumed that investors generally
lacked the resources, and probably the inclination, to supervise
management decisions. 159 It was understandable and predictable
that shareholders would leave corporate governance to management
and allow management to control the selection of directors. In
addition, management had a rational basis for its reluctance to
approve greater shareholder participation in corporate governance.
Allowing someone with inadequate resources to play a significant role
in the management of a large enterprise would not merely have
wasted time, it could also have damaged the corporation.
These concerns, however, do not accurately reflect the abilities of
With the increasing prevalence of institutoday's shareholders."
corporate governance regulations
marketplace,
investors
in
the
tional
that leave no role for investor involvement in corporate
decisionmaking are less tenable. Most institutional investors do have
the resources and the financial incentives to undertake a more active
role in corporate governance. 6' Indeed, they have shown an
increased propensity to seek such involvement.162 The question,
of income. Id. Such transaction costs may benefit investment managers and stockbrokers, but
they produce no real value for the traders or the companies whose stock is being traded and in
fact decrease the amount of capital returned to investors and thus available for reinvestment
158. See infta part IIA-B (discussing management decisions to richly compensate executives,
initiate hostile takeovers, and reject tender offers).
159. See supra note 143 (acknowledging that individual investors lacked expertise and
motivation to supervise management).
160. See supranote 145 (describing growth in institutional investors); supra note 154 (noting
unique ability of institutional investor to oversee corporate functioning); supra note 155
(suggesting that institutional investors have special economic incentive to improve corporate
operations).
161. See Lowenstein, supra note 154, at 4 (highlighting economic advantage du Pont had over
individual investors when it came to buttressing GM when automobile manufacturer fell on hard
times in 1920); Rock, supranote 154, at 460 (establishing that investor's motive is one of selfinterest because it owns concentration of shares).

162. See infra part L.D (characterizing typical modern shareholder as institutional investor that
puts more proposals forward and does not cede passively to management initiatives). While
some institutional investors have adopted trading patterns with an exceedingly high turnover of
stock ownership, others have sought an alternative to routine trading. This latter trend has been
most recently referred to as "relationship investing." Judith H. Dobrzynski, RelationshipInvesting
Bus. WK., Mar. 15, 1993, at 68, 68. Relationship investing depends on the existence of an
"established, committed relationship between a company and one or more shareholders." Id.
Ideally, the result of this pattern is that management gets "patient capital and shareholders get
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then, is whether we should retain corporate governance policies that
prevent investors from assuming a meaningful role when the original
justifications for those barriers no longer apply.
The answer to this question turns on two considerations. First, if
corporations and their shareholders are unlikely to derive any
practical benefit from permitting shareholder participation, it seems
foolhardy to waste time and energy changing the existing rules.
Second, if there are other reasons for precluding shareholder
participation in management, it may not be desirable to change the
rules simply because the original justification has ceased to exist.
Increased shareholder participation would likely produce the
immediate practical benefit of providing a meaningful alternative to
the Wall Street Rule, 6 3 which seems to be a driving force behind
the high rate of turnover in stock ownership. The Wall Street Rule
holds that shareholders who are dissatisfied with management
decisions can "vote with their feet" by selling their shares and finding
a different enterprise in which to invest."6 As is becoming increasingly apparent, there are major problems with the Wall Street Rule.
Clearly, it is an imperfect solution for dissatisfied shareholders: not
only does it impose transaction costs, it also presumes the availability
of acceptable substitute investments. 165 Large investors, however,
often cannot locate suitable substitute investments."6 Moreover, the

management accountability and a better-run company." Id. at 69.
163. The Wall Street Rule tells investors to "vote with their feet"; that is, if they do not like
management decisions, they should sell their stock rather than spend any time or effort trying
to change management. Many supporters of the existing model of corporate governance, and
its corollary, the Wall Street Rule, are highly critical of the short-term focus of modem investors.
It is ironic that the very structure that they hope to protect actually encourages the shorttermism that they criticize so intensely. See infra note 199 (describing short-termism as
phenomenon of high turnover in ownership of companies).
164. See Lowenstein, Stick & Carrot supranote 142, at 251 (referring to shareholders' ability
to sell if they do not like management decisions).
165. Cf Chris Welles, The Futureof Wall Street: Why OurFinancialSystem Will Never Be the Same,
Bus. Wy., Nov. 5, 1990, at 119, 120 (noting that transaction costs on NewYork Stock Exchange
can be from two to eight percent per share).
166. See Lowenstein, Stick & Carrot supra note 142, at 251-52 (suggesting that College
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) was involved in prominent proxy fight because it could not
find appropriate substitute investments). CREF filed a shareholder proposal with International
Paper Company asking that a proposed poison pill be submitted to the shareholders for their
approval. A CREF spokesperson explained that the proposal was necessary because "so many
other portfolio companies already have pills." Id.
In fact, there are numerous policies that are so prevalent that a dissatisfied shareholder would
have a very hard time finding a substitute investment without similar drawbacks. An investor
dissatisfied with the adoption of a shark repellent amendment would have to avoid 40% of the
Fortune 500 companies. See John Pound, The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover
Activity: Some Direct Evidence, 30 J.L. & ECON. 353, 353 (1987) (citing INVESTOR RESPONSIBILrIY
RESEARCH CENTER, ANTITAKEOVER CHARTER AMENDMENTS: A DIRECTORY OF MAJOR AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS (1985)). Similarly, if an investor wanted to find a company with confidential
voting, as of 1989, only 20 publicly held American companies fit the bill. MCGURN, supranote
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Wall Street Rule does not consider the growing possibility that an
individual investor may own such a significant block of stock in a
particular company that the very act of selling out would depress the
market, resulting in a lower return on the investment than the market
would normally provide. 7
Finally, this "solution" ignores the fact that it leads to the high
turnover of stock ownership that many authorities, especially those
supportive of the current model of corporate governance, apparently
believe to be inherently undesirable." Legal and news commentators, financial analysts, and members of management are complaining
that the high turnover of stock ownership in this country is producing
a whole range of undesirable consequences. 6 9 First, it increases
volatility in the capital markets.1 7 1 Second, it forces management to
make decisions that are profitable in the short term, even when other
17 1
alternatives would produce superior long-term results.
Increased shareholder participation in corporate governance could
also produce a second potential benefit: better decisionmaking.
Some directors have made some spectacularly poor decisions, at least
from an economic perspective, 172 over objections by shareholders.
The only remedy the current system provides is the Wall Street

133, at 49. An investor objecting to a corporate policy permitting its CEO to earn more than
$1,000,000 per year can eliminate the 173 companies that did pay their CEO in excess of
$1,000,000 in 1991. Shawn Tully, What CEO's Really Make, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 94, 98.
Investors seeking to avoid these objectionable policies must eliminate from the pool of
possible investments most of the blue chip companies that institutional investors have
traditionally preferred. When the investor has hundreds of millions of dollars to invest,
eliminating the largest corporations from the pool of suitable investments often eliminates all
viable substitutes.
167. See Howard D. Sherman, Can ShareholdersCall the Shots? Bus. Soc. REV., Fall 1988, at 64
("[T]oday's shareholders are simply too big to follow the Wall Street [R]ule. It's hard to sell
out and find a new market when you are the market. ...
[T]he mere act of selling could
depress share value .... ").
168. See supranotes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing increased stock turnover).
169. See Tamar Frankel, What Can Be Done About Stock Market Volatility?, 69 B.U. L. REV. 991,
991 (1989) (arguing that increased market volatility brought on by excessive trading creates
"bubbles," rising market prices, which can produce inflation, or "runs," falling market prices,
which can shrink consumption and production); Louis Lowenstein, Stockholders, Humbug! Giving
Them Top DollarCould Cheat UsAll, WASH. POsT,Jan. 14,1990, at B1, B4 [hereinafter Lowenstein,
Stockholders, Humbug!] (commenting that shareholders interested only in short-term profits,
rather than seeing company through long-haul, often sacrifice company through schemes like
leveraged buyouts of 1980s "which stripped the equity out of much of American industry").
170. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (setting out turnover rates in stock
ownership and attributing growth in rates to institutional investors).
171. See Lowenstein, Stockholders, Humbug!, supranote 169, at B4 (arguing that management
must meet short-term goals of investors to keep them happy, which often undermines its ability
to establish and achieve long-term goals).
172. See infra part II (pointing out areas of corporate decisionmaking that are especially
contentious for shareholders).
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Rule. 173 Allowing shareholders a meaningful opportunity to replace
directors with their own nominees, however, would provide management with a meaningful incentive to improve decisionmaking.
Of course, benefits such as improved decisionmaking will be
realized only if shareholders are both able and willing to assume an
active role in corporate governance. Given that institutional investors
have replaced individuals as the most common type of shareholder,
it is now feasible for at least some shareholders to participate in
corporate governance at a meaningful level if the barriers to such
participation were removed. It is for this reason that the SEC should
reexamine the rules and regulations limiting shareholder involvement
in corporate governance.
D. Attempts at ShareholderActivism
As institutional investors have increased their ownership in
American companies, they have also increased their interest in the
management of these companies. 7 4 It is thus no longer accurate
to depict the typical stockholder as a completely passive investor
waiting for dividends to roll in. Shareholders are placing more
initiatives on corporate ballots, and shareholder voting in recent years
has shown increased opposition to certain management proposals. 75
Moreover, there is a marked divergence between the views of
management and shareholder constituencies in the legal and business
literature and in comments to suggested regulatory reforms. 76

173. See supra part I.B (discussing barriers to shareholder participation in corporate
governance); see also supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing Wall Street Rule).
174. See Lowenstein & Millstein, supra note 142, at 743 ("Accompanying their increase in
economic power has been a movement on the part of institutional investors to increase their
participation in the corporate decision making process.").
175. SeeJayne W. Barnard, InstitutionalInvestors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1135, 1137 (1991) (maintaining that investors are issuing more proposals, banding together
to oppose management proposals, and uniting to pressure management into reforms); Patrick
J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, InstitutionalShareholder Proposals,and CorporateDemocracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97,
158-59 (1988) (discussing shareholder proposal campaign spearheaded by Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association and College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA/CREF), one of oldest and
most powerful pension funds, to require shareholder votes on management's adoption of poison
pill amendment); Brett D. Fromson, The Big Owners Roar, FORTUNE, July 30, 1990, at 67, 67
(detailing growth of institutional investor activism since 1987, when institutional shareholders
submitted total of 30 proposals and comparing this statistic with 98 resolutions submitted byJuly
1990); Dale M. Hanson, Proxy Season: Victories Without Majorities, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July
23, 1990, at 16, 16 (commenting on increased shareholder activism and gains achieved by
institutional investors even when their proposals did notwin majority); Marcia Parker, Funds Gird
for Proxy Season, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 13, 1989, at 92, 92 (describing two shareholder
proposals that called on corporations to submit plans to issue large blocks of stock or to amend
bylaws for shareholder vote).
176. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-20,091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,218 (1983)
(relaying debate about amendments to Rule 14a-8).
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As shareholders have demonstrated an increased willingness to
participate in corporate governance, there has been a corresponding
increase in proposals designed to increase shareholder participation
in corporate governance, and a growing shareholder hostility to
certain resolutions promulgated by promanagement factions. Law
review articles have urged various reforms designed to promote
shareholder participation in corporate governance. 7 7 Similarly, the
SEC adopted the most recent amendments to the federal proxy rules
for the express purpose of fostering shareholder communication and
the effective exercise of shareholder voting rights.1 78 The ALI
Corporate Governance Project also was designed to respond to the
9
changing nature of American stockholders. 1
Of course, any attempt to restructure corporate rules and regulations to permit shareholder participation in corporation governance
would prove futile if shareholders showed absolutely no propensity to
take advantage of such opportunities. In recent years, however, a
growing body of evidence contradicts the notion that shareholders will
always remain passive. Shareholder proposals, and shareholder votes
cast in favor of such proposals, have become increasingly common."8 Shareholder opposition to certain management proposals,
particularly proposals to adopt takeover defenses, has also been on
the rise. 8 ' Finally, shareholders are now more inclined to criticize

177. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV.
37 (1990) (advocating increased shareholder access to proxy process to improve shareholder
role in selection of directors); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66-69 (1987) (calling for renewal of shareholder democracy
by amending existing law to allow shareholders "free and equal access" to corporations' proxy
machinery); Lowenstein, Stick & Carrot, supra note 142, at 256-57 (proposing that shareholders
elect 20-25% of board separately from election of directors generally).
178. See Shareholder Communications, supra note 104, 1 85,051, at 83,355.
179. See ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 518-23 (recognizing that although
shareholders must rely on management's professional expertise, they must have mechanisms to
safeguard their interests).
180. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Buu.ETIN 115-23
(1990) [hereinafter IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN] (presenting list of major
shareholder proposals in 1990 and percentage of vote each received).
181. SeeJEFFREYw. BIERSHACH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SERVICE: VOTING BYINSTTUTIONAL
INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1990 PROXY SEASON ii (1990) [hereinafter
1990 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SURVEY] (presenting results of 1990 survey that show that
institutional investors have continued trend, begun in late 1980s, of "fairly strong opposition to
management anti-takeover provisions"). Opposition remained the same or increased on virtually
every type of anti-takover device in 1989. Id. The Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) is a non-profit research group that has conducted substantial research on institutional
investor responses to anti-takeover devices such as unequal voting stock, limits on special
shareholders' meetings, elimination of ability to act by written consents, adoption of a classified
board, authorization of blank-check stock, and anti-greenmail provisions. Id.
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management and promanagement regulatory schemes.182 These
facts point to the existence of increasingly aware and active shareholders.
Shareholders can formally express dissatisfaction with management
policies by making their own proposals to other shareholders, and by
Of the two, the most
staging or supporting proxy contests."8
common is the shareholder proposal; proxy contests are quite
rare. 8 4 A review of shareholder proposals in recent years, however,
reveals several important trends. First, shareholders are proposing
more resolutions, especially resolutions relating to corporate
governance.1 85 Second, such proposals are receiving a greater share
of the vote, even over management opposition.' 86 Finally, recent
a trend toward greater involvement by
proxy seasons clearly indicate
87

institutional investors.

1

182. See Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E. Korens, Institutional ShareholderActivism and
Related Proposalsfor Legislative and Regulatory Changes to Corporate Governance Rules, in PLI PROXY
CONTESTS, INSTrrITIONAL INVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 621, 627-28 (1990)
(discussing evolution of investors' attitudes from voting with management on all issues to actively
opposing management proposals and putting forth own). Institutional investors are also
organizing and lobbying the Securities and Exchange Commission for corporate governance
reform. Id. at 632.
183. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 39 (explaining that shareholders may have their
proposals circulated to other shareholders or may undertake independent proxy solicitation,
which is very expensive).
184. Marilyn B. Cane, The Revised SEC ShareholderProxy ProposalSystem: Attitudes, Results and
Perspectives, 11J. CORP. L. 57, 61 (1985) (contending that shareholder proposals are only formal
means of determining management reaction to shareholder desires). An independent proxy
solicitation most frequently occurs when a shareholder or outsider is seeking control of the
corporation. Klaus Eppler & Edward W. Scheuermann, Overview of the History and Current Uses
of Proxy and Consent Solicitation Contests: Shareholder Challenges and Management Responses, in PLI
PROXY CONTESTS, INSTITUlIONAL INVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 9, 16 (1990)

(describing use of proxy to gain control when financing for tender offer is unavailable). Proxy
fights are rare primarily because of the huge expenses involved. See Barnard, supra note 177,
at 39. Once legal, printing and professional solicitation fees are added up, the total cost often
runs into millions of dollars. Id.
185. See supra note 175; see also Cane, supra note 184, at 60 (describing proxy proposals
covering issues from nomination of directors to prohibiting investments in South Africa);
Rosenbaum & Korens, supra note 182, at 629 (stating that institutional-investor-sponsored
proposals hit "all-time high" in 1989).
186.

SeeWlLLIAM F. SANDER, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., SHAREHOLDER VOTING

ALMANAC 4-5 (1991) (noting that support for shareholder proposals has increased overall since
1986). In the area of shareholder proposals for confidential voting, there was an increase from
an average of 9.5% of shares in support in 1987 to nearly 33.5% of shares in 1990. ld. at 5.
Shareholder proposals to redeem or vote on poison pills, reduce supermajority vote
requirements, opt out of state takeover laws, and repeal classified boards also received a high
level of support in 1990. Id.
The increase in shareholder activism is even more evident when one notes that the only
shareholder proposal to pass in 1986 had management support, while management did not
support any of the 16 shareholder proposals that passed in 1990. Id. at 85.
187. See 1990 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SURVEY, supra note 181, at 5 ("The results of the 1990
IRRC voting survey confirm the trend toward increasing institutional activism in the proxy voting
process."). Institutions have continued their relatively high level of opposition to management
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The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), a not-for-profit
corporation formed in 1972 to compile and analyze information
relating to institutional investors, conducts an annual survey on the
response of institutional investors to corporate governance issues.18
The responses of institutional investors over the past few years reveal
that management can no longer depend on the support of institution89
al investors, particularly in the area of corporate governance.
The IRRC reviews and tabulates data on shareholder proposals at
approximately 1500 public companies. 9 0 This data indicates that
in the 1987 proxy season, forty-six corporate governance resolutions,
most of which related to takeover defenses, received more than twenty
percent of the shareholder vote. 9 ' In 1988, fifty-eight shareholder
resolutions received more than twenty percent of the vote.9 2 Most
of these proposals also related to takeover defenses, but other issues
included cumulative voting, confidential voting, and access to the
corporate proxy machinery.'93 In 1989, there were ninety-five such
corporate governance proposals.'9 4 While more than half related
to takeover defenses, nearly one-third supported confidential
voting.'95 In 1990, 170 corporate governance proposals received
more than twenty percent of the vote. 9 In fact, fourteen of these
proposals received more than half of the votes cast. 97 The trends
are clear: shareholders are making more proposals, which are
receiving support from greater numbers of shareholders.
These shareholder proposals, and the support they have received,
are not the only evidence that shareholders are increasingly dissatis-

anti-takeover proposals, id. at 13, while increasing their level of support for shareholder
proposals on corporate governance issues. Id. at 41. Institutional investors have also supported
social responsibility shareholder resolutions. Pension funds, church groups, and educational
institutions in particular showed a willingness to oppose management's viewpoint on social
responsibility issues. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CrR., How INSTITUTIONS VOTED ON
SOCIAL POLICY SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1990 PROXY SEASON 7 (Sept. 1990).

188. 1990 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SURVEY, supra note 181, at ii.
189. See SANDER, supra note 186, at 10. While more shareholder proposals are passing, 16
in 1990, as opposed to one in 1986, id. at 85, more management proposals are failing, 22 in
1990, as opposed to four in 1988 and 14 in 1986. Id. at 10. Failed proposals have increased
while the number of management proposals has decreased overall. Id.
190. See SANDER, supra note 186, at 1.
191. S. MARCIL & P. O'HARA, VOTING BY INSrTtrTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1987 PROXY SEASON 55-58 (1987).
192. P. BERGEN, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN
THE 1988 PROXY SEASON app. at 67-73 (1988).

193.
194.
IN THE
195.
196.
197.

Id.
L. KRASNOW, VOTING BY INSrrUTONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES
1989 PROXY SEASON 111-16 (1989).
Id.
IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN, supra note 180, at 115-23.
IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN, supranote 180, at 115-23.
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fled with their minimal role in the current system of corporate
governance. Public commentary provides evidence of increasing
tensions between corporate management and institutional investors.'9 8 Charges of bias and shortsightedness, or short-termism,',
are made on both sides, although such accusations have been
accompanied by surprisingly little meaningful dialogue."° Management generally resists the mechanisms that institutional investors
support, frequently on grounds of economic cost and inefficiency."'
Investors, and commentators arguing on their behalf, respond with

198. On August 16, 1983, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 14a-8, which governs
shareholder proposals. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-20,091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (Aug. 16,
1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1990)). One clear example of the hostility toward
management by pro-investor commentators is found in the literature debating these
amendments.
Originally, the SEC submitted three proposed amendments to the public for review and
comments. Exchange Act Release No. 34-19,135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (Oct. 26, 1982). The first
proposal made only operational changes to the existing rule: it increased the stock ownership
requirements, imposed a minimum holding period, limited the number of proposals, and
changed the deadline for submission of proposals. Id. at 47,421. The second proposal allowed
issuers to establish alternate procedures to govern shareholder proposals, and gave the
corporation the authority to decide disputes concerning the interpretation of corporate rules.
Id. at 47,422. The third proposal allowed all shareholder proposals permissible under state law,
excluding matters relating to the election of directors, subject to a numerical maximum. Id.
Shareholder activist Lewis Gilbert called the first two proposals "perfectly outrageous." John
Perham, Uproar Over the Annual Meeting, DuN's Bus. MONTH, Apr. 1983, at 64, 68. Wilma Soss,
president of the Federation of Women Shareholders, said that the second proposal would be
"like putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank." Id. at 65. The second proposal was
characterized as "a return to the law of thejunge." Id.
Management, on the other hand, criticized shareholder proposals as a waste of time and
money. See Cane, supra note 184, at 70 (reporting that survey mailed to 448 Fortune 500
companies revealed that 72.9% of managers viewed shareholder proposals as "a waste of
management's time and the corporation's money").
199. "Short-termism" is a term used to describe the phenomenon of high turnover in
ownership of companies. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 41. An investor who buys stock and,
within a short period of time, sells it and reinvests in another company is a short-term owner.
The familiar Wall Street Rule, see supranotes 163-66 and accompanying text, helps to explain
the prevalence of short-term investment strategies.
200. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., CorporateGovernance in the Nineties: Managers v. Institutions, 59 U.
CIN. L. REv. 357, 360 (1990) (remarking on tense relationship between management and
institutional investors and observing that "[e]ach regards the other warily, suspiciously, apprehensively, and sometimes, with downright hostility"). The conflict between management and
institutional investors was intensified with the takeover battles of the 1980s. Management viewed
hostile tender offers as a threat to long-term plans, while institutional investors were often glad
to accept the takeover premiums. Both sides have criticized the other for being unfairly biased
in these takeover battles, and the hostility engendered by these disputes has not dissipated. Id.
201. See Shareholder Communications, supra note 104, at 83,357 (noting, for example, that
when SEC solicited public comment on latest proposed amendments to proxy rules, proposals
"elicited widespread approval" and further suggestions for reform from shareholders while "[t ] he
corporate community raised numerous objections to the proposals").
Many corporate
commentators argued that "absent a filing obligation in connection with all communications
among shareholders, the reforms would 'further the disturbing trend toward the determination
of the outcome of shareholder voting by secret back-room lobbying of and negotiations with
institutional investors.'" Id. (citing comment letter submitted by The Business Roundtable 2
(Sept. 18, 1991)).
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policy arguments based on notions of democracy, typically ignoring
management's claims of wasted resources, or employing different
standards to evaluate efficiency of the shareholder proposal process.202 Thus, the data suggests that institutional investors are
increasingly willing to assume an active role in corporate governance
issues. The question becomes whether it is desirable to offer
institutional investors a greater role in corporate decisionmaking.
II.

CURRENT PROBLEMS ATrRIBUTABLE TO MANAGEMENT
DOMINATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The only practical reason for abandoning the current model of
corporate governance is if it is causing or contributing to poor
decisionmaking. It would be far simpler if we could justify retaining
our existing laws and regulations by concluding that our current
system is functional, efficient, and not subject to substantial abuse.
This approach is exemplified by the position of the Business
20 3
Roundtable that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."

This position, taken by some business executives, corporate lawyers,
and a few promanagement academicians, may appear to have some
validity. A review of the voluminous commentary surrounding the
state of corporate governance reveals that the bulk of the articles
suggesting that it is time to modify the American model of corporate
governance assumethat the separation of ownership and control noted
by Berle and Means creates problems. 20 4 Those commentators who
do take the time to discuss specific problems tend to focus on the
development of rules that insulate directors from accountability to the

202. For example, some pro-shareholder commentators have suggested that it does not
matter whether shareholder proposals are successful. See, e.g., Loss, supra note 121, at 477 ("It
is not too important that these proposals are not carried .... The very opportunity to submit
proposals, even of an advisory nature, affords a safety valve .... ").
203. See Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundationsof Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current
Push for Proxy Rule Changes, 17J. CORP. L. 163, 163-83 (1991) (explaining that as partner in
Washington, D.C., firm of Arnold & Porter, author served as counsel to Business Roundtable and
is familiar with Roundtable's position on corporate governance and its SEC submissions); see also
Larry E. Ribstein, ed., Edited Transcriptof the Proceedingof the Business Roundtable/Emory University
Law and Economics Center Conference on Remedies Under the ALI Proposals: Law and Economics, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 357, 361 (1986) (remarks of Prof. Michael Bradley, University of Michigan
Graduate School of Business) ("There is an issue of what is broken that needs to be fixed.
Comments were made about the ravages in the market for corporate control and all of the
abuses, but there has been no articulation of the problems at hand.").
204. See, e.g., Cane, supra note 184, at 58-62 (discussing exclusion of shareholders and impact
on corporate democracy, but not effect on corporate decisions); Sommer, supranote 200, at 357
(suggesting need for more independent and effective boards, but not discussing any problems
arising from separation of ownership and control).
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shareholders." 5 The assumptions made by these commentators
critical of existing corporate governance models may be justified, but
certainly a more detailed and direct examination of the extent to
which management abuses occur is necessary in order to justify any
significant reordering of power between shareholders and direc20 6

tors.

In fact, there is evidence that the American model of corporate
governance does not work as well as it should.0 7 Certain patterns
of abuse become clear upon examination of corporate
decisionmaking in America.20 8 Many decisions appear to be motivated more by self-interest than by concern for shareholders or even
other constituencies.2 ° Other decisions appear to be the result of
A system of corporate
sheer incompetence or inefficiency.2 10
governance that provides some check against such abuses would seem
preferable to one that allows them to occur unchecked. The accuracy
of this conclusion, of course, turns on the accuracy of the observation
that corporate decisionmaking in this country is flawed.

205. See, e.g., Barnard, supranote 177, at 37 (discussing failure of present system to provide
shareholders with meaningful role, but not demonstrating that failure produces poor decisions);
Richard M. Buxbaum, TheInternalDivisionofPowersin CorporateGovernance, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1671,
1678-1713 (1985) (detailing numerous obstacles to shareholder participation in corporate
governance); Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a FederalCorporationLaw?, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 55,
57-70 (1991) (discussing barriers to shareholder participation in corporate governance as
problem to be resolved); Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57
BROOK. L. REv. 113, 114-20 (1991) (criticizing corporate developments that limit shareholder
participation); John Matheson & Brent Olson, CorporateLaw and the Longterm Shareholder Model
of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1315, 1323-51 (1992) (discussing in detail numerous
barriers to shareholder participation in corporate governance and concluding that such barriers
justify modification of existing rules).
206. Certainly a few authors have made an attempt to identify some of the problems
occasioned by the imbalance of power between management and shareholders. See, e.g., Bernard
Black, The Value ofInstitutionalInvestorMonitoring. The EmpiricalEvidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895,
898-913 (1992) (discussing bad takeovers, corporate cash retention policies, and management
compensation as examples ofshortfalls in corporate performance under current system); George
W. Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,1989 Wis. L. REv. 881,
886-92 (suggesting that lack of shareholder involvement makes for decisions in certain areas that
ignore shareholder interests); Lipton, supra note 177, at 1 (identifying abusive takeover tactics
as existing problem).
207. See Nell Minow, Proxy Reform: The CaseforIncreasedShareholderCommunication, 17J. CORP.
L. 149, 149-62 (1991) (responding to Business Roundtable's position that proxy reform is
unnecessary). The author notes that "it is not surprising that the members of the Business
Roundtable (and other representatives of management) argue that the current proxy rules work
well. They are the primary beneficiaries of the current impediments to shareholder oversight."
Id. at 156.
208. See infra part II (assessing abusive decisionmaking by directors and its impact on
shareholders).
209. See supra part I.A (considering corporate decisions motivated by director self-interest).
210. See infra part H.B (reviewing cases involving poor corporate decisionmaking).
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A. Self-Interested Transactions
At least in theory, state statutes place strict limitations on actions by
directors who are personally interested in the subject matter of a
particular transaction."' These limitations are subject to judicial
enforcement 2 1 2 It is often difficult, however, to convince the court
that a particular action is self-interested. 1 One might assume, for
example, that decisions regarding one's own salary would automatically qualify as self-interested. In fact, the same state statutes that
purport to prohibit self-interested transactions typically grant directors
authority to manage all business affairs, including compensation levels
214
for themselves and for management.
Similarly, one might assume that a decision about whether or not
to sell control of the corporation,1 5 which will inevitably affect the
status of management, would be deemed self-interested. Certainly,
one can see the possibility of a conflict of interest in asking a director
to evaluate whether to sell a corporation, which might result in a
profit to shareholders but a loss of the director's position with the

211. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1990) (calling for full disclosure of material facts
surrounding corporate transactions in which director has "material financial interest"); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991) (requiring directors make full disclosure as to their "interest and
relationship with the transaction"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986) (requiring
disclosure of material facts surrounding transactions in which director has "substantial financial
interest"); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.35-1 (West Supp. 1993) (demanding disclosure of
material facts pertaining to director's relationship to and interests in transaction in which
director has financial interest).
212. See, e.g., Tevis v. Beigel, 344 P.2d 360, 362-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (discussing policies
underlying California statute regarding transactions between corporation and director and
applying statute to contract between corporation and interested director); Freedman v.
Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc., Civ. Act. No. 9212, 1990 Del. Cas. LEXIS 142, at *19-23 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 19, 1990) (interpreting and applying Delaware statute restricting directors' ability to
engage in self-interested transactions).
213. See, e.g., Alpertv. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 24-28 (N.Y. 1984) (highlighting
proof problems relating to valuation of assets, fair dealing, and full disclosure that plaintiff
shareholders faced in suit alleging self-dealing by directors).
214. See e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990) ("[T]he business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
direction of the board."); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors . .. ."); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986) ("[T]he business of a
corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors. .. ."); TEx. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.31 (West Supp. 1993) ("The powers of a corporation shall be exercised
by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed
under the direction of, the board of directors .... ").
215. It is somewhat misleading to speak in terms of selling control. In actuality, a sale of
control can be accomplished through a tender offer for outstanding shares, a sale of all or
substantially all of the corporation's assets, or a merger, combination, or even a mandatory share
exchange. All of these types of transactions can amount to an effective sale of control. See
Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTs, RAIDERS &

TARGETs: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314-22 (John Coffee et al. eds., 1988)
(reviewing methods of corporate takeovers in terms of purchase and sale of corporate control).
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company, or to fight the sale, which would allow the director to keep
her position. Yet courts have allowed directors tremendous discretion
in opposing takeovers. 16
In fact, there are several types of decisions that have withstood
17
judicial scrutiny, but seem suspect when viewed objectively.1
Decisions regarding executive compensation and takeovers fall within
this group.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the following
discussion, there are clear patterns of abuse in each of these areas.
1.

Executive compensation

One issue that has garnered significant attention recently, especially
in the popular press, is executive compensation.218 The fascination
with executive compensation stems in part from the huge numbers
involved. In one survey, the median annual compensation package
for CEOs of 200 of the largest American companies during 1991 was
$2.4 million.2 19 The highest paid executive in corporate America in
1991 earned at least $58.9 million.2
In 1991, when a sizable

216. See infra notes 283-95 and accompanying text (discussingjudicial acquiescence to antitakeover tactics and statutes).
217. For example, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have complained that courts are too
deferential to management in evaluating decisions relating to hostile tender offers. See Frank
Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1198-99 (1981) (arguing that business judgment rule should not
be available to directors in hostile takeover context).
218. See Shawn Tully, What CEOs Really Make, FORTUNE,June 15, 1992, at 94, 94 (stating that
increase in executive compensation packages in face of declining profits has led shareholders
to call for reform). Executive compensation can take many forms. A corporate executive's total
compensation is almost certain to consist of far more than basic salary. See id. (stating that in
1991, 19 top-paid CEOs received 86% of median total compensation in form of stock grants).
Not only do most corporations offer substantial deferred compensation and pension plan
payments, but in order to maximize income while minimizing taxability, corporations have also
offered their executives rewards in the form of profit-sharing and stock bonus plans, nonqualified stock options, performance stock, and phantom stock. See George H. Foote,
PerformanceShares Revitalize Executive Stock Plans, HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 121, 121-25
(documenting history, advantages, and disadvantages of performing shares as means of longterm executive compensation); Leo Herzl & Kenneth Perlman, Stock Appreciation Rights, 33 Bus.
LAW. 749, 749-58 (1978) (reviewing use of stock appreciation rights as means of incentive
compensation plans for officers and employees); Gerald Sherman, Deferred Compensation-Qualifledand Nonqualiffed: A LegislativePerspective Through the Tax Reform Act of1969, 11 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 870, 872-94 (1970) (analyzing various types of deferred compensation
arrangements and policy reasons behind them); Note, PhantomStock Plans,76 HARV. L. REV. 619,
619-22 (1963) (discussing use of deferred compensation plans as way to increase executive
remuneration).
219. Tully, supranote 218, at 94-99 (reporting that median salary, including bonuses, was
$1.2 million with average stock options and grants of restricted stock, doubling total value of
compensation package).
220. Tully, supra note 218, at 94. Roberto C. Goizueta of Coca-Cola received this package,
and $56 million of it was attributable to a million-share restricted stock grant. Id. Other sources
reported that Anthony O'Reilly, CEO of HJ. Heinz, may have earned as much as $75 million
during 1991. Steve Kichen & Eric Hardy, PuttingIt in Perspective,FORBES, May 25, 1992, at 174,
174; Maria Mallory, Turning Ketchup into Big Dough, BUS. WY., Mar. 30, 1992, at 58, 58.
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221
number of American workers were unable to find any work at all,
an even dozen CEOs brought home more than $10 million in annual
compensation. 2222 Compensation for the top executives in American
companies, on average, is about 160 times greater than an average
employee's salary, and several times more than that earned by
comparable executives in European and Japanese companies.2 23
Of course, the problem is not just the size of these numbers. If
high executive compensation meant huge returns to shareholders,
many shareholders would be willing to see CEOs take home huge
bonuses, stock incentives, and salaries. 224 The evidence, however,
suggests that the connection between CEO compensation and
corporate performance is not particularly strong.225 Executive
compensation continues to rise at unprecedented rates despite
226
economic problems for the rest of the country.
Other top executives in American companies also fare quite well.
The average chief financial officer earned in excess of $200,000 in
base salary during 1991;227 top marketing and sales executives

221. See Adam Clymer, House Approves Extended Benefits for Those Out of Work Six Months, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1991, at Al6 (stating that over 300,000 workers in 34 states had been out of work
for over 26 weeks); Marvin Newman, NovemberJobless Rate in New York CityJumps to 10.2%, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1991, at A25.
222. Tully, supranote 218, at 95. The dozen were Roberto C. Goizueta (Coca-Cola: $58.9
million); Hamish Maxwell (Philip Morris: $29.9 million); Stanley C. Gault (Goodyear Tire &
Rubber. $22.5 million); Lawrence A. Bossidy (Allied-Signal: $22.2 million); William A. Schreyer
(Merrill Lynch: $15.75 million); Stephan M. Wolf (UAL: $14.2 million); Noland D. Archibald
(Black & Decker- $13.5 million); Richard J. Mahoney (Monsanto: $10.6 million); John F.
Welch, Jr. (General Electric: $10.25 million); William D. Smithburg (Quaker Oats: $10.2
million); and Richard D. Wood (Eli Lilly- $10.1 million). Id.
223. Judith Dobrzynski, CEO Pay: Something Should Be Done-But Not by Congress, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 29, 29 (arguing for implementation of new accounting rules and increased
shareholder participation in order to curb abuses in executive compensation).
224. See Mallory, supra note 220, at 58 (observing that most shareholders would not object
to large executive compensation packages provided that shareholders were receiving good return
on their shares).
225. See Graef S. Crystal, The Great CEOPay Sweepstakes, FORTUNE, June 18, 1990, at 94, 94-95
(stating that factors such as company size, performance, and business risk account for only 45%
of variation in CEO compensation and concluding that market for CEO services is chaotic with
respect to compensation).
226. Geoffrey Colvin, How To Pay the CEO Right, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 60, 61. Colvin
describes trends in CEO compensation as follows:
Largely unharnessed from corporate performance, the pay of America's CEOs has been
galloping forward faster than the average production worker's pay, faster than
corporate profits, industrial production, the national debt, the population of India,
channels on cable TV, or just about anything else on earth but the number of newly
independent republics.
Id.
227. Kenneth Labich, The New Pay Game ... And How You Measure Up, FORTUNE, Oct. 19,
1992, at 116, 117. For companies in the manufacturing industry, the chief financial officers
earned an average of $224,000, and for similar officials in wholesale/retail, the average income
was $205,200. Id. at 116. These sums exclude bonuses, stock options, and stock grants. Only
base salary is included in these figures.
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earned an average of $135,000;228 and the chief corporate informadon officer earned an average of approximately $130,000.2 While
generous, these salaries are not nearly as excessive as the compensation paid to CEOs in the same companies. Because the CEO is the
single individual most likely to exert a significant influence on
directoral decisionmaking, 3 ° this discrepancy in salary makes CEO
compensation one area in which self-interest appears to play a major
role.
In addition to comment in the popular press, the SEC has
recognized that executive compensation is a serious issue for
stockholders.231 In light of the changing economic climate, the SEC
revised its longstanding policy that prevented shareholders from
including nonbinding resolutions on corporate pay policies in
shareholder proposals; as currently interpreted, the proxy rules
require management to include such proposals.3 2 Even more
recently, in the last round of amendments to the federal proxy rules,
the SEC entirely revised the executive compensation disclosure
requirements in an effort to make the disclosures more comprehensible.233 None of these changes, however, go to the heart of the
problem.
Shareholders are still not allowed a meaningful say in setting
executive compensation. They can pass nonbinding resolutions, but
they do not have even the ability to replace members of management
who allow self-interest to cloud their decisionmaking on such issues
as executive compensation. 234 Nor is it generally possible for them
228. Id. at 117.
229. Id.
230. See Black, supranote 206, at 899-902 (contending that CEO often dominates board of
directors). Frequently, this authority derives from the CEOs position as chairman of the board
of directors. In this capacity, the CEO can set agendas, appoint committees, and exert
tremendous influence over other board members. Id.
231. See Tully, supranote 218, at 94.
232. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1993).
Of course, the shareholder resolutions are still
nonbinding. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, CorporateLaw and Practice: ShareholderInitiative: A Social
Choiceand Game TheoreticApproach to CorporateLaw, 60 U. GIN. L. REv. 347, 348 (1991) (discussing
ineffectiveness of shareholder resolutions).
233. See Shareholder Communications, supra note 104, at 108-239 (citing need for more
comprehensible executive compensation statements).
234. Frequently, state statutes or, more commonly, corporate bylaws grant the power to
remove and replace directors to other directors, not to shareholders. CompareOHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.58 (Page 1992) (granting power to remove director to directors) with DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (k) (1991) (granting shareholders power to remove unless provided otherwise
in bylaws). Even where shareholders hold the technical power to remove and replace directors,
the removal process would require a shareholder meeting and vote. Id. (requiring holders of
majority of shares to vote for removal). Shareholders opposed to particular directors would thus
be faced with all of the expenses and difficulties of waging a proxy fight, likely against
management opposition. Moreover, because the business judgment rule is likely to protect most
decisions involving compensation issues, shareholders would not even be able to remove
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to rely on the Wall Street solution by finding a different company in
which to invest because the problem of excessive executive compensation seems endemic to American corporations.
2.

Takeovers-the decision to acquire another corporation

Yet another category of decisions that ought to be suspect, but is
instead accorded essentially the full protection of the business
judgment rule, involves the initiation of hostile tender offers. While
2 35
it is true that commentators offered a large number of theories
attempting to explain the takeover frenzy236 of the 1980s, one of the
most intriguing hypotheses was that directors liked to acquire other
corporations because such acquisitions provided top management
with benefits such as increased compensation, prestige, power, and
job security."' Some commentators have described this theory 23
as8
the empire-building hypothesis or the firm-expansion theory.
This theory suggests that the traditional explanations offered in
support of the wave of takeovers during the 1980s were inaccurate or,
at best, incomplete.
For example, one of the principal justifications offered in support
of hostile tender offers was the notion that takeovers increased
efficiency by replacing inefficient management with better managers.23' This hypothesis suggests that hostile takeovers are economically desirable because the bidding company's management would
operate more efficiently than would existing management, and the
expected increase in efficiency would raise the value of the target
after acquisition.24
Evidence, however, does not support this

directors by bringing a direct or derivative action. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text
(discussing removal of directors for cause).
235. See Richard Roll, EmpiricalEvidence on TakeoverActivity and ShareholderWealth, inKNIGHTS,
RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra note 215, at 243-50 (listing

seven possible explanations for wave of mergers and acquisitions that characterized 1980s).
236. The staggering level of takeover activity during the 1980s was the subject of much
comment. In 1986 alone, more than 4000 merger and acquisition transactions involving assets
in excess of $190.5 billion were consummated. See Deborah De Mott, Directors' Duties in
Management Buyouts and LeveragedRecapitalizations,49 OHIO ST. LJ. 517,517-20 (1988) (analyzing
legal, economic, and social concerns surrounding management buyouts and leveraged
recapitalization).
237. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028, 1033 (1982) (suggesting that bidding management may initiate hostile tender offer
out of interests such as desire for power and prestige).
238. See, e.g., Gregory Andre, Tender Offersfor CorporateControk A CriticalAnalysis and Proposals
for Reform, 12 DEL J. CORP. L. 865, 874-75 (1987) (stating that management's preference for
expansion probably is ancillary motive in takeover decision); Bebchuk, supranote 237, at 1030-33
(arguing that dominant motives for tender offers are creation of economies of scale in
production, marketing, control, reduced cost of capital, and tax savings).
239. Andre, supranote 238, at 872-73.
240. Andre, supranote 238, at 872-73.
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theory. Studies indicate that most bidders sought targets with
excellent management,24 ' and two-thirds of successful acquirors
allowed the acquired firm to retain control over operating decisions.242 In addition, the value of the acquired firm often did not
243
increase after acquisition.
Another justification offered in support of takeovers was the
This hypothesis suggests that bidders
synergistic-gains theory.2'
engage in hostile tender offers because the target has a unique value
to the bidder, and because combining the firms will allow the
realization of synergistic gains.245 But like the efficiency theory, the
evidence does not support the synergistic-gains theory. In fact, such
gains rarely materialize.246
The empire-building hypothesis does not attribute noble or
economically desirable motives to the management of bidding
companies. It suggests that the motivation behind hostile takeovers
is not to achieve higher rates of return to shareholders of the bidding
corporation, but rather to accommodate the self-interest of the
directors initiating the takeovers.247 Simply put, there are a number
of studies suggesting that there is a high correlation between firm size
and executive compensation.24 8 There are also a number of studies
suggesting that the bidding corporation's shareholders derive no
significant economic benefits from hostile takeover activity,249 and

241. SeeJohn Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Contro. A CriticalAssessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in CorporateGovernance,84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1212 (1984) (citing 1981 study
by Touche Ross & Co. that stated that 84% of bidding companies surveyed listed excellent
management as major factor in selecting takeover target).
242. Id.
243. Black, supra note 206, at 906.
244. Coffee, supra note 241, at 1166.
245. Coffee, supranote 241, at 1166 (explaining that synergistic-gains theory justifies hostile
takeovers by listing characteristics of target firm that would increase value to bidder to level
above market prices).
246. Coffee, supranote 241, at 1224. In addition, the synergistic-gains theory fails to explain
why target management opposes most of these transactions that, in theory at least, should
produce increased wealth for both parties. Id. at 1167.
247. See Bebchuk, supra note 237, at 1033 (suggesting that some hostile offerors are
motivated by self-interest).
248. CHARLES A. PECK, TOP EXECUTrVE COMPENSATION 2-7 (1987); see alsoCoffee, supra note
241, at 1167 n.50 (outlining studies that find strong connection between firm size and executive
compensation). According to studies conducted by Charles Peck at the Conference Board, onehalf of the variation in compensation in corporate CEOs is attributable to company size
measured by gross sales rather than profits. PECK, supra, at 3-7.
249. SeeJ. GRUNDFEST & B. BLACK, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STOCK MARKET PROFITS FROM
TAKEOVER ACTIVrrY BETWEEN 1981 AND 1986 (1987) (reporting five year study by SEC that
revealed that average above-market return to bidding firms was -0.04% for 30 day period
beginning 10 days before takeover announcement to 20 days after); Murray Weidenbaum &
Stephen Vogt, Takeovers and Stockholders: Winners and Losers, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1987,
at 157, 157-68 (concluding that shareholders of target corporation benefit while shareholders
of bidding firm lose on their investment). But seeJensen, supra note 215, at 314-22 (citing
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that in fact, such acquisitions may actually harm the bidding corporation. 5 Given this evidence, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
self-interest plays a role in the takeover markets."1 In many cases,
one can argue that there is only one plausible explanation 2 for the
fact that directors of bidding companies are willing to expend millions
of dollars to engage in a takeover battle when there is no evidence
that their shareholders will realize any increased rates of return:
directors are concerned with something other than the interests of
their shareholders."SS
In some ways, the problems with takeovers are a concern of the
past. Many states amended their statutes to impose substantial
barriers to hostile tender offers,2 4 and most corporations have
amended their corporate charters to incorporate an incredible array
of defensive tactics designed to fend off hostile offers. 5 Moreover,

returns to bidding firms as high as four percent). Other sources complain that the evidence is
insufficient to determine if there are any returns. See Roll, supra note 235, at 244-50 (stating that
there is not enough empirical evidence on takeover activity to support particular social policy).
It is not just the short-term returns that appear doubtful. The overall impact of takeovers on
bidders has also been questioned. At least one commentator has concluded that, "even in the
1980's, a period of relative prosperity, the bidders suffered an immediate and sharp decline in
profitability." Edward S. Herman & Louis Lowenstein, The EJf-iiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers,
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACr OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra note 215, at 231.
250. See William Proxmire, What's Right and Wrong About Hostile Takeovers, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
353, 361 n.17 (noting that one study examined share prices for successful bidding corporations
and found that, within three years of successful merger, price of shares in surviving firm actually
declined significantly) (citing Magenheim & Dennis Mueller, On Measuring the Effect of
Acquiring Firm Stockholders (paper prepared for Columbia Law School Conference on
Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Nov. 15, 1985)).
251. See, e.g., Jensen, supranote 215, at 314-22 (arguing that market for corporate control
is nothing more than arena in which managers compete for right to manage); Roll, supra note
235, at 250 (discussing management self-interest as one possible motive for takeover activity);
Murray Weidenbaum, Lessons of an Outside Director, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 563, 568 (1992)
(concluding that self-interest dominates decisionmaking process of corporate directors with
regard to initiating takeovers).
252. There are, of course, plenty of implausible explanations. For example, those closely
involved in staging hostile takeover battles claim that they are more concerned about
shareholders than the entrenched management. As another commentator has noted, "It strains
credulity to believe that the managers of acquiring companies are so idealistic that they are
willing to risk the assets of their own shareholders to liberate the downtrodden shareholders of
the target firms. Some other explanation must be sought." Weidenbaum, supranote 251, at
568.
253. See Coffee, supra note 241, at 1168 ("[T]he most important conflict of interest in
corporate control may be on the bidder's side of the transaction-between the interest of the
bidder's management and those of its own shareholders.").
254. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991) (limiting acquiror's ability to control
acquired corporation by preventing acquiror from engaging in certain business relationships
with acquired company for three years following acquisition); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1 to 42-9
(Bums 1989) (placing restraints on acquiror's ability to exert its power once it has purchased
certain percentage of target's shares).
255. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the Unocal/Revlon
Gap, 35 AI Z. L. REV. 989, 989-95 (1993) (indicating that many corporations have amended
corporate charters to include wide variety of defenses to hostile tender offers); infranotes 267-75
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the junk-bond market, which funded many of these acquisitions,
collapsed amid scandal." 6 The wave of takeover activity appears to
have subsided.
These changes have all occurred, however, without addressing the
fundamental defect that allowed the problem to surface in the first
instance. The "solutions" to the takeover frenzy work primarily by
giving the target's management greater authority to withstand
attempts by the bidding company's management to acquire the target.
The new rules actually give management additional authority to act
It is ironic that
without considering shareholder interests. 7
legislators chose to address concerns regarding takeovers258 not by
confronting the cause of the problem, 259 but by creating another
problem: the entrenchment of management permitted by the new
anti-takeover legislation.2 °
3.

Takeovers-the decision to oppose a tender offer

While evidence suggests that tender offers do not net a statistically
significant rate of return for shareholders of bidding corporations, 261 shareholders of target corporations are in an entirely

(explaining several types of takeover defenses that have been included in corporate charters).
256. See Ex-Officers of Drexel Penalized, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at D1 (outlining various
scandals that led to collapse ofjunk-bond market).
257. At first glance it might appear that this statement could not be true. How could giving
management greater power be a solution to excessive power held by management? The answer
lies in the fact that there are at least two corporations involved in any takeover-the bidder and
the target. Abuses of power by the bidder's management, that is the decision to engage in a
hostile takeover for personal gain, can be stopped by allowing management of the target greater
authority. If the directors of bidding corporations were the only ones abusing or prone to
abusing their authority, allowing target management greater flexibility and power in resisting
a takeover would not have been a problem. In reality, abuses could and did exist on both sides
of such transactions. Where target shareholders stood to realize economic gains from the
takeovers, a management decision to oppose the takeover was also abusive, and the losers on
both sides were the shareholder constituencies.
258. See Takeover Inc.: The Auctioningfor American Business Not a Bargainfor All, CI4. TRIB.,
Sept. 20, 1987, at CI (noting that many 1980s takeovers not only did not produce anticipated
economic gains, but in fact resulted in number of undesirable economic consequences).
Businesses failed or were sold off piecemeal; jobs and production capacity were lost; the value
of the surviving corporation, as measured by market price of stock, actually declined. See
Richard A. Booth, The Problem with FederalTender Offer Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 707, 709-13 (1989)
(addressing negative consequences of hostile takeovers).
259. According to the empire-building theory, the cause is directors acting out of selfinterest See Andre, supra note 238, at 875 (analyzing study showing high correlation between
management compensation and company size but little correlation between compensation and
return to shareholders, and suggesting that this data indicates that directors act out of selfinterest).
260. See infra part IIA.3 (explaining how new anti-takeover statutes benefit management at
expense of shareholders).
261. Weidenbaum & Vogt, supra note 249, at 157-68.
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different position.2 12 During the five-year period from 1981 to 1986,
the gain to target-firm shareholders was approximately $123 billion. 263 This gain translates into a premium of between thirty and
2
fifty percent for shareholders of target companies. 1
One might expect that if directors of bidding corporations were
willing to risk the assets of their shareholders for a marginal rate of
return at most, then directors of targets would jump at the chance to
realize a tremendous premium for their shareholders. The reality, of
course, is to the contrary.265 Over the objections of target shareholders, target management often works diligently to thwart takeover
266
attempts.
Corporate management has developed a bewildering array of
defensive devices to fend off unwelcome tender offers. Recognized
defensive tactics include shark-repellent amendments, 267 lock-up
options with a white knight,21 greenmail, 269 poison pills, 27 ° gold-

262. See Weidenbaum & Vogt, supra note 249, at 157-68 (stating that shareholders of target
firm can profit from takeover).
263. GRUNDFEST & BLACK, supra note 249.
264. See Jensen, supra note 215, at 314-22 (elaborating on financial gains available to
shareholders of target corporation).
265. See Weidenbaum & Vogt, supra note 249, at 568 (maintaining that directors of target
corporations often do not act in best interest of shareholders).
266. See Coffee, supra note 241, at 1160-65 (discussing conflicts that arise between directors
and shareholders of target corporations).
267. See Ellen Friedenberg,Jaws III: The Improprietyof Shark-RepellentAmendments as a Takeover
Defense, 7 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 32, 34 (1982) (describing shark repellent as any provision in target
company's articles of incorporation, such as staggered board provision, fair price amendments,
or super-majority voting requirements, designed to deter hostile tender offers).
268. A "lock-up" is a contractual arrangement with a friendly suitor (the "white knight") that
gives the latter an advantage in bidding for the target company. Stephen Fraden & Joseph
Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 821, 821 (1981). The white knight is given
either an option to purchase assets of the target (an asset lock-up, where particularly valuable
assets may be referred to as "crown jewels"), or target stock (a stock lock-up) in an attempt to
deter a suitor from continuing with a hostile takeover. Id. at 823-24. For a discussion of lockups, see Arthur Fleischer, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 326 (1983)
(discussing use of lock-up arrangement as defensive measure designed to thwart hostile tender
offer); Arthur Fleischer & Daniel Sternberg, CorporateAcquisitions, 12 REV. SEC. REG. 937, 937-41
(1979) (reviewing uses of lock-up agreements and delineating several variations on standard
lock-up agreement); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the BusinessJudgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 621 (1983) (analyzing use of lock-up amendments in context of businessjudgment rule).
269. See Note, Greenmail TargetedStock Repurchasesandthe Management-EntrenchmentHypothesis,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1045-46 (1985) (defining greenmail as defensive tactic whereby target
corporation repurchases securities from potential hostile suitor at premium price).
270. Poison pills take the form of preferred stock that is authorized, but unissued, until a
triggering event, such as a hostile tender offer, occurs. See Krishnan Chittur, Wall Street's Teddy
Bear: The Poison Pil as a Takeover Defense, 11J. CORP. L 25, 26-40 (1985). When triggered, the
poison pills are issued, and existing stockholders are given the right to acquire additional shares
of the company's stock at below-market prices. In addition, the poison pill may include a flipover provision, which allows shareholders to acquire shares of a successful bidding company at
below-market prices.
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en parachutes for management, 71 and, if all else fails, a management buyout.272 The Pac-Man Defense, where the target turns
around and makes a bid for the stock of the original bidder, was not
uncommon.2 73 The Nancy Reagan, or 'Just say no," defense was
also popular. 7 4 In extreme cases, some targets chose a scorchedearth defense 75 rather than permit another company to complete
the acquisition. It is true, however, that a truly determined bidder
276
could overcome most of these defenses.
Promanagement factions, not content with anti-takeover defenses
imposed only at the corporate level, lobbied extensively for the
creation of anti-takeover legislation. 277 The first of such statutes
generally sought to impose affirmative obligations and limitations on
a tender offeror.278 For example, the Illinois legislation imposed a
20-day precommencement period before a tender offeror could
proceed with a tender offer.279 In Edgar v. M1TE Corp.,2 ° however,
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Williams Act preempted

271. A golden parachute is a contractual arrangement between the target and one or more
executive officers whereby the target promises to provide the executive with substantial benefits
over and above those the executive would normally receive if the officer is terminated as a result
of a change in corporate control. See Martin Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Ripcordsor Ripoffs?
Some Comments on Special Termination Agreements, 3 PACE L. REV. 15, 17-19 (1982) (analyzing
validity and justifiability of golden parachutes). These agreements are also referred to as special
termination agreements. Id. at 16.
272. For a discussion of management buyouts, see Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the
Special Committee-EnsuringBusinessJudgmentRule Protectionin the Context of ManagementLeveraged
Buyouts and Other Corporate TransactionsInvolving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAw. 665 (1988).
273. See Deborah DeMott, Comment, Pac-Man Tender Offers, 1983 DuKE LJ. 116, 119
(considering pac-man strategy as defense to potential takeover).
274. See Robert A. Prentile &John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and The "NancyReagan
Defense": May TargetBoards :rustSay No-? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DELJ. CORP. L. 377,41260 (1990) (characterizing Nancy Reagan defense as refusal by target board to agree to takeover
on any terms).
275. A target would employ a scorched-earth defense to make itself utterly unattractive to
a bidding company. See Leonard I. Reiser, CorporateTakeovers: A Glossary of Terms and Tactics,
CASE & COM., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 35, 35. This defense may include any of a number of tactics:
selling off the crown jewels, orchestrating a mass exodus of top management, bestowing a huge
cash dividend to shareholders to empty the treasury, bloating the company with debt, or buying
back large amounts of stock to reduce equity. Id. at 48-49 (describing numerous terms
associated with corporate takeovers, including scorched-earth defense).
276. See Booth, supra note 258, at 708-10 (stating that unwelcome takeovers often succeed
because bidder may possess secret information or more competent management, and large
shareholders of target corporation may sell stock despite rejection of offer by target board).
277. See MergerMania: Don't Blame "Raiders"forSystemwide Abuses, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 1988,
at 16 [hereinafter Merger Mania] (finding that promanagement groups have succeeded in
obtaining passage of numerous anti-takeover statutes).
278. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.51 to 137.55 (1979) (limiting tender offeror's
ability to acquire target); see also 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-75 (1993) (restricting ability of
bidding corporation to make successful tender offer by restricting voting ability of acquiror as
well as its ability to engage in business relationships with acquired company).
279. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.51 to 137.55 (1979).
280. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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the Illinois statute. 21 The plurality opinion reasoned that any state
legislation that would upset the congressionally mandated balance
282
between management and a tender offeror was impermissible.
In response to this setback, proponents of anti-takeover legislation
successfully lobbied for a new generation of anti-takeover statutes.283
The Supreme Court has upheld these statutes214 even though they
can impose very formidable barriers to hostile acquisitions. For
example, the Indiana statute, which was upheld in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America,85 provides that a shareholder acquiring
"control shares"286 can vote those shares only after the approval of
disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders.2 87 Moreover,
the corporation is given the option to redeem the shares if the
disinterested shareholders do not restore voting rights.288 This type
of statute is known as a control share provision, and Indiana is not
alone in enacting such legislation. 9
Yet another type of state statute acts to prohibit a corporation from
entering into a business combination with any shareholder owning
more than a specified minimum number of shares without approval
by disinterested directors or shareholders, or compliance with other
requirements.2 90 Such limitations on business combinations affect
tender offers by making it impossible for acquirors to effect a squeezeout merger or other reorganization that would be necessary for the
2 91
acquiror to gain total control over the target.

281. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 636-38 (1982).
282. 1& at 632-34.
283. See Merger Mania, supra note 277, at 16 (highlighting role of promanagement groups in
promoting takeover legislation).
284. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,94 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of Indiana statute designed to protect shareholder of target corporation during tender offer).
285. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
286. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (Bums 1989) (defining "control shares" as shares that, but
for operation of Act, would bring acquiror's voting control to or above any of three thresholds:
20%, 33 1/3%, or majority).
287. Id. § 231-42-9.
288. Id. § 23-1-42-10.
289. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2561-2568 (1993) (placing restrictions on control shares).
290. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991) (prohibiting business combinations with
any shareholder who owns 15% or more of outstanding shares, unless: board approves
combination, shareholder acquires more than 85% of all outstanding shares, or two-thirds of
disinterested shareholders approve combination); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986)
(prohibiting business combinations with shareholders owning more than 20% of corporation's
stock, absent approval by disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders, or minimum
purchase price paid to all shareholders).
291. A squeeze-out merger is the second step in a two step process. See Thomas R. Wilcox,
Delaware'sAttempt to Swallow a New Takeover Defense: The Poison PillPreferred Stock, 10 DEL- CORP.
L 569,571 (1986) (describing squeeze-out merger). In the typical squeeze-out merger situation,
the acquiror would obtain a majority share of the target's stock by paying a premium on that
stock. Id. Then, once in control of the company, the acquiror would force the remaining
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While takeover defenses and anti-takeover legislation are typically
justified in terms of "protecting" shareholders from "unfair" or
"inadequate" tender offers,29 2 they often operate to prevent shareholders from receiving a substantial premium for their stock 3 and
allow management to retain their positions. 9 4 From the viewpoint
of the shareholders of potential target corporations, these devices and
statutes are economically inefficient295 because they benefit management at the expense of shareholder interests.
B. Poor Decisionmaking
Decisions regarding executive compensation, the initiation of
tender offers, and the responses thereto offer some of the most
prevalent examples of questionable decisionmaking in corporate
America. They are by no means, however, the only types of decisions
that are subject to attack by shareholders who have not been well
served by their "fiduciaries" on the board of directors. Case law is
replete with examples of decisions protecting directors from liability
for negligent actions.296
One of the more infamous cases regarding directoral discretion is
Kamin v. American Express.297 Kamin involved a decision by the board
of directors to elect an in-kind distribution of depreciated property in

shareholders to turn over their shares for a lower price or less valuable consideration, thereby
completing the merger. Id.
292. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985) (allowing plan
instituted by board of directors ostensibly designed to protect shareholders by warding off unfair
tender offers).
293. See Coffee, supra note 241, at 1155-65 (asserting that target management should be
accorded less discretion in responding to takeover bids because target shareholders are in
position to profit from takeover).
294. See Coffee, supra note 241, at 1155-65 (suggesting that takeover defenses allow
management to retain their positions at expense of shareholders).
295. "Inefficient" in this context refers only to the fact that by preventing successful tender
offers, management prevents shareholders from realizing maximum immediate gain from their
investment. This assumes, of course, that shareholders' only motive in investing is profit, an
assumption that is consistent with economic theory.
296. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 214 (Del. 1991) (declining to hold directors
liable for authorizing repurchase of single large shareholder's stock); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Il. 1968) (refusing to hold directors liable for alleged losses resulting from
refusal to install lights in Wrigley Field); Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-12
(Sup. CL) (holding that, absent fraud, oppression, arbitrary action, or breach of trust, plaintiff
shareholders could not state cause of action against directors for negligent declaration of
dividends), affd 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976). These decisions are consistent with the
business judgment rule. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 242 (stating that business
judgment rule shields directors from liability if transaction was reasonable and within
corporation's power and directors' authority); supra part I.A. I (discussing application of business
judgment rule).
297. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.), af'd,387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976).
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order to avoid recognition of the loss at the corporate level. 98 This
decision resulted in the corporation losing an $8 million tax
savings.'
The directors, apparently fully aware of the tax consequences of their decision, justified their actions by suggesting that a
loss of $25 million would have a negative impact on the net income
figures in the American Express financial statement.300 Absent
fraud, dishonesty, or nonfeasance, the court held that disgruntled
shareholders had no recourse against the directors who had unanimously voted in favor of a decision that cost the company $8
million."' Economically, the decision was unjustifiable. Nonetheless, the court precluded dissatisfied shareholders from recovering
against the directors who had made the decision.0 2
Equally disturbing from a purely economic perspective is Shienshy
v. Wrigley.3"3 In Shlensky, Phillip Wrigley, president of the corporation and owner of approximately eighty percent of the outstanding
shares, 3 4 refused to install lights at Wrigley Field, home of the
Chicago Cubs. 0 5 The complaint alleged that the decision not to
install lights was made "regardless of financial benefits"0 6 because
baseball was meant to be a day game."0 7 Wrigley Field was, at that
time, the last major league stadium not equipped with lights for night
games.3 8 The court concluded that the case was not subject to
judicial review absent allegations of "fraud, illegality or conflict of
interest."3 ' This case supports the conclusion that directors are not
held accountable to public shareholders, even for decisions that
ignore shareholders' financial interests.
Yet another example of corporate decisionmaking run amok is
Levine v. Smith.310 Levine, a consolidation of two derivative actions,
addressed complaints regarding the decision of General Motors'

298. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
299. Id. at 810.
300. Id. at 811.
301. Id. at 812.
302. Id.
303. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. 1968).
304. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 799 (Ill. 1968).
305. Id. at 777.
306. Id. at 778.
307. Arguably, this case is more supportable on policy grounds because a number of baseball
fans maintain to this day that our national pastime ought to be played in the full light of day,
not under artificial lights at night. See Ed Condrane, Take Me Out to the Ball Parks, TIMESPICAYUNE, July 11, 1993, at El (reporting that many Cubs fans opposed installation of lights at
Wrigley Field).
308. Id. (explaining why Cubs played all home games during day).
309. Shiensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
310. 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991).
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board of directors to buy out Ross Perot and several of his associates. sn Ross Perot had originally acquired his GM securities in
connection with his 1984 sale of Electronic Data Systems Corporation
(EDS) to GM. 12 Following the transfer, Perot continued to operate
EDS as a GM subsidiary.3 13 He had also become GM's single largest
individual shareholder and a member of the GM board of directors.

314

The GM board decided to buy back Perot's interest in GM after
Perot publicly and continuously criticized GM management.3 15 The
GM board paid Perot and his associates approximately $742.8 million
for his stock and notes. 31 6 One commentator characterized this
payment as "no more than a bribe-a bribe paid to a favored insider,
no less! ' 31 7 Regardless, the court did not allow shareholders to
prevent management from buying the "favored insider's" stock at
prices that substantially exceeded market value and were not available
to other shareholders. 1 8
In all of the above cases, the courts precluded disgruntled
shareholders from pursuing a judicial remedy against the directors.
This failure would be less significant if the dissatisfied shareholders
had the ability to replace directors guilty of such poor decisionmaking
at their next annual meeting. In fact, it often appears that judges
assume that dissatisfied shareholders will have the opportunity to vote
out offending directors. 19 In reality, as indicated in other parts of
this Article, shareholders seldom have any such option.32 °
In addition to these specific examples of decisions that appear
economically irrational from the shareholders' perspective, there is
growing evidence of general dissatisfaction with corporate
decisionmaking.3 21 One indication of the potential magnitude of
the problem is the number of recent proposals for reform. Professor

311. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 198 (Del. 1991).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Michael Dooley, Two Models of CorporateGovernance, 47 Bus. LAw. 461,476 n.50 (1992)
(criticizing directors who put their own interest ahead of shareholder interests).
318. Levine, 591 A.2d at 205-12.
319. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 828 F.2d 686, 699 (11th Cir. 1987)
("Shareholders have the right to combine their interest and voting power to secure such control
of the corporation and the adoption of and adhesion by it to specific policy and course of
business.").
320. See suprapart I.B.2 (discussing inability of shareholders to nominate directors).
321. See Separatingthe Chairman and CEO, N.Y. L.J., June 17, 1993, at 3 (commenting that
shareholder dissatisfaction with corporate decisionmaking has led to structural changes in
corporate governance at some corporations).
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Alfred Conard, for example, has suggested that institutional investors
be freed from responsibility to their beneficiaries to allow them a
more active role in corporate governance.322 Professor Bernard
Black has listed a wide variety of legal constraints that need to be
removed, including limitations imposed by the SEC, bank regulators,
the Department of Labor under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),323 and antitrust law.3 24 Professors Ronald
Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, among others, have supported
increased reliance on independent directors as a solution to perceived
corporate governance problems3 Professor Richard Buxbaum has
made a proposal that is modeled after the two-tiered boards used in
large German corporations. 2 6 These suggestions are merely indicative of a large and increasing number of proposals to reform
corporate governance in America. 327
Shareholders too are displeased with the existing patterns of
corporate governance. Shareholders have proposed the creation of
28
advisory committees to help get management "back on track."
The success of shareholder recommendations for reform also provides
evidence of the growing reluctance of shareholders to allow management continued unfettered discretion in decisionmaking.3 29 Share322. See, e.g., Alfred Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?,22 U. MICH.J.L. REF.
117, 119-28 (1988) (analyzing potential role of institutional investors in corporate governance).
323. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1989).
324. E.g., Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1990)
(calling for removal of legal constraints on shareholder participation in order to transform
shareholder vote into effective means of corporate control).
325. E.g., RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865-68 (1991) (urging reform of corporate
governance through increased participation by institutional investors and implementation of
independent boards of directors); see alsoJAY L. LORSCH & ELIZABETH M. MACIVER, PAWNS OR
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 184-87 (1989) (arguing that
chairman of board should be independent director).
326. See Richard Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative
Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 2-10 (1991) (considering impact of institutional investors on
corporate control in United States and Europe).
327. See, e.g., Barnard, supranote 177, at 40 (suggesting that certain shareholders be able to

nominate directors); Cane, supranote 184, at 60 (determining extent to which proxy regulations
and case law restrain shareholder participation in corporate affairs); Dent, supra note 206, at 88
(proposing transfer of control of proxy solicitation from management to committee of largest
shareholders); Karmel, supranote 205, at 55 (analyzing proper role of institutional investors in
corporate governance); Lipton, supra note 177, at 66-69 (calling for changes in system of
corporate governance in order to provide institutional investors with more control over
corporate management).
328. See, e.g., Barnard, supranote 177, at 53 n.91 (citing CalPERs proposals to shareholders
of TRW, Avon Products, and Occidental Petroleum thatwere designed to improve managementshareholder relations and increase profitability).
329. Lorna Cox, Investing Institutions Start To Rex Their Muscles in the U.S. Boardroom,
MULT NATIONAL Bus., Autumn 1990, at 1, 1. The author writes:
Indeed, an increasing number of shareholders, large institutions prominent among
them, are now asking unpopular questions about everything from art collections at
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holder proposals on corporate governance issues have garnered
330
dramatically increased levels of support.
Widespread indications of dissatisfaction with the existing system
only prove to be an underlying problem if one believes the old adage,
"[w] here there's smoke, there's fire."331 In this case, however, the
absence of any effective system through which shareholders can hold
management accountable causes the problems detailed in preceding
sections of this Article. Given these problems, it seems desirable to
explore alternatives to our current models of corporate governance.
III.

A.

WOULD INCREASED LEVELS OF SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?

Arguments in Favor of Reducing Barriersto ShareholderParticipation
in Corporate Governance

While it can certainly be argued that greater shareholder participation in corporate governance is necessary to provide an appropriate
check on directoral abuses," 2 this is only one of several possible
arguments in favor of permitting large shareholders a greater role in
the corporate decisionmaking process.3 3 3 In addition to prodding
Occidental Petroleum at the company's expense, to the recent selection process of Mr.
Smith's successor at General Motors. Generally shareholders apparently are fed up
with brazen CEOs who are unaccountable ....
Id.
330. Id. at 2 ("On average there was a 36 per cent vote on shareholder corporate governance
proposals, up from 7 per cent in 1986.").
331. Buxbaum, supra note 205, at 1733 (viewing dissatisfaction itself as problem deserving
of attention and pointing out that "(i]n the long run, a private sector economy is not well served
by judicial approval of institutions that erode the confidence of savers and investors").
Buxbaum's statement remains true today, where it is all too clear that our nation's economy is
tied to the strength of our capital markets, which themselves depend on investor confidence.
332. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 177, at 91 (suggesting that directoral decisionmaking may
be "less than optimal" without analyzing significance of poor decisions). Most commentators
who support the idea of greater shareholder involvement in corporate governance do no more
than assume that current models of corporate decisionmaking do not lead to the best decisions.
Many articles in this area argue that providing a larger role for shareholders would help
minimize poor decisionmaking. For example, Professor Barnard, advocating greater shareholder
access to the nominating process, states: "The harm averted may include friction between
capital providers and capital expenders. It may also include less than optimal modes of
directoral decision making, inattention to constituency demands, and simple self-dealing." Id.
333. This Article focuses on greater shareholder participation by large shareholders because
individuals who own a tiny fraction of a public corporation's shares cannot reasonably be
expected to have the resources or economic incentives to undertake a significant role in
corporate governance. Realistically, only the institutional investors and the rare large individual
investor have both the resources and economic incentive to undertake significant oversight
functions with regard to corporate management. See supra Part I.D. (describing shareholder
attempts at involvement, particularly by large and institutional investors).
The precise boundaries of what constitutes a "large" shareholder are subject to debate. One
alternative is to set a minimum share ownership requirement. For example, all shareholders
owning more than five percent of the outstanding voting stock of a corporation, or more than
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courts to overcome their inability or unwillingness to hold management to reasonable standards of fiduciary behavior,3 4 a greater
governing role for investors who own a significant amount of stock
issued by public corporations is supported by notions of democracy
because shareholders, after all, are the "owners" of the enterprise." 5
Theoretical notions of management and group dynamics also suggest

$5 million in market value of such shares, might be presumed to have the financial wherewithal
and sufficient economic incentive to participate in corporate governance. SeeLipton, supra note
177, at 67-68 (proposing $5 million threshold for participation in corporate governance).
A five percent limit, at least for the largest public corporations in the United States, might
be too strict. A search of the CDA/Spectrum Database reveals that at the largest U.S.
companies, there are extremely few investors who have more than even one percent of the
outstanding stock. Search of CDA/Spectrum Database, CDA Investment Technologies, Inc.,
Rockville, MD (Dec. 31, 1990) (search of 13F filings). According to the CDA Spectrum
Database, at Exxon Corporation, only the College Retirement Equities Fund (1.09%), Wells
Fargo (1.05%), and Bankers Trust NY Corp. (1.01%) meet this threshold. Id. At IBM, only
Wells Fargo (1.07%), Michigan State Treasurer (1.04%), and Bankers Trust NY Corp. (1.01%)
satisfy the requirement. Id. At General Electric, only Wells Fargo (1.09%) and Bankers Trust
NY Corp. (1.02%) hold more than one percent of outstanding stock. Id. General Motors has
six shareholders that meet this cutoff: Bernstein Sanford & Co. (2.48%), Wells Fargo (1.61%),
Bankers Trust NY Corp. (1.50%), the Michigan State Treasurer (1.42%), Wellington
Management Co. (1.22%), and Mellon Bank Corporation (1.06%). Id. Conversely, one percent
might be too broad for the smallest publicly traded corporations, particularly if shareholders are
allowed to aggregate their shares by forming groups.
It might thus be easier to focus on the market value of the securities, as a shareholder with
a sufficiently large economic stake would be likely to have the financial ability and incentive to
participate in corporate governance. As mentioned above, a $5 million threshold has been
advocated by Martin Lipton:
To promote the accountability of management, this Article proposes that the federal
securities laws be amended to allow any shareholder, or group of shareholders, with
more than $5 million in market value of the corporation's shares free and equal access
to the corporation's proxy machinery at the corporation's expense.
Lipton, supranote 177, at 67.
334. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (tracing history and impact of business
judgment rule that shields directors from liability). The business judgment rule effectively
insulates directors from liability for most business decisions. Courts are reluctant to substitute
their own judgment for that of directors for many reasons, not all of which are questionable.
See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (revealing that business judgment rule generally
requires gross negligence before judicial intervention). Directors are usually more attuned to
the business of their corporation than are judges, and judges often do not have the time to
devote to corporate decisionmaking. Pursuant to the business judgment rule, courts do not
generally hold directors accountable for bad or even negligent decisions. Consequently,
shareholders must find some other way to hold directors accountable. Selling out is one way,
but that is an increasingly unattractive option for large institutional investors. See supranotes
163-67 and accompanying text. A better solution would allow shareholders to nominate
directors, and for shareholders to take a more active supervisory role.
335. See Cane, supra note 184, at 61 (explaining that shareholders, although frequently
thought of as passive investors, are actual and legal owners of corporations). Currently, the only
official mechanism by which shareholders can elicit management reaction is through the
shareholder proposal process. Id. Father David Bayne, long recognized as a champion of
corporate democracy, once wrote: "The day when the shareholders' meeting performed its full,
democratic function, and substantially every shareholder attended, is gone. Remove the effective
use of the proxy, and corporate democracy is no more." David C. Bayne, The Basic Rationale of
"NProperSubject "34 U. DET. LJ. 575, 575 (1957).
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potential benefits to greater investor participation."' Furthermore,
if attentive shareholders had a cost-effective alternative to selling out
or threatening litigation, then certain harmful behavior, such as high
stock turnover and the corresponding pressure on management to
produce a quick return, might be minimized.
1.

Directoralresponsiveness to shareholderconcerns

Logically, removing barriers to shareholder participation in
corporate governance should provide some balance to the lopsided
jurisprudence that, in recent years, has acted to insulate directors
from any meaningful degree of accountability to shareholders.-3 7
If backed up by a regulatory scheme permitting such involvement, the
threat of increased shareholder participation might well cause
management to implement sound decisionmaking processes, respond

336. See IRVING L. JANIS, GRoUPFHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982) (finding that overly cohesive group may strive for unanimity at expense
of tolerance for different perspectives and willingness to share ideas);JAYW. LORSCH, PAWNS OR
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 91-95 (1990) (suggesting that
dynamics of average board of directors inhibit free exchange of ideas); Walter C. Swap,
DestructiveEffects of Groups on Individuals, in GROUP DECISION MAKING 69-95 (Walter C. Swap et
al. eds., 1984) (concluding that excessive homogeneity or cohesiveness can impair
decisionmaking process).
A more balanced board may actually produce better decisions. See CHARLES A. ANDERSON &
ROBERT N. ANTHONY, THE NEW CORPORATE DIRECTORS: INSIGHTS FOR BOARD MEMBERS AND
EXECUTrIVES 90 (1986) (advocating balance of occupation, experience, age, gender, race, and
geographical representation for board members); Barnard, supra note 177, at 77 ("These
behavioral patterns can ultimately lead to an institutional inability to challenge the managementdelivered view of corporate affairs and a resulting failure of the board to exercise sound and
independent business judgment."). A balanced board seems particularly appropriate as
traditionally selected boards tend to be hesitant to take the steps necessary to ensure
independent decisionmaking. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALIY 52-53 (1986)
(reporting that outside directors are more likely than inside management to ask challenging and
discerning questions during board meetings and to promote debate that leads to better
decisionmaking). Mace's study concluded that even a minimal number of outside directors can
stimulate independent thinking. Id. at 64.
337. Various methods have been used to exclude shareholders from participation in
corporate decisionmaking. Some states have enacted legislation permitting management to
bypass certain shareholders in making decisions concerning business combinations. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 203(a) (2), 203(c) (5) (1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney
1986). One recent study identified 28jurisdictions with such legislation. SeeJohn H. Matheson
& Brent A. Olsen, ShareholderRights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1425 app. at 1521-29 (1991). Other state statutes minimize shareholder
voting rights for "control shares." Id. at 1533-37 (identifying 27 states with control share
legislation). Other states have empowered directors to consider interests other than those of
shareholders. See Symposium: CorporateMalaise-StakeholderStatutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 1 app. at 279-93 (1991) (listing 28 state statutes that allow directors to consider, for
example, community or societal needs in addition to those of corporation).
Nor are statutes the only method used to relegate shareholders to a smaller role in corporate
governance. Judicial decisions have also acted to tip the scales in favor of management. See
John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olsen, CorporateLaw and the Longterm ShareholderModel of Corporate
Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1347-53 (1992) (describing recent decisional law limiting
director accountability to shareholders).
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to informally expressed shareholder concerns, and avoid transactions
tainted by self-interest.
Such changes would represent a significant departure from recent
trends, which have generally provided directors with more discretion
and less accountability. State legislatures have adopted an incredible
variety of extremely promanagement statutes, and state courts have
eagerly embraced a very expansive view of the business judgment
rule." In fact, the business judgment rule has become a shield of
immense proportions, preventing claims against directors from
succeeding in the vast majority of cases. 3 9 Even without a significant shift in actual shareholder behavior, amending federal regulations and state provisions affecting shareholder participation in
governance might well have a salutary effect on management
behavior.
We can only speculate as to whether shareholder behavior might
change in such a way as to cause changes in corporate
decisionmaking. Evidence that large shareholders seem ready to
assume a greater role in corporate governance 40 is insufficient to
ensure that they will in fact assume such a role if the opportunity is
provided. Similarly, evidence that shareholders have not successfully
imposed their views on management in the past is no indication that
shareholders will never succeed in such an endeavor.34 1

338. See supranotes 71-73, 84-92 and accompanying text (discussing recent trends related to
director liability and increased exclusion ofshareholders from management of corporate affairs).
339. See supranotes 73-82 and accompanying text (discussing business judgment rule).
340. See supra Part I.D (discussing attempts at shareholder activism, particularly by
institutional investors).
341. See supraPart II.B (finding that substantial barriers to shareholder access to corporate
proxy machinery adequately explain shareholders' inability to influence management decisions).
Currently, no procedural and regulatory limits exist for informal communications between
shareholders and management. It would seem then, that shareholders could communicate with
management outside of the cumbersome arena of proxy solicitations. It has been suggested that
the failure of shareholders to take advantage of such informal communications indicates a lack
of commitment by shareholders. But see Barnard, supra note 177, at 79-81 (citing lack of
incentives and high cost of participation, rather than lack of commitment, as cause of
shareholder passivity, but noting current trend away from apathy).
It is management, however, that appears to have prevented this approach from becoming a
meaningful avenue of participation in decisionmaking. See supra parts I.D, IIA (discussing
shareholder attempts at activism and management pursuit of self-interest). First, there is little
incentive for management to change its policies merely because a shareholder makes an
informal request. Second, there is no reason to believe that the majority of corporations have
any structure for responding to informal shareholder requests.
In addition to informal channels of communication, one commentator has suggested that the
rule allowing shareholder proposals is a far less efficient means of communication than the
informational clues and incentives presented to management via the capital markets. See George
W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatoy Failure,30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 31-38 (1985)
(contending that management can use capital markets to determine whether large groups of
shareholders are so dissatisfied with corporation's performance that they have decided to sell
out). Dent also notes, however, that it will often be difficult, if not impossible, for management
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To date, legislatures and courts have never really given shareholders
in public corporations a meaningful opportunity to participate in
corporate decisionmaking. It is ironic that as institutional investors,
who have the financial and practical resources necessary to participate
meaningfully in corporate governance, become more prominent,
obstacles to their participation in corporate decisionmaking have also
proliferated.3 4 When regulatory obstacles were at a minimum,
shareholders generally lacked the practical ability to monitor or
participate in corporate management.m3 Now that practical limitations have receded, regulatory obstacles have come to the forefront
3 44
to prevent meaningful involvement.
It is true that we do not know whether giving shareholders the
opportunity to participate in corporate governance will actually result
in such participation at a significant level. The current system,
however, is unbalanced and subject to abuses. Further, there is some
indication that many institutional investors are in fact ready and
willing to assume a greater role in corporate governance. 4 5
The
time has come, therefore, to implement changes that will allow
shareholders to participate more actively in corporate governance.
2.

Corporate democracy

To the extent that the preceding argument may be deemed
unpersuasive, there are other reasons to provide shareholders with
greater access to corporate decisionmaking. The potential benefits of
increased shareholder access do not all assume or require that all
eligible shareholders will become intimately involved in the governance of public corporations. The theoretical ideal of corporate
democracy, for example, does not require that shareholders exercise
their rights; it merely requires that shareholders have the opportunity
to participate."'
Technically, at least, shareholders are the owners of corporations

to tell exactly what prompted the decision to sell. Id.
342. See Conard, supra note 322, at 155-63 (illustrating obstacles encountered by institutional
investors, such as "emptiness of shareholder rights," liability of investors deemed to be
'controlling" by exercising rights, and group filing requirements).
343. Conard, supra note 322, at 126-30.
344. See suprapart I.B (describing barriers to shareholder participation in corporate governance).
345. See Conard, supra note 322, at 152-63 (considering emerging presence of institutional
investors and potential effect on role of shareholders in corporate governance); see also supra
part I.D (describing shareholder attempts at participation).
346. For example, the United States is still considered a democracy, even though the voter
turnout in most elections is far below 50% of the eligible population. SeeJeanne Williams, School
Voucher Initiative, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at B6 (reporting 50% voter turnout at presidential
elections).
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in which they have invested. State statutes carefully establish the
rights of shareholders to control major life changes of the corporations in which they have an equity interest. 4 These statutes also
carefully establish shareholders as the parties who have the right to
elect the directors who control day-to-day operations."' Nothing in
the federal statutes or regulations changes this basic allocation of
power to shareholders. How, then, can shareholders in public
corporations claim that they have been effectively disenfranchised? 49
The answer to this question is found by examining the mechanics
of corporate governance. Yes, shareholders have the right to "elect"
directors, but they have no effective way of nominating them.5 °
Shareholders can stage a proxy fight if they want to elect an opposing
slate of directors, but this is an incredibly expensive process, particularly for shareholders who really only want to replace one or two
management nominees with new candidates. 51 In reality, then, the
right to "elect" directors in American corporations becomes no more
meaningful, and no more democratic, than elections in totalitarian
states where the government hosts "elections" with only one "candidate" for each of the public offices to be filled. 52

347. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 141(k), 211(b), 242, 251, 271, 275 (1991)
(setting forth shareholder voting rights, removal of directors, election of directors, charter
amendments, mergers, sale of assets, and dissolution).
348. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing how state statutes give
shareholders right to elect directors, who, in turn, manage corporations); see also Bernard S.
Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MicH. L. REV. 520, 531-32 (1990) (identifying matters
on which shareholders generally vote under state law).
349. Only shareholders in public corporations claim to have been disenfranchised. In close
corporations, where the directors are typically themselves shareholders, there is generally no
problem with self-perpetuating boards that are insulated from shareholder concerns. In most
close corporations, the shareholders play a significant role in management. See Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511,515 (Mass. 1975) (drawing analogy between fiducial
obligations of partners in partnership and those of stockholders in close corporation).
Moreover, in a small corporation, it is not impractical for the shareholders to get together
and arrange an ouster of inattentive directors. See id. Although minority shareholders in close
corporations often complain about having been "frozen out" of their corporations, it is other
shareholders who typically arrange for minority shareholders to be cut off. See id. As a group,
shareholders in close corporations have a meaningful level of control that is generally
commensurate with their ownership in the corporation.
350. See supra part I.B.2 (discussing ways in which current proxy rules exclude shareholders
from nomination process and indicating that such exclusion precludes real shareholder choice
in elections); see also Lowenstein, supranote 154, at 2 (explaining that "there was no substance
to process" of allowing shareholders to elect directors). Lowenstein added that "[m] anagement
had picked the candidates beforehand, and over 99 percent of the time there was no opposition
slate." Id.
351. See BarryJ. Sobering, Comment, ShareholderDemocracy:A Description and CriticalAnalysis
of the Proxy System, 60 N.C. L. REV. 145, 159-60 (1981) (discussing prohibitive costs associated with
proxy contests).
352. SeeBarnard, supranote 177, at 39 (comparingAmerican corporate elections to elections
in North Korea to demonstrate lack of democratic choice in corporate elections).
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With regard to matters other than election of directors, there are
similar regulatory provisions purporting to grant shareholders access
to the decisionmaking process. As a matter of federal law, shareholders can solicit proxies at their own expense 353 or force the corporation to include shareholder proposals in corporate proxy materials at
the corporation's expense.35 4 These provisions may seem to provide
fair access to the decisionmaking process. After all, if shareholders
can solicit their own proxies and make their own proposals, then it
does not appear as if they have been unfairly silenced. Unfortunately,
just as with the apparent right to "elect" directors, access to the proxy
machinery is often more apparent than real.
Federal law generally requires certain disclosures that must
accompany any proxy solicitation. 5 Although the disclosures are
somewhat burdensome, the SEC screening process for proposed proxy
solicitations is even more of a barrier to shareholder communication. 356 To some extent, the 1992 amendments to the proxy rules
have made the review process less burdensome for most shareholders.
Prior to these amendments, all communications relating to proxies
had to be prefiled with the SEC. 357 The 1992 amendments exempt

communications by most shareholders 5 8 not seeking proxy authority
from the regular prefiling requirements,3 59 but impose a special
notice requirement for written solicitations by beneficial owners of
securities having a market value in excess of $5 million." ° At this
time, the exact process by which the SEC will review filings under the
new rules is still uncertain. The right of large shareholders to
353. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1993).
354. See id. § 240.14a-8.
355. See id. § 240.14a-101. While additional items must be disclosed, a soliciting shareholder
may incorporate by reference any material that appears in the company's proxy statement. Id.
§ 240.14a-7.
356. See Black, supra note 348, at 536-42 (discussing costs and risks of shareholder
communication due to proxy rules); Conard, supra note 322, at 117 (positing that proxy rules
hinder rather than encourage shareholder involvement); Nell Minow, Proxy Reform: The Casefor
Increased Shareholder Communication, 17J. CORP. L. 149, 155 n.20 (1991) (arguing that current
SEC proxy rules inhibit stockholder communication); John Pound, Proxy Contests, The SEC
Rewrites the Rules, AM. ENTERPRISE, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 58, 58-59 (arguing that current SEC proxy
rules deter "free speech and efficient communication" among shareholders).
357. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1986).
358. Id. § 240.14(a)-2(b) (excluding registrant, any affiliate, any officer or director if
solicitation is financed by registrant, any nominee for election as director, and certain other
persons from exemption to prefiling rules).
359. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (reporting amendments to proxy rules). The
particular amendment dealing with the exemption from prefiling is codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-2(b) (1992).
360. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g) (1) (1992). This notice requirement does not apply to oral
solicitations, speeches delivered in a public forum, or information appearing in broadcast media,
newspapers, magazines, or bona fide publications. Id. § 240.14a-6(g) (2).

1994]

PROXY REFORM

communicate with other shareholders on matters of grave importance
to shareholders is thus compromised by the existing federal regulations.
Perhaps more important, at least from a corporate democracy
standpoint, there are other substantial obstacles to shareholder
participation in corporate governance through the proxy process. As
is more fully described elsewhere in this Article, shareholders face
numerous regulatory obstacles in trying to participate in the proxy
process.3 6 ' There are, for example, numerous topics that shareholders are not permitted to raise in proxy proposals. 2 Furthermore,
shareholders must limit the supporting statements for their proposals
to 500 words, while management is not limited in the length of its
response.3 63 Finally, shareholders have no way to communicate with
other shareholders outside of the proxy process, which is controlled
and scrutinized by the corporation. 6
In fact, the voting process in most corporations is not confidential. 5 Management is generally free to screen proxies and to
communicate with recalcitrant shareholders. 3" Shareholders always
face the possibility of retaliation by management on future decisions,
a fact of which many shareholders are well aware. 67 Management

361. See supra part I.B (criticizing barriers to shareholder participation in corporate
governance, including directoral dominance and exclusion of shareholders from director
nominations process).
362. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1993). The shareholder proposal rules expressly permit
corporate management to exclude from consideration any shareholder proposals relating to
election to office, ordinary business matters, anything that is the subject of another resolution,
or matters that are not "significant" to the corporation. Id. § 240.14a-8(c).
363. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
364. For example, federal law does not require that the corporation supply the shareholders
with a list of other shareholders. Even under the provision that allows shareholders to conduct
mailings at their own expense, the corporation has the right to choose whether to allow the
shareholder access to the shareholder list or make the mailings on the shareholder's behalf.
Id. § 240.14a-7c.
State law frequently provides some access to shareholder lists, but only at limited times and
only for a proper purpose. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a) (1991) (requiring that officer
of corporation prepare shareholder list and have it available for inspection "at least 10 days
before every meeting of stockholders"). Because this 10-day timeframe is completely inadequate
to allow communication between shareholders, this obligation is essentially meaningless in the
context of proxy solicitations. If the corporation refuses to provide a shareholder list in a timely
fashion, the shareholder can seek judicial relief, although such relief would almost certainly not
be granted in time for the shareholder to make an effective mailing prior to a particular
meeting. See Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del.
1987) (holding that "statutorily guaranteed right to examine the stock ledger cannot be
frustrated by nonfeasance").
365. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (discussing fact that most boards of
directors have access to proxies prior to vote and such proxies are not kept confidential).
366. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (reporting results of IRRO Survey that
revealed pre-vote contact between directors and voting shareholders is not uncommon).
367. See McGuRN, supra note 133, at 53-78 (presenting detailed discussion of comments by
shareholders that express their fear of retaliation).
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can even conduct resolicitations in the rare cases where the process
has not given management enough of an edge."
Consequently, shareholders in public corporations, although
technically the owners of the corporation, have no meaningful say in
how the corporation is run. They cannot change directors or
corporate policies. They can only change their investment, and they
can only do that if transaction costs are not too high and a suitable

replacement exists. Such a model does not fit well with notions of
corporate democracy and shareholder suffrage.
3.

Improved group dynamics

Of course, to the extent that shareholders do choose to participate
in corporate governance, there may be additional advantages.
Certainly it is not unreasonable to expect that the presence of
shareholder nominees on the board would have some impact on
directoral abuses. Indeed, the ALI's suggested model for corporate
governance relies heavily on "outside" directors as a check on
management abuses. 369 The ALI report suggests, for example, that
every large publicly held corporation's board"7 0 have a majority of
outside directors 7' and independent audit, 72 nominating, 73

368. See infra notes 492-95 and accompanying text (contending that shareholders feel
threatened by management).
369. See ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, part III-A, at 143-74 (recommending
that directors should not have any "significant relationship" with senior executives of
corporation). The term "significant relationship" includes any director who is employed by the
corporation, was employed within the two previous years, has an immediate family member who
fits either of these tests, "has made to or received from the corporation during either of its two
preceding years, commercial payments exceeding $200,000," or "is affiliated in a professional
capacity with a law firm that was the primary legal adviser to the corporation with respect to
general corporate or securities law matters.., within the two preceding years." Id. § 1.34, at
42-44.
370. See AL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 1.24 (defining "large publicly held
corporation" as corporation that had 2000 or more record holders of equity securities and over
$100 million in total assets).
371. ALI, CO'ORPATE GOVERNANCE, supranote 9, § 3A.01 (a). It is not unusual to see such
emphasis placed on outside directors. In fact, the comments to this section of the report note
that the NewYork Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange all recommend
a minimum of two independent directors. Id.
372. ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supranote 9, § 3A.02. The ALI proposal recommends
that the independent audit committee be composed exclusively of outside directors. Id.
373. ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 3A.04. This proposal suggests a
nominating committee composed entirely of directors who are not officers or employees, and
a majority of whom have no significant relationship with the corporation's senior executives.
Id. The efficacy of nominating committees in assuring independent decisionmaking is, however,
subject to doubt. Even when a nominating committee is employed to choose new directors, the
CEO tends to dominate the selection process. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING
BOARD 4 (1983); John Perham, The Men Who Pick the Board, DUNS REV., Dec. 1978, at 57
(summarizing three general types of nominating committees and roles of CEO in each model).
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and compensation committees. 74
While these recommendations evidence a certain degree of faith in
outside influences as a curb against directoral abuses, the ALI model
falls short of the goal of providing truly independent directors. If
adopted, the ALI recommendations would operate in a system where
outside directors are nominated by directors approved and appointed
by existing management. 5 Management is likely to select directors
who are compatible with other directors and likely to agree with
management suggestions. 76 Outside directors chosen in such a
77
manner are unlikely to change the dynamics of board behavior.
If outside directors disagree with management during their tenure
on the board, management might not nominate them again, and,
short of a major proxy contest, shareholders would have no effective
means by which to lobby for their retention. Shareholders do not
even have the power to include nonbinding resolutions of support for
particular candidates in the proxy materials because such resolutions
would relate to election to office, and management can exclude them
under current shareholder proposal rules. 78
If shareholders were given the power to exercise direct control over
the nominating process, management would always know that
shareholders could step in if the insiders go too far in selecting
passive outside directors. The deterrent effect of such provisions
should not be overlooked. Moreover, if shareholders had the power
to nominate their own candidates, they could in fact exercise that
power. In that case, shareholders would presumably select candidates

374. ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supranote 9, § 3A.05.
375. See suprapart I.B.2 (discussing exclusion of shareholders from directoral nomination
process).
376. See JEREMY BACON &JAMES K. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICE: ROLE,
SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD 30 (1975) (finding that personal compatibility with
CEO and genuine interest in company are typically requirements for outside directors); MACE,
supra note 336, at 97-101 (stating that when outside directors are chosen by current
management, factors considered include friendliness, relationship to current management, and
propensity for avoiding conflict or creating discord);James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias
in the Boardroom: PsychologicalFoundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91 (1985) (stating that "the leading criterion for selecting a board
nominee is his probable identification with and acceptance of the company's goals and methods
of operation"); see also Michael P. Allen, Economic Interest Groups and the CorporateElite Structure,
58 SoC. So. Q. 597, 607 (1978) (defining "interlocking corporations" as those with one or more
directors in common, and identifying interlocking corporations that create geographical and
financial interest groups due to close relations between members of management); Thomas
Koenig et al., Models of the Significance ofInterlocking CorporateDirectorates,38 AM.J. ECON. & SOC.
173, 178-79 (1979) (describing "interlock replacement patterns" in modem corporations).
377. See Cox & Munsinger, supranote 376, at 85-108 (discussing psychological foundations
of directoral decisionmaking and concluding that even independent directors succumb to
managerial bias).
378. 17 C..R. 240.14a-8(c) (8) (1993).
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with an eye toward safeguarding shareholder concerns.
One commentator has stated that a board of directors is most likely
to perform its functions well "when important stockholders are
holding a prod to its collective back." 79 Because directors have the
legal right to manage their corporations, 3 ° and because the business judgment rule effectively shields directors from liability for even
negligent mismanagement,"' the only meaningful way to ensure
optimal decisionmaking by the board is to give shareholders the right
to replace directors who fail to live up to shareholder expectations
with shareholder nominees.
4.

An alternative to the Wall Street Rule

Many commentators have bemoaned the high rates of turnover
apparently favored by modern investors.382 Short-term investing has
been blamed for a number of problems, ranging from pressures on
the board to make policy decisions that are counterproductive in the
long run, to pressures for high rates of return that make business
failures more likely.383 Management and promanagement commentators have been particularly vehement about the dangers associated
with the high turnover of stocks. 84 Yet many of these same
promanagement voices also praise the Wall Street Rule and market
forces as appropriate devices for controlling management abuses.m
Under the Wall Street Rule, investors who are dissatisfied with
management are supposed to turn to Wall Street for a solution to
their woes. In other words, if they become dissatisfied with the
management of a particular enterprise, they should sell their shares
in that company and invest in another business that has better
management. It is ironic that this "market solution" contributes to

379. Barnard, supranote 175, at 1135-36.
380. See supranote 56 (citing state statutes that give directors authority to manage affairs of
corporation).
381. See supranotes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussing business judgment rule).
382. See, e.g., Richard R. Ellsworth, Capital Markets and Competitive Decline, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 171, 172 (noting that corporate strategies designed to produce short-term
returns to investors interfere with corporations' ability to compete in international market and
to produce long-term returns); Lipton, supra note 177, at 7-9 (criticizing institutional investors,
who are viewed as seeking immediate profits, for wave of highly leveraged takeovers);
Lowenstein, Stockholders, Humbug!, supra note 169, at B1 (noting that during past 10 years,
corporate takeovers and buybacks have been aimed at promoting shareholders' short-term
interests).
383. See supranotes 163-67 and accompanying text.
384. See supranotes 163-67 and accompanying text.
385. See supranotes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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the turnover of stock ownership.8 6
Providing shareholders with a meaningful role in corporate
governance may well serve to minimize at least some of the pressures
that encourage the high turnover of stock. Instead of leaving
dissatisfied shareholders with no meaningful option other than selling
their shares, new corporate governance rules would provide shareholders with the option of contesting management's decisions. If
regulations were amended to allow shareholders a greater role in
corporate governance, they could nominate directors with competing
views, or could propose resolutions to oppose particular policies. In
either event, shareholders would have more meaningful options than
selling out and moving on.
B. PotentialProblems with Reducing Barriers to ShareholderParticipation
Not surprisingly, just as numerous commentators have proposed
changes to allow shareholders a greater role in corporate
decisionmaking," 7 other commentators have raised a number of
objections to such proposals. 8 The objection that is repeated most
often is that greater access would result in a waste of management
and corporate resources. Regardless of whether the suggested reform
is designed to promote shareholder proposals, shareholder participation in the directoral nominating process, or otherwise, critics
generally respond by describing shareholders as apathetic and unlikely

386. See supra note 199 (discussing short-termism and high-turnover-associated market
forces). Of course, the market solution also overlooks transaction costs and the very real
possibility that it may be exceedingly difficult for investors to locate appropriate investments with
better management.
387. See, e.g., Conard, supra note 322, at 163-76 (discussing positive consequences of
increased shareholder activity, including higher profits, fewer resources wasted on takeovers,
deterrence of inappropriate managerial compensation, and prevention of shareholder suits);
Thomas M. Jones, Corporate Governance: Wo Controls the Large Corporation?, 30 HASTINGS LJ.
1266, 1280-85 (1979) (concluding that despite shareholder voting power, lack of incentives and
political resources prevents effective change in dominance of management); Robert B. Reich,
Corporate Accountability and Regulatory Refonn, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 5, 31-37 (1979) (proposing
reforms in collective decisionmaking processes and improvements on market exchanges as
solutions to corporate management problems).
388. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory oftheFirnm 88J. POL. ECON. 288,
289 (1980) (proposing that separation of ownership from control is "efficient form of economic
organization" and that competition from other organizations disciplines those in control);
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movemen 35 VAND. L. RFV. 1259 (1982) (challenging
argument that traditional corporate governance models are inappropriate and problematic, and
criticizing movement toward increased shareholder participation); Homer Kripke, The SEC,
Corporate Governance and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 175-78 (1981) (noting that efforts to
revive corporate democracy are futile because shareholders do not consider themselves partial
owners, but rather holders of investment contracts with corporation, with no incentive to
monitor corporation's actions).

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:379

to participate even if given the opportunity to do so.'
When
discussing reforms designed to remove barriers to shareholder
proposals, promanagement commentators typically contend that such
reforms would prove ineffective because most shareholder initiatives
fail.39 With regard to proposals to allow shareholders access to the
directoral nominating process, management often contends that
shareholder candidates would not be elected, and if they were, such
candidates would impair efficient decisionmaking.3"9 ' It has also
been suggested by management that shareholder candidates would
recognize only short-term interests, 392 that the market for corporate
control is a better mechanism for dealing with poor management, 393
and that allowing institutional investors to nominate directors may
harm the investors' beneficiaries. 4
There are a number of possible responses to most of these
objections. One can assert both theoretical and practical responses
to the argument that reforms are a waste of time because shareholders are apathetic and would not take advantage of the opportunity to
make or support shareholder proposals. Theoretically, any prediction
based on past shareholder behavior is valid only if one postulates the
continuation of existing barriers to shareholder participation. In fact,
the argument that reforms removing barriers to shareholder proposals
will waste management time because shareholder initiatives fail under
the current regime is utterly circular.
It is true that most shareholder initiatives enjoy little success at the

389.

See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 177, at 79 (citing lack of economic incentives, costs

outweighing benefits, and free-rider risks as causes of shareholder apathy and passivity); Henry

G., Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1440-41 (1964)
(explaining that costs outweigh benefits of shareholder proxy solicitations and therefore
shareholder opportunities for participation in corporate governance are wasted).

390.

See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 177, at 75 (noting that SEC's pre-1990 position against

shareholder proposals changed as such proposals encountered more success); William J. Feis,

Is Shareholder Democracy Attainable?, 31 Bus. LAw. 621, 640 (1976) (arguing that shareholder
initiatives fail because too few shareholders participate in process); Sobering, supra note 351, at
164 (observing that use of shareholder initiatives to install shareholder nominees has been
ineffective because such proposals rarely garner majority of vote).
391. SeeBarnard, supranote 177, at 76-79 (discussing argument that diversified board is likely
to be ineffective decisionmaking body).
392. See Reich, supranote 387, at 26-28 (1979) (suggesting separation of shareholders from
decisionmakers as solution to corporate focus on short-term considerations).
393. See Barnard, supranote 177, at 84-86 (offering rebuttal to conventional wisdom of Wall
Street Rule). The phrase "market for corporate control" refers to the notion that when a
company is poorly managed, it will be under-valued, and thus more vulnerable to being taken
over by new owners. Assuming the new owners acquire enough of an interest to place them in
effective control, they can replace existing management and thereby presumably increase
efficiency and the value of the company.
394. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 88-89 (rebutting common objections that empowering
institutional investors will subject their beneficiaries to liability as "controlling" persons, or to
"short swing trading" liability under SEC proxy rules).
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present time, at least when success is measured in terms of how many
of these proposals are adopted over management opposition.39 5
This pattern, however, would not necessarily continue if the numerous
barriers to the success of such measures were removed. In fact, the
failure rate is just as easily advanced as a reason why reform is
necessary. Without reform, shareholder proposals do not succeed;
with reform, they may prevail."9 6
With regard to the objections specifically targeted toward shareholder candidates for directoral positions, there are again a number of
responses. The objection that any reform is a waste of time because
shareholders will never elect candidates opposed by management can
be dismissed as unsubstantiated speculation. The fact that in the past
shareholders have elected so few shareholder candidates over
management opposition is readily explainable by the variety of
procedural and substantive barriers that currently limit a
shareholder's rights to pursue such nominations.3 97
Moreover, if allowing shareholders to propose nominees will not go
far enough toward establishing shareholder suffrage, additional steps
can be taken. For example, it is possible to structure the system so
that a certain percentage of directoral seats are reserved for shareholder nominees. If shareholders do not nominate candidates to the
designated shareholder seats, then management could select
nominees for the seats. Under such a system, the argument that
reform would waste time because shareholder nominees would never
be elected is rendered moot. If the election process is set up in such
a way that it will affect the ultimate selection of board members, then
opponents to such reform cannot dismiss the idea as a waste of time
and resources solely because they do not believe that it will result in
the election of shareholder nominees.3 98
Opponents to reform also object that shareholder candidates will
waste management resources if elected. It is not at all clear, however,
that shareholder candidates would in fact "waste" time. There is

395. See Cane, supra note 184, at 59-62 (presenting types and numbers of proposals excluded
under current proxy rules).
396. This is, of course, precisely as circular as the reasoning of promanagement commentators. Earlier sections of this Article, however, present additional reasons why reform is necessary;
the Article does not rely solely on this circular rationale.
397. See supra part I.B.2 (discussing obstacles to shareholder participation in corporate
democracy).
398. Of course, such extreme actions may not be necessary. Just as the "failure" rate of
shareholder proposals under the current system is no guarantee that they would continue to fail
under a different regulatory regime, the fact that shareholder candidates have not fared well in
the past is no real evidence that this pattern would continue if shareholders had any meaningful
access to the nomination process.
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theoretical evidence 9 9 that directors nominated by shareholders and
dependant on shareholders for renomination could improve
decisionmaking at the board level.'
Such evidence comes principally from studies of group dynamics and group decisionmaking.4'
For example, studies suggest that the presence of active participants
who are willing to question data and proposed conclusions generally
leads to better decisions."°2 Similarly, other studies have found that
involving outsiders in the decisionmaking process helps produce
optimum results. 3
At the current time, the typical board of directors operates in a way
designed to preclude outside participation and probative questioning.
Traditional board members are chosen because they are likely to
agree with management and other board members, and to abide by
conventions that overvalue the opinions of the CEO and minimize
expression of alternate options or opinions.0 4 Because of the
structure of the typical board of directors, there is seldom any real
discussion on policy decisions. 4 5 This system is not the optimum
structure or process for complex decisionmaking.
Moreover, it is difficult to defend the position that outside directors
will negatively affect the operation of corporate directors when the
current system is substantially premised on the value of outside
directors. The presence of outside directors, for example, is often
cited as a reason why directors' decisions are considered presumptive-

399. Empirical evidence of the success of shareholder nominees in American corporations
does not exist because the model of corporate governance in America effectively precludes
shareholders from nominating competing directors, unless they are seeking to replace the entire
board.
400. See MACE, supranote 336, at 104-05 (concluding that shareholder nominees would be
more likely to spark debate that will improve decisions in long-run); Barnard, supra note 177,
at 76-79 (arguing that shareholder-elected directors would create more diverse group of
management resulting in improved decisionmaking).
401. SeeJANIS, supra note 336, at 262-71 (recommending outside directors as one solution
to problem of "groupthink" in corporations); Michael R-Callaway et al., Effects of Dominance on
Group Decision Making. Toward a Stress-Reduction Explanation of Groupthink, 49 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 949, 952 (1985) (concluding that groups whose members have predisposition toward
arguing for their own point of view are likely to reach high-quality decisions); Mann &Janis,
Decisional Conflict in Organizations, in PRODUCTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES FOR
ORGANIZATIONS 21, 37-38 (D. Tjosvold & D.Johnson eds., 1983).
402. See Callaway et al., supranote 401, at 950-52.
403. SeeJANIS, supranote 336, at 262-71; Mann &Janis, supra note 401.
404. See C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 11-12, 122-30 (1963) (defining "people of
higher circles" as separate and compact class and asserting that CEOs at America's largest
corporations control who may and may not enter their circle); Elmer W. Johnson, An Insider's
Call for Outside Directors, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 47, 47 (describing "control
mentality" of CEOs in corporate management selection process in light of experience as director
on GM board).
405. SeeJohnson, supra note 404, at 47.
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ly reasonable under the business judgment rule.)° Furthermore,
the presence of outside directors is often deemed significant by courts
reviewing a board's recommendation to dismiss a derivative action.4 °7 After more than a decade of study, the ALI project on
corporate governance advocates significantly increased reliance on
outside directors, particularly regarding decisions on nominations and
compensation. 8 The objection that shareholder candidates will
prevent the board of directors from functioning properly thus seems
contradicted by the overwhelming theoretical support that exists for
outside directors.'
The studies on the practical effect of outside directors are somewhat mixed. Many commentators have suggested that, when outsiders
are chosen by incumbent directors, there is no real difference in
corporate decisionmaking.4 1
This result is not particularly surprising considering that these outsiders are chosen precisely because they
are likely to agree with existing policies and procedures.4" Nonetheless, one might expect some small degree of improvement in
decisionmaking with outside directors. Even if outsiders are closely
linked to management, at least they are more likely to remain

406. See, e.g., Panterv. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,294 (7th Cir.) ("The presumption
of good faith the business judgment rule affords is heightened when the majority of the board
consists of independent outside directors."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Wharshaw v.
Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) (noting that directors' actions are presumed to have
been taken in good faith and that plaintiff therefore bears burden of proving improper motives
or relations to group benefitted by particular decision); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695
(Del. Ch. 1971) (indicating that separation or independence from transaction requires
deference to sound business judgment).
407. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979) (holding that by enacting ICA,
Congress intended independent directors to determine whether to terminate derivative action,
even though not frivolous, and that courts should defer to that judgment); Cramer v. General
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that court's decision to defer to
director's business judgment must be based on good faith and independence of director), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
408. ALI, CORPORATF GOvERNANcE, supranote 9, §§ 3A.04, 3A.05; see also supranotes 369-74
and accompanying text (using ALI recommendations as example of prevalence of view that
outside directors can perform important corporate governance function).
409. See ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 145 (noting that even Business
Roundtable endorses board structure composed principally of outside directors).
410. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-HeavenlyCity or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REv. 597, 611-13 (1982) (suggesting that independent directors are not particularly
successful because they share cultural values with management and lack resources and adequate
incentives); Conard, supranote 322, at 129 (concluding that current independent directors are
tied so closely to management that "It]hey will support almost anything that the executives
propose," and "will resign in extreme cases rather than oppose the executives who invited them
on the board"); Lewis D. Solomon, Restructuringthe CorporateBoard of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint
Promise?, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 581, 593-600 (1978) (presenting results of empirical review of
corporate board performance indicating insignificant changes in decisions or approach to
governance after implementation of court-imposed changes in structure, including use of
outside directors).
411. See Brudney, supra note 410, at 611-13; Conard, supra note 322, at 129.
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objective than management itself. In fact, some studies do reflect
minor improvements in decisionmaking as the percentage of outsiders
increases.4 1 2 Thus, while outside directors chosen by management
are not a panacea for the problems facing American corporations,
they are at worst a benign influence, and outside directors chosen
directly by shareholders might provoke the board to render even
more responsive and effective decisions.
Opponents to increased shareholder influence also argue that
shareholder-nominated directors are likely to have only short-term
interests at heart.413 Current directors, however, are already accused
of concentrating on short-term concerns; 414 there is little reason to
believe that adding shareholder candidates to the boards of directors
of American corporations would increase the focus on short-term
concerns. 41 1 In fact, as shareholders are given greater incentives to
stay on for the long run, the presence of shareholder candidates may
result in greater long-term vision. Moreover, once directors are
elected, regardless of who nominated them, they become fiduciaries
of the corporation, and shareholders' candidates should have no
more reason to focus on short-term interests than other directors.4 6
Finally, some critics contend that "an uninhibited market for
corporate control" is a more efficient mechanism for correcting poor
performance by management. 417 Practical considerations, however,

412. See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of
Directors: PerformanceEffects of Changes in Board Composition, I J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 101, 104, 121
(1985) (finding that increasing number of outside directors has mild positive effect on
organizational performance); Idalene F. Kesner & Roy B. Johnson, An Investigation of the
RelationshipBetween Board CompositionandStockholder Suits, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT.J. 327, 333 (1990)
(concluding that boards with higher percentages of outsiders are sued less often for breaches
of fiduciary duty than those with more insiders).
413. See Lipton, supranote 177, at 7-9 (commenting on short-term goals of newly empowered
institutional investors); Lowenstein, Stockholders, Humbug!, supranote 169, at BI (noting current
trend toward optimizing shareholder returns); Reich, supra note 387, at 26 (arguing that
increased shareholder participation through collective decisionmaking may be dominated by
short-term concerns at expense of long-term policy).
414. See BRYAN BURROUGHS & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABisco 4-5 (1990) (detailing preoccupation of CEO Ross Johnson and RJR board with
'undervalued" stock prices and improving quarterly financial figures); LORSCH, supra note 336,
at 188 (maintaining that corporate leaders make decisions that affect entire economy and
therefore should focus on long-term rather than short-term interests).
415. See Barnard, supranote 177, at 86-88 (arguing that shareholder-elected directors are no
more likely to focus on short-term objectives than traditional directors and that "providing
shareholders access to the proxy would encourage long-term thinking").
416. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 88-89. It is especially important that shareholdernominated directors understand that they must act independently of the shareholder or
shareholder group responsible for their original nomination. If such directors are closely
controlled by the shareholder responsible for their nomination, the shareholder runs the risk
of liability as a control person under the securities laws. Black, supra note 348, at 548-49.
417. Barnard, supranote 177, at 84-86.
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make the market for control decidedly imperfect.4 1 8 Given the
extent of state and federal regulation of tender offers, and the
prevalence of anti-takeover measures adopted by corporations, it is
naive to suggest that anything approaching a "perfect" market for
control exists. 419 Moreover, the market for control simply cannot
redress situations where the corporation would be better off if it
replaced some, but not all, of its directors.
IV. How To GIVE SHAREHOLDERS A GREATER VOICE
Congress and the SEC can and should take several steps to facilitate
a more meaningful role in corporate governance for the shareholders
of American corporations. Because corporate directors are unlikely
to voluntarily adopt these suggestions, firm legislative or regulatory
action is required. While states might be willing to adopt legislation
along the lines suggested herein, guidance on most of these proposals
needs to originate in Congress or with the SEC. State legislatures and
courts actually bear significant responsibility for the existing imbalance in power between management and shareholders;4 2 it seems
unlikely that they would now act to redress that imbalance by giving
shareholders more power at the expense of directoral discretion.
Even if state legislatures did enact the changes needed to improve the
role of shareholders in corporate governance, it is virtually certain
that the resulting rules would lack uniformity, and highly likely that
corporations would reincorporate in any jurisdiction that refused to
pass such remedial legislation.4 2 ' Federal regulation thus appears
to be the best mechanism to provide shareholders with a meaningful

418. Barnard, supranote 177, at 85. Theorists who postulate that the "market for corporate
control" will act as a sufficient deterrent to inefficient management are acting under a number
of mistaken assumptions. First, the theory's validity depends on inefficient management being
generally vulnerable to takeovers. This assumption is not supported by an examination of
current tender offer and takeover regulations. See supra notes 261-95 and accompanying text.
Obviously, if legal impediments protect inefficient management from hostile takeover attempts,
the very existence of "an uninhibited market for corporate control" is suspect.
Moreover, the theory that the market for corporate control adequately assures reasonable
management decisions assumes that the reason takeovers are attempted is in fact to improve
management. This assumption is not supported by the evidence. See supra notes 235-60 and
accompanying text.
419. Barnard, supranote 177, at 85 (identifying impediments to market for control). Even
assuming that takeovers are motivated by a desire to improve management, the regulatory
barriers and restrictions that limit the effectiveness of tender offers and proxy fights means that
inefficient management is often protected from such activities. Because existing rules tip the
scales in favor of existing management, this "market for control" cannot correct or deter
management abuses.
420. See supranotes 71-73, 84-92 and accompanying text (demonstrating that at state level,
most movement has been toward restrictingrights of shareholders).
421. SeeWilliam L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.
663, 668 (1974).
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role in corporate governance. Furthermore, while the SEC could
probably institute most of the proposed changes 2 without intervention by Congress, certain modifications may require the passage of
new legislation.

423

This Article recommends various changes to existing law to allow
shareholders a greater role in corporate governance. First, the SEC
should give shareholders the power to nominate directors. Second,
the SEC should amend current proxy rules to remove or limit many
of the existing impediments to and restrictions on shareholder
proposals. Third, Congress should impose confidentiality requirements on proxy voting in public corporations.4 24 Finally, the SEC
should guarantee shareholders meaningful access to the shareholder
list for their corporation.
A.

The Power To Nominate Directors

Giving shareholders a real role in the selection and election of
corporate directors is one of the most important changes this Article
recommends. To accomplish this change, the SEC must revise the
existing federal proxy rules. The current system provides virtually no
shareholder involvement in the nominating process,425 and, because
of the manner in which directors are nominated, no meaningful role
in voting.426 While this proposal is presented separately from the

422. The SEC has signaled its willingness to reconsider the proper role of shareholders and
shareholder access to the proxy by promulgating the recent amendments to the proxy rules.
These amendments were expressly adopted in order to remove "unnecessary limitations on
shareholders' use of their voting rights." Shareholder Communications, supranote 104.
423. Congress has, in fact, considered several bills that would have redressed some of the
imbalance in power between management and shareholders. See, e.g., The Corporate Takeover
Reform Act of 1989, S. 1244, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1989); Investor Equality Act of 1989, S.
1658, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1989); Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987, S.
1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987); Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1) (1987); Protection of Shareholder Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a) (1980); Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 105(a) (1980). While none of these proposals passed, they do indicate a willingness on
the part of at least some members of Congress to consider the issue of greater shareholder
participation in corporate governance.
424. This change may require legislative action because the current statutory provisions
authorizing the SEC to regulate proxies do not give the SEC any direct authority to impose
confidential voting.
425. The proxy rules do allow a shareholder to stage a proxy contest over the slate of
directors. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1992). Nevertheless, the expenses of staging such a fight make
it effectively impractical in all but the most egregious of situations. See Sobering, supra note 351,
at 160. It is true that the most recent set of amendments allow shareholders to include in their
slate the names of nominees put forward by management, so long as the shareholder nominees,
if elected, would not constitute a majority of the directors. 17 C.FR. § 240.14a-4(d). As a
practical matter, however, this does not reduce the expense of staging a proxy contest.
426. Shareholders, of course, are entitled to vote on directors. This "right" is rendered
meaningless, however, if there is only one slate of candidates for whom shareholders can vote.
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following suggestions, shareholders will more effectively influence the
composition of corporate boards if the SEC also amends the proxy
rules to create a level playing field for all shareholder proposals,
including those relating to election to office. The full potential
benefits of shareholder participation, therefore, are likely to be
realized only when the SEC promulgates comprehensive amendments
to the existing regulatory structure that redress the existing imbalance
in power between shareholders and management.
With regard to the proper role for shareholders in the directoral
nominating process, commentators have advocated a variety of
models. Some academics have suggested that institutional investors
be freed from responsibility to their beneficiaries to allow them a
more active role in corporate governance. 427 Others have listed a
wide variety of legal constraints on institutional investors that need to
be removed, including limitations imposed by the SEC, bank
regulators, the Department of Labor under ERISA, and antitrust
law.428 Still other commentators continue to support the idea of
independent directors as the solution to the existing problems in
corporate governance. 429 Finally, one commentator's proposal is
modeled after the two-tiered boards used in large German corporations."' Shareholders themselves have proposed the creation of
shareholder advisory committees. 43
The simplest and most direct solution to allow shareholders access
to the directoral nominating process would be to amend SEC Rule
14a-8,4 32 the shareholder proposal rule, to eliminate the clause that
allows corporations to exclude any proposal relating to elections to
office from proxy materials.4 33 Deleting this clause would allow
In fact, this practice is the norm in public corporations. If there are 11 directors to be elected,
shareholders are presented with a list of 11 names from which to choose. Thus, even though
shareholders have the "right" to vote, it is not a meaningful right at this time. See Sobering,
supranote 351, at 159-60.
427. E.g., Conard, supranote 322, at 177 (positing that institutional investors' voting rights
should be exercised in sole interest of beneficiaries and not dictated by sponsoring business
enterprises). The principal concern here seems to be the notion that institutional investors may
be required to choose investment options that maximize short-term value rather than long-term
interests under existing rules. To the extent that this is the case, amendments to ERISA would
be necessary to insure that plan managers are free to consider long-term interests.
428. E.g., Black, supranote 348, at 530.
429. E.g., LORSCH & MAcIvFR, supra note 325, at 184-87 (urging that chairman of board
should be independent director); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 325, at 863 (advocating
outside directors with increased dependence on shareholders).
430. Buxbaum, supranote 326, at 1.
431. See, e.g., Barnard, supranote 177, at 53 n.91 (citing CaPERS proposals to shareholders
of TRW, Avon Products, and Occidental Petroleum).
432. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8 (1992).
433. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 39 (noting that current rule denies shareholders
mechanism for nominating directors).
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shareholders meeting the minimum share ownership and holding
period requirements to nominate one director to compete with
management's nominees.

34

Of course, allowing shareholders to nominate competing directors
may not result in any direct shareholder representation on corporate
boards. Nonetheless, it seems advisable to make this change as one
step in the effort to provide shareholders with a real role in corporate
decisionmaking. In the event that there are an insufficient number
of nominations for shareholder candidates to make a difference in
the composition of corporate boards, the SEC could further amend
the proxy rules to require proxies to include shareholder nominations
for a specified percentage of available director positions.43 5 The
SEC could even transfer control of the nominating process from
incumbent management to shareholders. 46 The SEC need not
adopt, or even consider at any length, such suggestions, however,
until there is some indication that the simple step of allowing
shareholder nominations fails to produce the hoped-for benefits of
more direct shareholder representation on corporate boards.
It is also possible, however, that unlimited access to the nominating
process could overwhelm the proxy system. Corporations may receive
too many nominations to include them all in their proxy materials.
There are a number of solutions to this potential problem. For
example, the SEC could limit the number of nominations that
shareholders can make or restrict shareholder nominations to a
certain number of candidates, or a certain percentage of the total
number of positions to be filled. Alternatively, the SEC could draft
the proxy rules so that the corporation would only have to include
those nominations supported by a minimum number of shares in the
proxy materials. To make this second alternative workable, the SEC
might have to adopt an express exclusion from the proxy solicitation
disclosure requirements for communications designed to obtain

434. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 39 (advocating amendment to Rule 14a-8 to allow "a
shareholder or shareholder group owning $1 million or 3% of the market value, whichever is
less, of a company's voting stock to nominate up to three directoral candidates"). Professor
Barnard's proposal is modeled after The Corporate Takeover Reform Act of 1989, S. 1244, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), an act proposed by Senators Howard Metzenbaum and William
Armstrong. The complete proposal, which is detailed in Professor Barnard's article, also calls
for equal access to corporate proxy statements and materials. Barnard, supra note 177, at 98-99.
435. See LOWENSTEIN, supranote 150, at 205-29, 256.
436. See Dent, supranote 206, at 907 (arguing in favor of complete shift in control of proxy
solicitation from management to corporation's largest shareholders). Professor Dent's proposal
would call for the 10 to 20 largest shareholders of a public company to form a committee to
assume complete control over the nomination process. Id.
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preliminary support for shareholder nominations. 43' Any of these
measures would limit the nominating process to avoid overwhelming
the proxy system. The question is whether it is necessary to propose
such limitations on shareholder candidates at the outset, or whether
the SEC should impose such limitations only in the event that the
revised rules prove difficult to implement.
Because the corporate governance model for American corporations has systematically excluded public shareholders from the
directoral nominating process, there is no direct proof of how
shareholders would respond if given the opportunity to nominate
directors. The indications are, however, that at least some shareholders would welcome the opportunity to participate in the nominating
process. Despite the current formidable barriers to shareholder
involvement in the selection of directors, examples of shareholder
involvement in selecting directors exist. Perhaps the most widely
publicized example is the success of Exxon's institutional investors in
forcing the corporation to appoint an environmentalist to its board
of directors.4 38 Texaco has also appointed a particular nominee to
its board of directors at the request of certain institutional investors.439 Similarly, Lockheed has directors who were directly empowered through the involvement of institutional investors."0 Finally,
institutional investors have closely scrutinized General Motors'
directoral selection process. 441
Based on such evidence, it seems safe to predict that at least some
institutional investors will seek greater involvement in the directoral
selection process if the SEC makes this option available to them.
Moreover, while not all institutional investors are likely to participate," 2 there are sufficient indications of a significant reaction from

437. Without such an amendment, any shareholders seeking to organize a shareholder group
to support a particular candidate might inadvertently violate the proxy solicitation rules. While
the proxy rules, as amended, generally permit communications among shareholders who are not
seeking proxy authority, this authorization does not extend to the largest shareholders who are
participating in a contested election of directors. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-2(b) (1) (vi) (1992).
438. See Carolyn K. Brancato, Who Owns CorporateAmerica-The Momentum of the Big Investor,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter 1990, at 38, 45; They Own the Company (Exxon Appoints Environmentalist to Board), L.A. DAILYJ., May 25, 1989, at 6.
439. Brancato, supra note 438, at 45 (discussing appointment to board of pension fund
nominee as part of fund's agreement to vote with board in proxy fight against dissident
shareholder Carl Icahn).
440. See Marcia Parker, '90 Proxy Victories Leave Key Questions, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr.
16, 1990, at 1, 32 (citing involvement of CalPERS, NewYork City Employees' Retirement System,
and Florida State Board of Administration in appointment of directors at Lockheed).
441. Id.
442. See, e.g., LeonardJ. Hollie, Activism Not RoleforFirms, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct.
2, 1992, at 17 (explaining that mutual fund managers generally do not want to make changes
to corporate boards).
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the institutional investor community to justify imposing some
limitations on shareholder participation in the nominating process.
In order to avoid the risk of overburdening the proxy machinery,
it seems advisable to avoid unlimited access to the nominating
process. The simplest approach would be to limit the total number
of nominations that a corporation must include in the proxy
materials. The SEC should allow shareholders, as a group, to
nominate one person for every two positions to be filled on the board
of directors at a given meeting. If there are more shareholder
nominations than positions available, those nominations endorsed by
shareholders having the most shares should be selected for inclusion
in the proxy materials." 3
The SEC should impose additional limitations on shareholders'
rights to nominate directoral candidates. To avoid making directoral
nominations a weapon in contests for corporate control, no one
shareholder should be allowed to nominate more than one-fourth of
the total number of directors at any one annual meeting. While this
limitation does not eliminate the possibility that directoral nominations will become a new arena for takeover battles, it will prevent a
single shareholder from staging a complete takeover in one meeting.444
In addition, short-term shareholders should not be eligible to
nominate directors. Large investors have the ability and, because of
the inadequacies of the Wall Street Rule, often the incentives to
monitor managerial behavior.445 Certain investors, even if they are
large institutions, do not meet the second of these criteria. Notably,
arbitrageurs or program traders are unlikely to spend the time and
money necessary to engage in any meaningful oversight of board
activity even though they might have the ability to do so. Thus, only
shareholders who have held their stock for a minimum of one year
should be allowed to use those shares to support the nomination of

443. To prevent one large shareholder from controlling the entire shareholder nomination
process, shareholder groups could be formed where every participating shareholder would be
allowed one endorsement per share.
444. To prevent groups of shareholders from staging takeover attempts ihrough the proxy
process, the SEC could require every shareholder nominating a directoral candidate to disclose
whether they have entered into any arrangement with any other shareholder with regard to the
election or nomination of other candidates. Failure to properly disclose such agreements, and
to respect the limits on the number of permissible directors, could result in the exclusion of the
shareholders' candidates from the proxy materials.
445. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (noting difficulties and drawbacks for
large investors who contemplate selling their shares in favor of alternatives).
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shareholder candidates for directors.'8 This requirement is clearly
7
in line with existing requirements for shareholder proposals."
Finally, one last amendment to the proxy rules is needed to
effectuate shareholders' power to nominate candidates. The existing
proxy rules permit management to exclude any shareholder proposal
that attacks management personally, or is counter to any management
proposal."8 Without amendment, management could use these
provisions to substantially restrict the ability of shareholders to
nominate directors. At the very least, the language of the existing
rules would make it impossible for shareholders nominating candidates to include criticism of management's nominees in their
description of why other shareholders should elect their candidates.
An additional amendment or clarification to the proxy rules is
therefore needed to ensure that shareholders nominating directors
will be allowed to provide a full and complete analysis of candidates
without fear that management will be able to exclude it.J9
B.

Creatinga Level PlayingFieldfor ShareholderProposals

Permitting shareholders to nominate directors would go a long way
toward providing shareholders with a meaningful role in corporate
governance. Even so, additional amendments to make the shareholder proposal process more balanced should also be considered. In the
past few years, institutional shareholders have sponsored and
supported a large number of shareholder proposals relating to
corporate governance issues. 5 ° In order to give shareholders a
meaningful say in the operation of their corporations, the proxy rules
should allow shareholders to present such proposals in terms and
under conditions that are reasonably fair.
The existing rules regulating shareholder proposals place too many
limitations and restrictions on shareholders wishing to make such
proposals. Under the current rules, shareholders are limited to one
proposal per meeting,"' regardless of the extent of their interest in

446. Not only would this suggestion minimize the risk that short-term investors would select
directors with no interest in the long term, it would also encourage shareholders to become
long-term investors by rewarding long-term investors with the right to participate in the
nomination process.
447. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1) (1992) (requiring that proponent of shareholder proposal
must have owned his or her shares for at least one year).
448. Id. § 240.14a-8(c) (9).
449. Management should retain the right to exclude any nomination materials that include
false or misleading information. Liability for erroneous information should be imposed on the
proponent and candidate rather than on the registrant.
450. See suprapart I.D. (discussing increased shareholder activism).
451. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (4) (1992).
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the corporation. The supporting statement that proponents are
allowed to include may not exceed 500 words, including the proposal
itself,45 despite the fact that there is no limit on the length of
management responses. 3 In addition to the preceding limitations,
management can omit shareholder proposals if they fall into any of
a number of excludable categories.5 4 Management can exclude
proposals from proxy materials if they are not the "proper subject" for
a shareholder vote, if they relate to an issue that is insignificant to the
corporation's business, or if they relate to the ordinary business of the
corporation.4 55 In recent years, the SEC has permitted management
to exclude numerous shareholder proposals on such grounds.45 6
Generally speaking, management's power to exclude shareholder
proposals seems excessive.
The SEC should ease, or even eliminate, each of these limitations
and restrictions on shareholder proposals. The rules should not limit
large shareholders to one proposal per year, should not limit
explanatory statements to 500 words, should not force resolutions to
be merely precatory in nature, and should allow shareholders to
determine which issues are significant, including those that relate to
the ordinary business of the corporation. Each of these suggestions
will be addressed in turn.
1.

Multiple proposals

The purpose behind the one-proposal-per-meeting rule is clear:
requiring the corporation to include an unlimited number of
shareholder proposals from all interested shareholders meeting the
minimal ownership requirements 457 of the current proxy rules could
easily make the proxy solicitation process unwieldy. The cost of
printing and mailing a voluminous proxy statement is a factor,4'
and if the proxy form is exceedingly long and involved, the number
of shareholders executing and returning proxies would likely decrease.
While these problems are real, and it does not seem wise to give all

452. Id. § 240.14a-8(b) (1).
453. See id. § 240.14a-8(e).
454. See id. § 240.14a-8(c); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (listing excludable
categories).
455. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1), (5), (7).
456. See supranote 129 (citing several types of proposals that management has successfully
excluded).
457. 17 C.F.R. § 14a-8(a) (1) (setting forth share ownership requirements). To be eligible
to make a shareholder proposal, the proponent must be the beneficial owner of at least one
percent or $1000 in market value of voting securities, and must have owned such securities for
at least one year. Id.
458. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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shareholders unrestricted access to the proxy process, it does not
seem fair or necessary to restrict large shareholders to one proposal
per meeting. If the rules provided greater access only to shareholders
owning at least five percent or more than $5 million in market value
of securities, the risk of overburdening the proxy solicitation process
seems minimal. Because these are the very shareholders with an
economic stake sufficiently large to make selling their shares an
unattractive alternative, and who have the economic justification to
allocate resources to evaluate corporate performance on more than
a casual basis, they ought to be allowed to make multiple proposals if
they deem it desirable to do so. If a numerical limit is deemed
essential to satisfy concerns about overwhelming the proxy process,
the rules could limit even large shareholders to three or four
proposals per meeting, exclusive of directoral nominations. Thus,
large shareholders would be able to make more than one proposal
when more than one issue is truly compelling, but they would be
forced to limit themselves to three or four significant issues. This
proposal should give shareholders sufficient access to corporate proxy
materials, while protecting the corporation from the risk of excessive
expense and unwieldy proxy forms.
2.

Expanded supportingstatements

The existing rules limiting the length of the supporting statement
that shareholders may include with a shareholder proposal are also
problematic. The proxy rules currently allow the proponent of a
shareholder proposal to include a supporting statement along with
the proposal, so long as the proposal and statement, in the aggregate,
do not exceed 500 words.459 If the proponent exceeds this word
limit, the corporation may exclude the proposal from the proxy
materials.4"
Again, the purpose of this rule seems clear. A supporting statement
fifty pages in length would be prohibitively expensive to mail out to
thousands of shareholders, and excessively long supporting materials
would make it a virtual certainty that shareholders would not read the
documentation. Even a single proposal with supporting materials of
this clearly excessive length could cause major problems in the proxy
solicitation process.
Nonetheless, the current 500-word limit seems unreasonably

459. 17 C.FRL § 14a-8(b)(1).
460. Id. § 14a-8(a) (4) (requiring that corporations give proponent notice and 14 days to
reduce size of submission).
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restrictive, especially given the fact that there is no similar restriction
on the length of the management response.4 6' It seems fair to level
the playing field by imposing equal and reasonable word limits on
shareholder supporting statements and management responses. Five
hundred words is a very brief statement, especially when the proponent has reason to expect that management will oppose the proposal.462 Fifteen hundred words, excluding the words in the proposal
itself, seems more reasonable, provided that the corporation, as
represented by management, would be similarly limited. In the event
that management feels that it cannot comply with its fiduciary duties
to adequately inform shareholders in a statement limited to 1500
words, management could be allowed the option of a longer
statement, as long as the proponent is given a reasonable opportunity
to revise and lengthen its supporting statement. This change would
put shareholders on even footing with management, and would limit
the unfairness inherent in the existing rules.
3.

Expanding what is 'proper"forshareholders to consider

The current proxy rules permit a corporation to omit from its
proxy materials any proposal that is "not a proper subject for action
by security holders."46" The law of the corporation's state of incorporation is used to determine whether a particular proposal is
appropriate for consideration by shareholders. 4' This exclusion has
prevented shareholders from mandating action by the corporation's
directors, and has limited them to precatory or advisory resolutions.
In recent years, some states have adopted provisions that would
allow shareholders in close corporations to restrict the power of
corporate directors to make certain business decisions, reserving such
powers to the shareholders instead.465 Case law has also liberalized
the extent to which shareholders in close corporations are entitled to

461. See id. § 240.14a-8.
462. Five hundred words would be particularly inadequate if the shareholder proposal
related to election to office. Federal law requires very specific disclosures about candidates for
office; the word limit for statements relating to directoral nominees should be 500 words
exclusive of all disclosures required by law. See, e.g., id. § 240.14a-11(c) (providing filing
requirements applicable to corporate director elections).
463. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(1).
464. Id.
465. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31 (1993); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2331 (1993); TEX.
Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN. art. 12.35 (West Supp. 1994); see REVSED MODEL BUSINESS CODE §
7.32(a) (1) (1983) (permitting shareholders to eliminate directors entirely, or to restrict their
powers or discretion, by adopting shareholder agreement to that effect, although such
agreements cease to have any legal effect if corporation's shares are listed on national
exchange).
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restrict the decisional powers of directors in shareholder agreements. "
It is clear, however, that state law does not extend such
rights to shareholders in publicly traded corporations.4 6 State law,
at least as to public corporations, protects management against
shareholder intervention.'
In light of current state law, deleting
the requirement that resolutions concern a proper subject for
shareholder action would not be sufficient to authorize shareholders
to pass binding resolutions.
In fact, an amendment to the federal proxy rules deleting the
section authorizing management to exclude shareholder proposals
that are not a proper subject for shareholder action under state law
could produce the anomalous result of federal law apparently
requiring inclusion of shareholder proposals stated in mandatory
terms that, under state law, directors would be free to disregard.
Consequently, either the proponent would have to clearly explain that
the apparently "mandatory" resolution might not be binding on the
corporation's directors, or the directors would have a good case to
argue that the proposal should be excluded as misleading. 9
Merely deleting the language in the federal proxy rules that permits
management to exclude shareholder resolutions that are not "proper"
would thus not have the effect of allowing shareholders to pass
binding resolutions.
One approach that would give shareholders the power to pass
binding resolutions is to amend state law to permit greater control by
shareholders even in public corporations. The advantage to this
approach is that if state law did permit the adoption of binding
shareholder resolutions, no amendment to federal law would be
necessary. State law would then regard such proposals as proper
subjects for shareholder action. There is some precedent for the
adoption of such rules: state statutes 470 and case law" 1 have granted shareholders in close corporations such powers. There is no

466. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 586-87 (II1. 1964) (holding shareholder
agreement in close corporation, relating to directorships, salary continuation payments to widow,
and dividends, was valid and not against public policy); Darvin v. Belmont Indus., 199 N.W.2d
542, 544-45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (noting special character of close corporation and analyzing
plaintiff's claims in that special context); Westland Capitol Corp. v. Lucht Engineering, 308
N.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Minn. 1981) (treating loan agreement as shareholder agreement and
declaring enforceable provision restricting corporate purchase of fixed assets).
467. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
469. 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-8(c) (2) (1992) permits the corporation to exclude any proposal that
would require the corporation to violate any federal law. Rule 14a-9 prohibits false or
misleading statements in a proxy statement. Id. § 240.14a-9.
470. See supra note 465 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
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indication, however, that states are willing to extend this flexibility to
shareholders in public corporations. Moreover, management is likely
to oppose the adoption of such rules, and as long as one or more
states refuse to grant shareholders such powers, public corporations
would probably reincorporate in jurisdictions more supportive of
472

management prerogatives.

Another approach would be to adopt a federal rule requiring
directors to accept direction from mandatory shareholder resolutions.
Such a rule would preempt conflicting state regulation that, as
discussed earlier, generally prevents shareholders in public corporations from mandating action by corporate directors. This approach
would provide uniformity and avoid any problem with management
"shopping" for a state of incorporation with statutes more favorable
to management. This approach, however, would require federal
action on an issue that has traditionally been left to the states.47374
Congress undoubtedly has the power to adopt such regulations,
and unless states make an abrupt about-face and show a willingness
to offer shareholders in public corporations the power to pass binding
resolutions, the only alternative, if this proposal is to be implemented,
is for Congress to act.

472. See Gary, supra note 421, at 666, 701 (condemning "race to the bottom" where each state
attempts to draft statutes more favorable to management than other state statutes in order "to
encourage incorporation within its borders"). But see S. Samuel Arsht, Reply to Professor Gary, 31
Bus. LAW. 1113, 1115 (1976) (characterizing Professor Cary's view of Delaware case law as
selective and disingenuous); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Reisited: Reflections on
RecentDevel*ments in Delaware'sCorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913,921,944 (1982) (arguing
that "race to the bottom" thesis is based on premise of shareholder irrationality).
473. A detailed discussion of the pros and cons of federalizing corporate law is far beyond
the scope of this Article. Other commentators have addressed the desirability of federalizing
certain corporate law issues, and several have concluded that a federal approach would remedy
numerous problems with existing state law. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437,
1484 (1992) (advocating federal regulation, or at least minimum standards, for issues such as
corporate takeovers, proxy contests, parent-subsidiary mergers, and managers' fiduciary duties);
Cary, supra note 421, at 702 (suggesting federal minimum standards on fiduciary duties,
absolution of nonvoting shares, and more frequent requirement of shareholder approval for
corporate transactions); Karmel, supranote 205, at 55 (urging federal protection of voting rights
and increased shareholder responsibility); Donald E. Schwartz, A Casefor Federal Charteringof
Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125, 1139 (1976) (arguing for federal incorporation of larger
corporations).
474. The Commerce Clause certainly seems broad enough to permit federal regulation of
the aspects of corporate governance addressed in this Article. See Cary, supra note 421, at 703;
Note, Federal Charteringof Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123, 134 (1972).
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781, has been described as 'at
least the second cousin, if not the first cousin, to federal incorporation in substance," and no
one has seriously challenged its constitutionality. Louis Loss, The American Law Institute'sFederal
Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27, 29-30 (1969).
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Ordinary business matters

The SEC has permitted management to exclude a wide variety of
shareholder proposals on the grounds that they relate to the ordinary
business of the corporation. 7 For example, the SEC has permitted
exclusion of proposals limiting the number of officers,476 and
proposals requiring directors to report negative votes.4" Resolutions condemning particular officers, directors, or the entire board,
or asking for a vote of "no confidence," have also generally been
excluded under SEC rulings.478 Although reported decisions in this
area are rare, courts have upheld these types of exclusions. In Grimes
v. Ohio Edison Co.,479 for example, the court permitted a corporation
to exclude a shareholder proposal that would have required the
approval of corporate capital expenditures in excess of a specified
minimum on grounds that it related to the ordinary business of the
corporation.4 s
Such proposals are obviously of significance to the shareholders
involved, or they would not take the time to formulate the resolutions
and the necessary supporting documentation, and risk the displeasure
of management. The issue is whether management ought to be able
to prevent a vote on these issues that are clearly important to
shareholders on the grounds that they relate to the corporation's
ordinary business.
One argument in favor of allowing the exclusion of such proposals
is that they are insignificant in relation to the corporation's business.411 If this is the true justification for exclusion, however, there
is a separate provision that specifically authorizes exclusion of
proposals that relate to operations accounting for less than five
percent of the corporation's assets, sales, and earnings, and which are
not otherwise significantly related to the registrant's business.48 2
Management does not need to exclude matters relating to ordinary
business in order to avoid burdening the proxy materials with
"insignificant" matters. To the extent that shareholders are sufficient-

475. See supranote 129 and accompanying text.
476. See Eppler & Leibowitz, supranote 124, at 796 (noting exclusion of Proctor & Gamble
proposal).
477. Eppler &Leibowitz, supranote 124, at796 (citing exclusion of Union Electric proposal).
478. Eppler & Leibowitz, supra note 124, at 838-40 (citing exclusions of proposals by
Healthrest, UAL Corp., Time-Warner, and Exxon).
479. 992 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1993).
480. Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Curtin v. AT&T,
124 F. Supp. 197, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (permitting exclusion of proposal relating to budget).
481. Grimes, 992 F.2d at 457.
482. See 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8(c) (5) (1992).
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ly concerned with ordinary business matters to draft a shareholder
proposal in conformity with the proxy rules, a corporation should
include such a proposal in the proxy materials. Management should
not have the power to preclude shareholder proposals on this ground.
C.

Confidentiality of Proxy Voting

The preceding suggestions offer a possible basis for permitting
active shareholder involvement in the directoral nominating process,
and for creating a level playing field for shareholder proposals by
removing existing limitations and restrictions. This next proposal is
also intended to create a fairer environment for shareholders who
wish to participate in corporate governance. This suggestion relates
to the confidentiality of shareholder voting.
In most American corporations, management has access to proxies
as they are returned.4 83 Management can readily determine how
given shareholders intend to vote and how they actually cast their
ballot. The lack of confidentiality in proxy voting is a significant
barrier to shareholder proposals and yet another way in which the
balance of power has been tipped in favor of management. Management can pressure shareholders to agree with management on
proposals, 484 threaten retaliation, 48 5 and resolicit proxies if they
find that they are not doing well during the initial solicitation.8
Various shareholders, who are well aware of the lack of confidential
voting in American corporations, argue that confidentiality is
necessary to guarantee the integrity of the proxy voting process. For
example, CalPERs stated, in support of its 1988 confidential voting
proposal to Ryder System, that the proposal was "submitted with the
goal of protecting what we consider to be one of the most crucial
rights of all shareholders: the integrity of the vote."487 Shareholder
rights activist T. Boone Pickens, Jr., describes the existing process as
follows: "Think about it: Public corporations are the only place in
America where you sign your ballot, send it to the incumbent and ask
him how the election turned out. They didn't do that even
when I
4
was running for homeroom president in the fifth grade.", 1
On the other hand, opponents of confidential voting say that the

483. See supra note 133 and accompanying
484. See supra note 134 and accompanying
485. See supra note 134 and accompanying
486. See supra note 135 and accompanying
487. McGuRN, supranote 133, at 53.
488. McGuRN, supranote 133, at 54.

text.
text.
text.
text.
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political analogy is inapt;' 89 they argue that, because the vast majority of American companies use the open ballot, it cannot possibly be
wrong 4 9 In addition, it is often argued that Congress or even the
SEC could have chosen to mandate or recommend confidential
voting, and the decision not to do so must represent a considered
opinion that no such change is needed."
As a consequence of open ballots, if it looks like a shareholder
proposal is garnering a significant measure of support, something that
management can generally determine because the process is not
confidential, there is nothing to prevent the corporation from
pressuring shareholders to vote with management, and even from
resoliciting proxies in an attempt to defeat the proposal. Not
surprisingly, then, evidence suggests large shareholders are subject to
varying degrees of pressure to vote with management on contested
issues. Institutional shareholders, in response to surveys promulgated
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center, have indicated that
management representatives have contacted them to discuss pending
proxy votes, and that the level of contact has increased.4 92 Other
surveys have documented the same phenomenon.49
There is
evidence that at least some institutional investors have succumbed to
management pressures to vote for proposals that may not have been
in the shareholders' best interests.49 4 Threats of retaliation need
not be overt; banks, insurance companies, and investment firms have
all indicated that they operate under the assumption that management will "not look kindly upon a vote on a significant proxy proposal
that... [is] contrary to management's wishes. 495
These pressures, as well as the threat of resolicitation, could be
resolved by mandating confidentiality of proxy voting. A number of
corporations, although still a minority, have voluntarily adopted

489. For example, Donald D. Geary, president of the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries, wrote to members of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance to oppose a secret ballot provision. He explained that
"[c]orporate elections do not involve matters that require the protection of citizens' privacy."
MCGURN, supra note 133, at 56. Management of Lockheed and General Dynamics have also
publicly opposed treating corporate voting like a political election. Id.
490. McGuRN, supranote 133, at 59-61.
491. MCGURN, supranote 133, at 59.
492. McGURN, supranote 133, at 64.
493. McGuRN, supra note 133, at 65 (citing 1988 survey of 250 portfolio managers and
executives by N.Y. Society of Security Analysts that found that 22% of respondents believed that
they had been subjected to "undue pressure" to vote particular way during 1988 proxy season).
494. J. HEARD, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXYVOTING SYSTEM (1987); McGuRN, supra
note 133, at 66 (citing 1987 report by IRRC).
495. MCGURN, supranote 133, at 67.
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confidential proxy voting,49 and their experience suggests that it is
quite workable.497 Nonetheless, most American companies have
resisted the idea.4 98
The question of whether or not confidential voting would make a
significant difference in terms of shareholder participation in
corporate governance cannot be answered with complete certainty.
Confidential voting would at least remove the appearance of
impropriety that currently taints the proxy process. Confidential
voting would remove the possibility of resolicitations' and would
eliminate fear that management would retaliate against a shareholder
who voted in opposition to a particular management position.
The clearest indication that confidential voting is viewed by
investors as significant to corporate governance is the intensity of
efforts in recent years to have management accept confidential voting
on a voluntary basis. Several shareholder proposals have urged
confidential voting, 00 and these proposals have garnered increasing
levels of support among shareholders."' If shareholders did not
view confidential voting as an important issue, one would assume that
they would not devote so much time and energy to the issue.
Of course, confidential proxy voting can take several forms. For
example, in the American corporations that have adopted confidential
voting, there is great disparity in the detail with which the confidenti-

496. In 1989, the IRRC conducted a survey of 22 American companies that had adopted
rules providing for confidentiality of proxy votes. McGuRN, supranote 133, at 49. The following
companies had adopted confidential proxy voting- Alcoa, American Brands, AT&T, Chase
Manhattan, Chemical Banking, Chevron, Citicorp, Datapoint, DuPont, Exxon, General Electric,
General Mills, General Motors, IBM, ITT, Loral, Mesa Limited Partnership, 3M, J.P. Morgan,
Sara Lee, United Technologies, and Xerox. Id.
While the policies adopted by these companies differ in detail, there are a number of
common characteristics. All of the companies have agreed that signed proxies, ballots, and
voting tabulations will be seen only by tabulators, except in certain limited circumstances. Id.
An independent tabulator is hired to tally the votes. Id. The votes are verified by independent
inspectors, and management is given the vote totals, along with a transcription of any comments
written on the proxies. Id. The proxies are retained for one to three years, and then destroyed.
Id.
497. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
498. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
499. A resolicitation occurs when management, after reviewing preliminary information from
proxies, decides to send out additional materials to encourage a change in voting by some
shareholders. For example, in 1981, shareholders sponsored resolutions calling for the adoption
of confidential voting at American Home Products, Abbott Laboratories, and Bristol-Myers.
McGuRN, supra note 133, at 20. All three companies admitted resoliciting proxies based on
information that significant shareholders had opposed management or abstained from voting.
Id. at 22.
500. McGuRN, supra note 133, at 5 (reporting that in 1988, there were 16 shareholder
proposals asking American corporations to adopt confidential voting). In 1989, more than 50
such proposals were planned. Id. at 5-7.
501. See MCGURN, supra note 133, at 22 (explaining that average support for shareholder
proposals calling for confidential voting increased from 6.1% in 1980 to 18.8% in 1988).
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ality requirement is imposed, and in the procedures by which such
confidentiality is guaranteed." 2 Ideally, any system of confidential
voting should provide that, except as necessary to comply with
applicable law, only the chosen tabulators, who should not be
members of or related to management, should view the signed
proxies, ballots, and votes. The independent tabulators should count
all votes, which should be verified by independent inspectors.
Management should have access only to the vote totals with respect
to each proposal, and not to the identities of those casting the
votes."° The tabulators or inspectors should store the proxies for
a set period of time, and then should destroy them. These steps
should provide reasonable protection for shareholders who do not
want it known that they disagree with management on particular
items.
D. Access to the ShareholderList
Yet another way in which the SEC should amend the federal proxy
rules is to allow shareholders meaningful access to the corporation's
shareholder list. Under federal law, shareholder proposals are
included in the corporation's own proxy materials; there is no
requirement that management provide the proponent with a list of
shareholders." 4
If a dissident shareholder wishes to circulate
separate proxy materials, federal law ensures that the shareholder will
be able to do so, but gives the corporation the option of providing
the shareholder with a mailing list or handling the mailing itself, at
the shareholder's expense. 5 5 Because management has a vested
interest in preventing a dissident from having free access to other
shareholders and in avoiding the dissemination of its mailing list, it
is not surprising that management overwhelmingly favors the option
06
of mailing the materials for the dissident shareholder.
State law also fails to provide meaningful access to shareholder lists.
While many state corporate statutes require corporations to prepare
a shareholder list in contemplation of shareholder meetings, and to
give shareholders access to the list, the access is generally guaranteed
only for a very brief period of time. Delaware, for example, requires
502. See MCGURN, supra note 133, at 37-52 (discussing various confidentiality policies that
corporations have adopted).
503. Comments on the proxies can be transcribed and reported to the corporate secretary
without revealing the identity of the shareholder granting the proxy.
504. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1992).
505. Id. § 240.14a-7.
506. Black, supra note 348, at 542 (contending that companies invariably mail materials
themselves to avoid disclosing shareholder names).
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the preparation of a shareholder list at least ten days before any
shareholder meeting, and provides that such list must be available to
shareholders for at least ten days before the meeting.5 7 This ten
day period, which may be perfectly adequate to permit communication in a closely held corporation with a small group of shareholders,
is grossly inadequate to permit meaningful communication between
the hundreds or even thousands of shareholders in public corporations. Other state statutes are similarly inadequate when it comes to
requiring that management provide shareholders with access to a
shareholder list.508
Because it is necessary to identify shareholders before one can
communicate with them, this lack of access to shareholder lists is a
significant impediment to communication. Although institutional
shareholders are likely to know the identities of other large shareholders, if shareholder proposals are to gain widespread acceptance,
communication cannot and should not be limited to a few large
shareholders."°
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to contend seriously that shareholders have a
meaningful role in corporate governance under existing regulations.
The deck is clearly stacked in favor of management, and the real issue
is whether this imbalance has created any problems that could be
resolved by providing shareholders with greater opportunities to
participate in corporate decisionmaking.
This Article has examined a few of the more clearly documented
areas in which managerial abuses are widespread. Decisions to initiate
takeovers, decisions to oppose them, and decisions concerning
executive compensation have all been subject to substantial abuses, to
the detriment of shareholder interests. None of the existing

507. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a) (1993).
508. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 607 (McKinney 1986) (mandating that list be available
during meeting); TEX. Bus. CORP. Act ANN. art. 2.27 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that
corporation make list available for 10 days).
509. Under prior law, it is likely that any such communication would have been classified as
a solicitation, and would have had to comply with the federal proxy rules as to form and
content. In the October 1992 amendments to the proxy rules, however, the SEC acted to
exempt from regulation communications by persons who do not seek proxy authority, and are
not otherwise ineligible. Shareholder Communications, supra note 104, at 20. These rules are
to be codified at 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-2(b). From the standpoint of corporate governance, there
are two important limitations on this exemption: it does not apply to any person (1) who is
interested in the subject matter of the vote, or (2) who owns more than five percent of the

outstanding securities of any class and has an interest in or intent to contest a solicitation for
the election of directors.
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mechanisms for curbing such abuses have proven effective. This
Article does not, however, seek to redress these particular concerns
by proposing greater regulation in the area of takeovers or executive
compensation. Rather, it proposes amendments to existing regulations to give shareholdersthe ability to restrict management discretion
in areas where abuses occur. Specifically, these amendments would
allow shareholders to propose binding resolutions, and give them the
ability to hold management accountable by nominating and electing
new directors if management fails to protect shareholder interests.
These suggestions would not only redress the particular problems
identified in this Article, but also the more general problems
stemming from shareholder disenfranchisement and lack of accountability by management.
No longer would shareholders be encouraged by the Wall Street
Rule to sell out rather than work with management. Instead, these
recommendations would create a real incentive to longer term
investment by offering shareholders who retained their shares for at
least one year the opportunity to participate in the directoral
nominating process. And finally, such changes at least attempt to use
shareholder participation in corporate governance as a solution to
poor decisionmaking. Even if shareholder participation does not
work as planned, at least then we will know that a solution lies
elsewhere.

